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THE EMPEROR NEEDS NEW CLOTHES: 
SECURITIZING THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 
Volker Franke 
 
Abstract 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought to a head change that had 
been underway since the end of the Cold War in how we think about security: 
(1) there is no longer consensus about who or what constitutes the “enemy”; 
(2) Realism as the dominating paradigm for studying international relations 
is collapsing; (3) domestic factors are gaining importance for devising 
security policies; and (4) with increasing globalization these domestic 
factors attain impact beyond national borders. In this article, I examine the 
nature of these developments and illustrate that the concept of security is 
often misapplied for political gain and/or to justify extraordinary measures 
for countering impending or perceived threats. Comparing various 
conceptions of security, I analyze the dangers resulting from 
oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat traditional policy issues 
as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the need to more clearly 
define the distinction betw-een nonexistential and existential threats that 
justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical security complex 
theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security sectors and can be 
applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing between those 
issues that should be securitized and those that can be addressed through 
existing policy channels.  
 
 
   On that tragic morning of September 11, 2001 when terrorists attacked the 
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, 
the world had changed forever. Or at least, so we learned from politicians 
and pundits, security experts and pollsters. In his address to a joint session of 
Congress on September 20, President George W. Bush described this change: 
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war 
against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 
136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one 
Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but 
not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans 
have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of 
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night 
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fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under 
attack.1 
   While that September morning brought the most vicious attack on U.S. 
homeland in history, the world had already begun to change more than a 
decade earlier. Speaking about the implications of the end of the Cold War, 
then President George H. W. Bush celebrated “a very real prospect of a new 
world order” in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
October 1990. The United Nations, freed from the cold war stalemate, was 
finally in a position to fulfill “the historic vision of its founders” (quoted in 
Gregg 1993, p. 135) and “unite [its] strength to maintain international peace 
and security” (Preamble of the UN Charter).  
   Although the threat of global thermonuclear war has virtually vanished, the 
world has not yet become a safer place. Since George Bush’s UN speech, we 
have been witnessing growing ethnic strife and violent quests for self-
determination, incidents of genocide, mass migration and floods of refugees, 
and repeated acts of terrorism. September 11 brought to a tragic head change 
that had already been underway for more than a decade. Since the Cold War 
ended: (1) there has been no clear consensus about who or what constitutes 
the “enemy”; (2) Realism has been losing its stronghold as the dominating 
paradigm for studying international relations; (3) domestic factors are 
gaining importance for devising security policies; and (4) with increasing 
globalization these domestic factors attain impact beyond national borders. 
   In this article, I examine more closely the nature of these developments and 
illustrate that the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain 
and/or to justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or 
perceived threats. Comparing various conceptions of security, I analyze the 
dangers resulting from oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat 
traditional policy issues as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the 
need to more clearly define the distinction between nonexistential and 
existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical 
security complex theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security 
sectors and can be applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing 
between those issues that should be securitized and those that can be 
addressed through existing policy channels.  
 
The Dilemma 
 
   Traditionally, studying security has meant focusing on issues such as 
national defense, military power, and the use of force. Stephen Walt (1991), 
for instance, defined security studies as “the study of the threat, use, and 
control of military force” (p. 212). This fairly narrow definition worked well 
                                                 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, last visited 
January 8, 2002. 
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for scholars working under the shadow of the nuclear threat. Attention 
focused primarily on analyzing military hardware and nuclear deterrence and 
on doctrines about their use (see Kriesberg 2002). However, over the past 
decade the field of security studies has been forced to accommodate new 
realities. The relatively peaceful protests and mass anti-government 
demonstrations in Prague, Budapest, and East Berlin in the fall of 1989 
showed the ability of non-state actors to shape international relations. The 
early 1990s also demonstrated that security can no longer be expressed solely 
in military terms, as the world has become more interdependent 
economically, politically, socially, and culturally. At the same time, a series 
of global problems has brought the international community closer together. 
Widespread violations of human rights, threats to biodiversity, global 
warming, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and, 
recently, the looming threat of terrorism, have severely reduced the ability of 
states to solve problems on a purely national basis (Dierks 2001; Lechner & 
Boli 2000; Rosenau 1992; Scholte 2000). 
Defining Security 
   Students of international relations have traditionally focused their inquiries 
on the study of war and peace. For Realists, threats to the security of a state 
manifested themselves in the form of wars. Hobbes’ state of nature, and by 
extension, the anarchical structure of the international system, is 
characterized by inherent competition over scarce resources and, ultimately, 
by states’ inherent quest for power. By nature, human beings (and by 
extension states), Realists argue, unconstrained by government and law, 
exhibit motives and behaviors that will inevitably lead to war, thereby 
threatening the security of all. Consequently, imposing one’s will on the 
enemy (before he can subject others to his will) becomes the “natural” means 
for gaining and maintaining power and, subsequently, for ensuring safety. Of 
course, military might—along with the threat to use it—still proves in many 
instances an effective tool of conventional power politics. However, Realists 
have conceded that power can also stem from economic capabilities 
(Keohane 1984; Keohane & Nye 1977; Waltz 1979). Dependency theorists 
went even further and argued that economic inequality itself may be a root 
cause for security threats since for as long as “hunger rules peace cannot 
prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty” (see 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980, p. 6; 
see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank 1984).  
 
 
 
 
Security Sectors 
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  In his classical security complex theory, Buzan (1991) recognized five 
distinct yet overlapping security sectors, each characterized by unique types 
of interactions. The military sector revolves around relationships of forceful 
coercion; the political sector around authority, governing, and recognition; 
the economic sector around relations of trade, production, and finance; the 
societal sector around relationships of collective identity; and the 
environmental sector around issues related to the planetary biosphere (see 
also Buzan et al. 1998).  
   More specifically, military security describes the interplay of the armed 
offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each 
other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of 
states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. 
Stability of governance is seen, for instance, in the democratic ideals of free 
and equal opportunity for all citizens to participate, open and fair procedures 
for gaining power, and stable structures for the peaceful transfer of power.  
   Economic security depicts the access to resources and technology, and the 
finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and 
state power. Economic security may be threatened by a widening gap 
between rich and poor (states, individuals, classes), modified dependencies 
(from the dependency on single or limited commodity trade to service 
dependencies ranging from tourism to sex (see Enloe 1990; Steans 1998) and 
a growing new divide between the technologically connected and 
disconnected (see Rifkin 2000).  
   Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their 
traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and 
national identity and custom. The main security objective lies in establishing 
peaceful relations among diverse collective identities, i.e., in answering the 
questions how can various ethnic, religious, national, or other groups sharing 
a common identity live together peacefully (see Rawls 1993)?    
   Finally, environmental security relates to the maintenance of the local and 
planetary biosphere as the essential support system for human existence. 
Threats to the environment include global warming, pollution, depletion of 
resources, energy and food shortages, extinction of species, and uncontrolled 
population growth. More generally, Barnett (2001) explained that 
environmental degradation and insecurity are a “product of meta-processes of 
development in the industrialized North at the expense of underdevelopment 
in the industrializing South” (p. 13, see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank 
1984). Consequently, environmental insecurity stems from people’s 
vulnerability to the effects of environmental degradation, including how that 
degradation affects human welfare. 
   In the mid 1990s the United Nations attempted to broaden the idea of 
security to encompass virtually all threats to human existence. Human 
security means, “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life–whether in homes, in jobs or in 
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communities” (United Nations Development Programme 1994, p. 23). The 
1994 UN Development Report specified the following security areas (see 
also Paris 2001): 
• economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty); 
• food security (e.g., access to food); 
• health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from 
diseases); 
• environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as 
environmental pollution and resource depletion); 
• personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, 
war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even 
traffic accidents); 
• community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic 
groups, and the physical security of these groups); 
• political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and 
freedom from political oppression). 
 
   Given the plethora of security concerns circumscribed by the umbrella term 
“human security,” Paris (2001), understandably frustrated, concluded that 
while “as a political campaign, the human security coalition has…been 
successful in a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the 
landmines convention,” as a new conceptualization of security or as a 
framework for understanding the sources of conflict, human security “is so 
vague that it verges on meaninglessness—and consequently offers little 
practical guidance…to policymakers whose responsibility it is to prioritize 
among competing policy goals” (p. 16).  
   Despite frustration regarding a comprehensive conception of security, a 
growing number of observers recognize the need for rethinking what security 
means (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 1991; Kriesberg 2002; Paris 2001), while 
others still attempt to hold on to traditional conceptions of security 
(Mearsheimer 2001, 1990). Cold War security strategies—shaped by 
predictable fears of Communism and Soviet nuclear prowess and an 
American determination to control both—promoted deterrence, containment, 
military strength, and interventionism. Ironically, America’s “victory” in the 
Cold War has removed many of the cornerstones that had imposed structure 
and a sense of order in world politics (see Gaddis 1999; Mearsheimer 1990). 
Consequently, some authors have bemoaned the collapse of the Cold War 
order that had provided somewhat calculable levels of certainty and 
predictability. Three texts stand out in this context, all of which share rather 
pessimistic predictions for our future. 
 
 
Three Marker Texts 
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   In 1989 Francis Fukuyama jubilantly proclaimed the “end of history” 
(1992, 1989). He argued that the West’s victory in the Cold War had once 
and for all settled ideological differences. According to Fukuyama, the grand 
ideological debate was over and there was nothing more to be discussed. 
“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as 
such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government” (1989, p. 4). Fukuyama was convinced that the expanding 
number of democratic states would help overcome the conflictual nature of 
international anarchy (an assessment widely shared among Democratic Peace 
theorists. See Doyle 1986; Müller forthcoming).  
   Given standard Realist Cold War argumentation, one should have expected 
unqualified excitement about the predicted global spread of Western values 
and capitalistic market principles. Instead, Fukuyama concluded his article 
by lamenting that the end of history was a very sad time that left him longing 
for “the time when history existed.”  Fukuyama explained: 
 
The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a 
purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called 
forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by 
economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, 
environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated 
consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither 
art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of 
human history. (1989, p. 18) 
 
   Half a decade later, Robert Kaplan (2000, first published 1994) published 
his notes collected from travels through Eastern Europe and Africa, 
suggesting that West Africa was a window for things to come worldwide. His 
“coming anarchy” contained “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, 
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-
states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, 
security firms, and international drug cartels” (p. 7). From these 
observations, Kaplan concluded that “[w]e are entering a bifurcated world,” 
some parts “inhabited by Hegel’s and Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, well-
fed, and pampered by technology.”  The other, “larger part is inhabited by 
Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short. Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the 
Last Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not (p. 24).”  Although 
Kaplan acknowledged and vividly illustrated the severity and global reach of 
emerging security threats in the environmental, societal, and political sectors, 
he bemoaned a loss of Western control and argued that “in places where the 
Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been 
mass poverty, people find liberation in violence” (p. 45). The Hobbesian 
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nature of the international system is inescapable and aggression and self-
interest will continue to dominate relations between “us” and “them.” 
   Extending Fukuyama’s conclusion that with the end of the Cold War the 
ideological bases for conflict had lost meaning, Samuel Huntington (1993) 
argued in his famous Clash of Civilizations that “the great division among 
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation 
states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal 
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different 
civilizations” (p. 22). Huntington predicted that the clash of civilizations 
would dominate global politics after the Cold War and that conflict between 
civilizations would be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the 
modern world. Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural 
grouping of people and broadest cultural identity short of what distinguishes 
humans from other species. In the post Cold War world, he argued, people 
would define their identity in ethnic and religious terms. The ideological 
divide that had characterized the Cold War was giving way to “us” vs. 
“them” relations between people and members of different cultures, 
ultimately pitting the West against the Rest. 
 
What To Do… 
 
   The “end of history” and the “coming anarchy” signify not only the 
emergence of new security threats, but also manifest a profound assault on 
those theoretical premises that have served Realists well for explaining 
international relations for more than 2,000 years. Understandably, Realists 
attempt to develop solutions for emerging problems based on their time-
tested assumptions. Huntington, for instance, provides a number of 
recommendations for what the West should do to address civilizational 
security threats (notice, all of them presume the conflictual nature of human 
relations and promote the “us” versus “them” dichotomy that has 
traditionally informed Realist scholarship). His recommendations include: 
(1) maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; (2) exploit 
differences among other civilizations; (3) support civilization groups 
sympathetic to Western values and interests; (4) strengthen international 
institutions that reflect Western values and interests; and (5) promote 
involvement of non-Western states in those institutions. 
   The clash of civilizations presents Huntington’s attempt to safe Western 
identity for which Realism has traditionally provided the normative 
framework. Now that the Cold War is over and the enemy has vanished, 
Huntington wonders who the next enemy might be. After all, since human 
relations are, by their very nature, conflictual, we need a new enemy to 
continue our competition over scarce resources. Therefore, constructing 
“threats” becomes part of constructing the “other.”  Effective “othering” 
oftentimes involves the use of stereotypes, which are often thrust upon those 
(the “other” or the enemy) whom we wish to silence, dehumanize, or 
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securitize (see Allport 1971; Abrams & Hogg 1999; Prins 1998; Tajfel 
1978). While a more detailed examination of the dynamic between 
securitization, stereotyping and enemy imaging is beyond the scope of this 
article, future research should explore conflict strategies based on 
securitization of the “other” and examine the extent to which politicized 
(instead of securitized) response mechanisms could deescalate conflict. 
 
What Else To Do… 
 
   As this brief excursion demonstrates, the most prominent policy 
recommendations derived over the past decade have left intact the very 
assumptions that informed the prevalent theoretical explanations and policy 
options of the Cold War. Yet, global security in the aftermath of 
thermonuclear threat is about more than just advanced weapons technology 
and military competition. But we can no longer simply add new security 
sectors and still make our explanations stick. Rather, it is essential to 
profoundly revise the premises and the scope, and to overcome the 
stereotypes that have informed our thinking about security. Security threats 
are not universal nor do they apply objectively to actors worldwide.  
  Security today encompasses a wide array of sectors and actors. Buzan and 
colleagues (1998) argued that security is about survival, meaning the level at 
which an issue poses “an existential threat to a designated referent object 
(traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, 
territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use 
of extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). Traditionally, the referent 
object of security has been the state, threatened primarily militarily by some 
peer competitor (see Schwarz & Layne 2002; Mearsheimer 2001; Keohane & 
Nye 1977). Politically, existential threats may be viewed as challenges to 
constituting principles, especially sovereignty and perhaps even state 
ideology. The state may also be a referent object in the other sectors, but is 
much less likely to be threatened in its very existence. Economically, for 
instance, firms are the most common referent objects—threatened by 
bankruptcy. Crises to a national economy absent a war are only rare 
occasions. In fact, the largest bankruptcies in American history (Enron, 
Worldcom) have not threatened the survival of the American economy.  
   The primary referent object in the societal sector are collectivities formed 
around a shared identity independent of the state. The recent events in the 
Kosovo region of Yugoslavia illustrate this. Under the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution, Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia. From 
the late 1980s Kosovo faced growing Serb nationalist sentiments. Slobodan 
Milosevic, who had gained power in Serbia in 1987, revoked Kosovar 
autonomy in 1990, dissolved the Kosovo Provincial Assembly and 
Government, removed Kosovo Albanians from important state posts, and 
declared a state of emergency. Growing Albanian resistance to rule from 
Belgrade led to attacks against Serbian security forces by the Kosovo 
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Liberation Army (KLA) in the mid-1990s. Belgrade responded with military 
repression of the Kosovar population as a whole. By mid September 1998 an 
estimated 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes and 
some 50,000 were still in the open as the winter approached. It was clear 
many might die. Despite the extent of the human tragedy, the international 
community waited until the spring of 1999 before it recognized the potential 
security implications for the European Community (legitimized as a 
traditional state actor referent object) and responded with air strikes which 
eventually lead to the capitulation of the Milosovic regime.2   
   These examples illustrate that security takes “politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of 
politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23). Any issue, so the 
upshot of this argument, can be securitized, i.e., presented as an existential 
threat that requires immediate attention, oftentimes in form of emergency 
measures. According to classical complex security theory (see Buzan et al. 
1998; Buzan 1991), any public issue can be located along a spectrum (see 
Figure 1) ranging from non-politicized (i.e., the state does not deal with the 
issue and is not made part of the public discourse on the issue) through 
politicized (i.e., the issue is part of public policy and thus requires 
government decision and resource allocations or, in some cases, some form 
of communal governance) to securitized (i.e., the issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside normal political procedure). 
 
FIGURE 1: Spectrum of Securitization 
|------------------------------|------------------------------| 
   non-politicized         politicized           securitized 
 
   For example, religion is politicized in some states (e.g., Iran, Saudi-Arabia) 
but not in others (e.g., Germany, France); some states securitize culture (Iran, 
the former Soviet Union) while others don’t (the United Kingdom or the 
Netherlands). Similarly, the writers of our three marker texts have clearly 
securitized culture or civilization. Using speech act theory (see Austin 1975; 
Bourdieu 1991), Buzan et al. (1998) argued that a discourse that presents 
something as an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself 
create securitization, but is only a securitizing move. The issue is securitized 
if and when the audience accepts it as such. Buzan et al. identified two 
dangers: (1) opportunities for power holders to exploit threats for domestic 
purposes (e.g., Reagan’s invasion of Grenada following the 1983 suicide 
                                                 
2 A detailed account of the events can be found at 
http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/intro.htm. 
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truck bomb that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut bombing or, concomitant 
the Lewinski scandal, Clinton’s bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in 
response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998); and (2) attempts to securitize not because an immediate existential 
threat exists, but merely to gain “tactical attention,” e.g., for environmental 
problems. The danger lies in the fact that issues may be securitized whenever 
there is a failure to address them (at least with the desired outcome) through 
normal politics. 
 
The Danger of Oversecuritization 
 
   Securitizing everything from nuclear missiles to miniskirts and pop music 
(as is the case in the former Soviet Union, Iran, or the Taliban’s Afghanistan) 
suffocates civil society, jeopardizes democracy, and creates coercive states 
whose only legitimacy stems from countering ever increasing security threats 
(see Buzan et al. 1998). Therefore, avoiding excessive securitization 
becomes as important as widening our understanding of what security means. 
The tendency to oversecuritize issues of public policy is quite common as a 
few examples from the American context illustrate. These examples show the 
intricate overlap between security sectors and suggest that the perceived need 
to securitize an issue in one sector may produce a threat in another sector. 
   SEMATECH. Capitalism strives on the fact that the main actors—firms and 
workers/ employees—feel insecure. After all, insecurity in terms of market 
shares and employment produces market efficiencies. But what happens 
when the forces present in a global free market produce outcomes that 
threaten the security of the state?  By the mid-1980s, the U.S. electronics 
industry had lost its global market dominance partially due to government 
supported research and development activities by overseas competitors. 
Concerned about the growing dependence on foreign supplied 
semiconductors and components for advanced weaponry, the Reagan 
Administration supported industrial policy efforts to reinvigorate the U.S. 
semiconductor industry, recapture the market, and assure that the American 
military could rely on domestic chip manufacturers. The government 
promoted the establishment of a non-profit consortium of U.S. 
semiconductor manufacturers, known as SEMATECH (SEMiconductor 
MAnufacturing TECHnology), which, in conjunction with government 
agencies and universities were to sponsor and conduct research aimed at 
assuring U.S. leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology (see 
O’Keefe & Franke 2002). While the most prominent manufacturers joined 
the consortium, some 200 smaller chip-makers stayed out, steered off by the 
financial requirements or because they feared the larger companies would 
dominate the research agenda. In addition, some critics argued, by helping 
one set of companies, SEMATECH effectively shut out those manufacturers 
whose products and research ideas it opted not to support. 
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   TRP. Convinced that SEMATECH had been a success, the Clinton 
administration modeled its 1993 Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) 
initiative for developing dual-use defense technology largely after that 
experience (see O’Keefe & Franke 2002). The perceived earlier success of 
merging private and public resources into the SEMATECH consortium to 
produce internationally competitive semiconductors encouraged the Clinton 
administration in its efforts to pursue the development of dual-use 
technology through partnering arrangements between the public and private 
sectors. Quickly TRP renewed the controversy over the economic priorities 
of government policies, raising questions of whether the government should 
directly interfere in domestic market competition by sponsoring specific 
R&D efforts to help promote the competitiveness of the U.S. defense 
industry in the global marketplace. While one can easily point to increased 
levels of military security by reducing dependencies on imported 
technologies, government interference in the market presents a direct threat 
to firms or entire industrial sectors that do not benefit from government 
contracting. 
   The International Space Station. As the Clinton administration took power 
in 1993, national security officials became aware that Russia was about to 
transfer rocket technology to India. It appeared that the U.S. might well have 
to impose severe trade sanctions to head off or punish Russia for missile 
proliferation. However, instead, the Clinton administration decided to bring 
Russia aboard international efforts to build a space station, thereby linking 
business relations with the requirement that Russia would abide by the 
Missile Technology Control Regime.3  With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and economic downturn accompanied by continuous deficit spending, space 
policy was declining both in national prominence and in its importance for 
national security (as a symbol of global technological dominance). What 
would justify multi-billion dollar expenditures absent superpower rivalry?  
Would exploration for science’s sake be enough?  The decision for space 
cooperation securitized the space station by linking it directly with U.S. 
foreign policy objectives and, at the same time aided NASA in gaining 
funding to keep the program alive (see Lambright 2001). 
   The State of the Union. Most recently the Bush administration has 
attempted to link domestic policy objectives with efforts to curb terrorism. 
Unquestionably the Bush administration is preoccupied with waging war on 
terrorism, thereby running the risk of oversecuritizing policy issues that 
present neither an existential threat nor require extraordinary measures. In his 
State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush focused 
                                                 
3 This meant specifically that Russia could provide India with rocket engines (the 
product), but not with the know-how of how to make them (the process). See 
Lambright 2001. 
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primarily on his administration’s efforts to “win the war on terror.”4  
Conveniently, since public support for his foreign policy performance is at an 
unprecedented high, the president linked his domestic policy agenda directly 
to his war efforts, stating that “…we will win this war, we will protect our 
homeland, and we will revive our economy.”  From his discussion of military 
and homeland security, Bush moved directly to promoting his economic 
security plan, which he “summed up in one word: jobs. Good jobs begin with 
good schools, and here we’ve made a fine start…”   
   Bush continued his address with a call for a new culture of responsibility, 
culminating in the unveiling of the USA Freedom Corps, designed to focus 
on “three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home, rebuilding our 
communities, and extending American compassion throughout the world.”  
As discussed above, societal security concerns the ability of societies to 
reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and 
religious and national identity and custom. The main security objective lies 
in establishing peaceful relations among diverse collective identities. Instead 
of promoting cultural diversity, securitizing values threatens the legitimacy 
of non-Western normative and cultural societal frames, directly translating 
the “us” versus “them” mentality that inspired our three marker texts into 
political praxis. President Bush suggested that “America will lead by 
defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging 
for all people everywhere.”  He continued, and this demonstrates the reach of 
oversecuritization, “we have no intention of imposing our culture, but 
America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human 
dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, 
private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.”  Again, 
by securitizing everything security looses its substantive meaning. 
   The War on Drugs. During the 2002 Super Bowl, the president’s Office of 
National Drug Control Policy aired a commercial linking illegal narcotics 
trade to terrorism. While previous anti-drug messages focused on how users 
harm themselves, the Super Bowl commercial claimed that money to 
purchase drugs is likely to end up in the hands of terrorists and narco-
criminals. Focus groups conducted before the add aired revealed a “strong 
decline in intension to use” among teenagers and showed considerable 
support among parents who found the commercials a “‘powerful way to 
initiate conversations’ with their children” (Ahrens 2002, p. A3). 
   Farm Subsidies. Speaking to a convention of ranchers in February 2002, 
President Bush declared crop and cattle production to be a national security 
issue, providing a fresh rationale for continuing farm subsidies. “This nation 
has got to eat,” Bush told the crowd. “It’s in our national security interests 
that we be able to feed ourselves. Thank goodness, we don’t have to rely on 
somebody else’s meat to make sure our people are healthy and well-fed” 
                                                 
4 For the text of the State of the Union Address see Washington Post, January 30, 
2002, p. A-16. 
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(Allen 2002, p. A4). Bush’s attempt to securitize cattle farming lead even 
staunch conservative commentators like George F. Will (2002) to remark that 
“President Bush tiptoed to the edge of parody” (p. A33). 
   The Budget. The Bush Administration’s tendency to oversecuritize 
government policy objectives can be seen in its FY 2003 budget that shows 
significant increases in proposed expenditures for homeland security efforts. 
While this is to be expected in the aftermath of September 11, some budget 
experts caution that “spending could get out of hand as agency heads rush to 
seek more money by cloaking their mission in the mantle of homeland 
security” (Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7). As Robert Bixby of the budget 
watchdog group Concord Coalition explained, “It will be very tempting for 
agencies to redefine their missions under homeland security and for almost 
any member of Congress to explain an add-on or earmark as a matter of 
homeland security” (quoted in Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7). 
 
What This Means… 
 
   The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict, the nuclear muscle-flexing by 
India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Argentina’s economic collapse and 
continuing European integration, global warming and ozone depletion, drug 
trafficking and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, 
and, most recently, America’s war on terrorism illustrate that threats to 
security in the 21st century will take on various forms and will require 
interdependent responses that both link security sectors and bring together 
the range of actors shaping international politics. In these pages, I have 
argued that in a world that admittedly is becoming more dangerous in many 
areas, the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain and/or to 
justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or perceived threats. 
The examples above illustrate the dangers of oversecuritization and 
demonstrate the need to more clearly define the distinction between 
nonexistential and existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. In 
the following section I attempt to develop a framework for determining the 
existentiality of threats and for deciding on appropriate responses (either 
through existing policy response mechanisms or extraordinary measures). 
 
A New Framework for Determining Threats 
 
   Measuring the respective impact of various issues threatening 
sustainability, Dovers (1995) developed a framework for assessing the 
magnitude of security threats that can be adapted to examining the severity or 
existentiality of possible challenges across security sectors and to 
determining the most appropriate types of responses. According to Dovers’ 
model, three parameters—time, space, and impact—help determine the 
magnitude of security threats. More specifically, Dovers identified six 
problem-framing attributes that are useful for developing criteria for 
 14
distinguishing between issues that should be securitized and those that could 
be handled through existing political response mechanisms. The more highly 
problems rate across parameters, the more severely they are thought to 
impact upon security: 
1. Spatial scale of cause and effect, describing the “spread” of the issue 
across political boundaries, assuming that the more diffuse causes 
and/or effects are, the more difficult it will be to rely on clearly 
defined political response mechanisms. For instance, climate change 
is a much more diffuse policy issue (and potential security threat) 
than solid waste management or weapons proliferation. 
2. Magnitude of possible impacts, referring to “the degree of ‘damage’ 
in a worst-case scenario relative to the whole of the entity impacted 
upon” (Dovers 1995, p. 96). For instance, smaller changes in 
economic productivity (due to seasonal variations) are less serious 
than larger changes (due to recession or a stock market crash). 
3. Temporal scale of possible impacts, distinguishing on the one hand 
between immediate, near-term impacts and very far-off impacts and, 
on the other hand, between discrete, short-term effects and long-
term, lasting impacts (of, for instance, storage of nuclear waste or 
preemptively striking Iraq). 
4. Reversibility and the assumption that irreversible or very costly 
impacts (e.g., the loss of a particular species or the effects of nuclear 
war) are more severe than more easily reversible and less costly 
impacts (e.g., development of alternative energy sources or 
adjustment of consumer behavior). 
5. Mensurability, describing the degree to which we actually 
comprehend and can measure relevant impacts and processes 
pertinent to the problem. Dovers distinguishes between “well-
known” cause-effect associations; “risk” where we can at least assign 
trustworthy probabilities to possible outcomes; “uncertainty” where 
only the general nature and direction of outcomes are understood; 
and “ignorance” where outcomes are “unknown, unguessable, or can 
only be speculated upon” (p. 97). 
6. Degree of complexity and connectivity, establishing a continuum 
ranging from discrete issues to highly complex issues featuring 
multiple feedbacks and possible threshold effects. Issues scoring 
highly on this attribute include, for instance, climate change, 
population-environment linkages, or globalization and the 
democratization-development dynamic. 
   In addition to these problem-framing attributes, Dovers provides a further 
filter for identifying the magnitude of problems and prioritizing policy 
responses. He distinguishes problems at three levels: 
1. Micro-problems are “spatially and temporally discrete; not overly 
complex or fraught with uncertainty; not requiring large resource 
commitment or the development of new mechanisms or policy 
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processes for redress; and, if particularly topical, then only on a local 
or sectoral scale or are so despite lack of substantive evidence” (p. 
100). Problems on the micro-level can typically be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis within existing institutional arrangements and 
policy processes (e.g., settling of labor disputes, trade negotiations, 
crime prevention). 
2. Meso-problems are significant and may be prominent on the public 
agenda, but “do not pose systemic threats to the present pattern of 
production and consumption, or overwhelming challenges to existing 
policy processes” (p. 100). Major issues fully addressable within one 
country may fall into this category (e.g., national air pollution 
emission standards, social security provisions). 
3. Macro-problems present threats that are “multifaceted, complex, 
fraught with uncertainties and ignorances, spatially and temporally 
diffuse, highly connected to other issues (or security sectors, VF) and 
threaten major possible disruption of human or natural systems” (p. 
100). Again, climate change, resource scarcity, the spread of 
infectious diseases, the widening gap between rich and poor, 
developed and underdeveloped, technologically connected and the 
disconnected, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
wars of all kinds (in an increasingly interdependent world) present 
macro-problems of varying magnitude.  
   Applying both problem-framing attributes and problem levels to the 
examples discussed above illustrate the threat distortion caused by 
oversecuritization. Both SEMATECH and TRP adressed national-scale 
meso-level issues by employing problem-resolution mechanisms based on 
existing or easily adaptable industrial policy strategies. Overall, global 
market competition and the significant defense drawdown of the early 1990s 
presented moderate, near- to medium-term, and fairly easily reversible 
threats to the economic (and by extension military) security of the United 
States, and risks were fairly well-known in each case. Although the issues of 
dual-use technology and, more generally, industrial policy are fairly complex 
and can span across security sectors, these examples show that remedies 
were found through existing policy channels. 
   The Missile Technology Control Regime and the International Space 
Station provided bilateral/international policy responses to threats whose 
potential impact can be judged as moderate to severe and medium (in terms 
of timing) and medium to long-term (in terms of longevity), difficult and 
certainly expensive to reverse, with somewhat uncertain risks and a high 
degree of complexity and connectivity. Still, the U.S. and Russia were able to 
address the security threat (weapons technology proliferation) through 
establishing a new regime for dealing with this issue. Therefore, the ISS can 
be viewed as an instance of a fairly typical international policy resolution 
mechanism, but not as an extraordinary measure. 
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   The war on drugs and farm subsidies differ in their spatial impact (regional 
versus national), but both policies respond to minor threats with short-term 
and fairly obvious impacts. Interestingly, attempts to reduce the influx of 
illegal drugs into the United States, Plan Colombia, the U.S. backed and 
partially funded Colombian government initiative is pushing indigenous 
peoples toward the brink. U.S. military aid has intensified militarization and 
provoked a surge in rural violence. At the same time, U.S. backed crop 
fumigation is destroying small-scale agriculture and highly biodiverse 
rainforest ecosystems (see Lloyd & Soltani 2001; Wilson 2001). Thus, policy 
measures designed to boost U.S. security pose immediate and severe threats 
to the economic, political and environmental security of the population in 
that region.  
   By contrast to the examples discussed above, climate change, 
sustainability, nuclear war, and terrorism present threats that are international 
to global in scale, with long-term, potentially catastrophic and irreversible 
impacts on both natural and human systems and high levels of mensurability 
and complexity. As the war on terrorism and the recent conference on 
sustainability in South Africa illustrate, no policy channels are currently in 
place to effectively counter these threats and, given the severity of these 
threats, extraordinary measures may be called for. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
   The purpose of this article was to sketch a preliminary model for 
distinguishing between existential and nonexistential threats and, 
consequently, to provide suggestions for how to decide which threats can to 
be addressed using existing policy mechanisms and which may require 
extraordinary measures. While a more specific quantification of threat 
potentials is beyond the scope of this article, future research should develop 
more concrete measures for operationalizing threats. For instance, building 
further on Dovers (1995) sustainability framework, such research could 
weigh the various impacts and apply the emerging measures to very specific 
security threats. Such research could be of great benefit for scholars 
interested in tracking and predicting potential security threats and policy 
makers charged with appropriating finite resources to deterring, preventing 
or, when necessary, countering threats. 
   During the Cold War international relations were overshadowed by the 
threat of thermonuclear war. As existential as this threat was, it forced states 
to cooperate not only with regard to strategic arms limitations but also in 
political and economic sectors. The end of the Cold War has not ridded the 
world of existential threats. In fact, the threat of a nuclear holocaust merely 
masked other existential threats during the Cold War (every other threat 
received a lower ranking on the security continuum, see Figure 1). With the 
end of the Cold War we can now shift our focus to those neglected threats, 
reassess their importance, and decide whether to respond through existing or 
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develop new policy mechanisms or whether a threat requires extraordinary 
response measures. It should be in states’ interest to cooperate on tackling 
those security problems that present existential threats to all of them. A non-
exclusive list includes: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stability 
of governance, the ever-widening gap between rich and poor (states, 
individuals, classes), the emerging divide between the technologically 
connected and the disconnected (see Rifkin 2000), global warming, 
pollution, depletion of resources, increasing energy demands, improving 
education and health, and population control and food security. 
   Security can no longer be defined in state-only terms. International 
relations are shaped by non-state actors and security concerns span across 
sectors and link various security communities. International actors (states, 
groups, firms, organizations, individuals) of various types may share the 
same existential concerns and may find that cooperating alongside others 
who share those concerns may benefit all of them. During the Cold War, 
everybody shared the fear of thermonuclear war. Today, in a world 
characterized by globalization and interdependence, actors may share 
common interests in preserving the biosphere, safeguarding the free market, 
preventing the further spread of infectious diseases, and, most visibly since 
September 11, combating terrorism.  
   The more it will be possible to promote communication and build 
cooperation among actors (state and non-state) and across sectors, the more 
regularized patterns of behavior and relationships will become and, 
consequently, the more actors may focus on shared interests. As a result, the 
more trust may be established and the closer we may come to attaining peace 
as a goal in international relations. 
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EXPLORING the RELEVANCE and CONTRIBUTION 
OF MEDIATION TO PEACE-BUILDING 
 
Jacob Bercovitch and Ayse Kadayifci 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper considers the nature and characteristics of peace-building as an 
approach to conflict. It suggests that mediation should be seen as a 
particularly important aspect of peace-building  efforts, and one that may be 
used at different phases of a conflict. The paper develops a framework for 
analyzing the circumstances under which mediation may contribute to peace-
building. The framework lays emphasis on contextual and perceptual 
dimensions. The paper argues that mediation, properly utilized, can achieve 
not just a settlement  of a conflict, but facilitate, in the longer run, a full 
transformation of relations. Any successful program of peace-building 
requires some form of mediation. 
 
Introduction 
 
   As the Cold War system collapsed in 1991, we witnessed an increase in 
ethnic and religious intrastate conflicts (e.g. Indonesia, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, 
etc.), as well as the persistence of long-standing inter-state conflicts (e.g. 
India-Pakistan). Scholars in the fields of international relations and conflict 
resolution are faced with new and challenging questions relating to the nature 
of conflicts, particularly their prevention and termination. Within this 
context, new concepts such as ‘peace-building’, ‘conflict prevention’, 
‘conflict transformation’, ‘second track diplomacy’, and ‘citizen diplomacy’ 
have been introduced to address these challenges and to complement more 
traditional conflict management mechanisms such as deterrence and 
coercion.  
   One of the emerging concepts in international peace and conflict resolution 
studies is “peace-building.” This term attracted attention after the UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a document titled “An 
Agenda for Peace” in 1992. In this document, Boutros-Ghali suggested that 
the responsibilities and actions of the UN and the international community 
should focus on four major areas of activity, including preventive diplomacy, 
peace-making, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building. In “An 
Agenda for Peace”, Boutros-Ghali suggested that “preventive diplomacy” 
aims at preventing the escalation of conflict into violent confrontation, or 
preventing its spread should it arise; “peace-making” aims at bringing about 
a cessation of hostilities and the creation of a framework that will allow the 
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disputants to pursue nonviolent solutions; ‘peace-keeping’ aims to separate 
disputing parties and maintain a state of non-violence between them; and 
‘peace-building’ purports to establish the conditions for a sustainable 
settlement. In this paper we would like to focus on peace building 
mechanisms and, in particular, the relevance of mediation in this process.  
 
Definitions of Peace-Building 
 
   Peace-building has become one of the central themes in conflict studies, so 
defining it is an important first step. Based on an analysis of UN experience 
in conflicts in Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia, Doyle and Sambanis see 
peace-building as the fourth phase in the United Nations strategy for conflict 
resolution (Doyle & Sambanis 1999), following conflict prevention, peace-
making and peace-keeping. According to Doyle and Sambanis, peace-
building involves identifying and supporting those structures that can 
strengthen and solidify peace in the aftermath of peace-making and peace-
keeping (Doyle & Sambanis 1999). The distinction between peace-building, 
peace-keeping, and peace-making was first made by Johan Galtung (1975), 
who emphasized conflict prevention and resolution at grass root and global 
levels. He is critical of so-called “elitist” peace-building efforts that take 
place at the official level and suggests instead that peace-building efforts are 
necessary at the grass roots level if the community at large is going to accept 
them. Bierbrauwer and van Tongeren, on the other hand, perceive peace-
building as part of conflict prevention framework that takes place mostly at 
the official state level (Bierbrauwer & van Tongeren 2002). 
   Thus, peace-building may take place at the group, community, or state 
level. More than the signing of an agreement between officials of rival 
parties, it offers an approach that includes economic reconstruction that may 
lead to institutional transformation of society (e.g., reforming the police, the 
army, and the legal system, and re-building civil society). Peace-building 
becomes especially important in intractable conflicts, where a history of 
hostility and frequent eruption of violence disrupts the normal functioning of 
societies. Within this context peace-building can transform the war-like 
behaviors of communities. According to John Paul Lederach, peace-building 
is more then a post-conflict reconstruction; it encompasses, generates, and 
sustains a full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform 
a conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships (Lederach 1997). 
In that sense, peace building involves a range of activities and structures 
before, during, and after formal peace agreements between parties are signed. 
   Here we use the term ‘peace-building” to refer to a whole host of activities 
and modalities of intervention designed to bring about a state of peaceful 
relations by conflicting parties. Peace-building is a dynamic process of 
resolving conflict and rebuilding societies, and it refers to mechanisms and 
structures that can prevent, terminate, transform, or resolve a conflict. It also 
refers to mechanisms and structures that can strengthen the capacity of a 
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society to manage change without violence. This may involve addressing the 
root causes of the conflict through long-term economic and social provisions 
as well as policies of reconciliation.  
   One crucial aspect of peace-building efforts is the recognition of the role 
played by various informal and local conflict resolution mechanisms and 
structures, (e.g., indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and second track 
diplomacy) and unofficial actors (e.g., local, regional and international 
grassroots organizations, and nongovernmental organization) in peace-
building. This perception is an acknowledgement that for peace to last, it has 
to be sustained in various local social and cultural contexts, and that efforts at 
the official level (formal mediation, for example) must be supported by 
informal efforts such as second track diplomacy, along with local peace 
making efforts by various NGO’s and other groups. 
 
Characteristics of Peace-Building 
 
   The following are the main characteristics of peace-building efforts: 
1. Peace-building is a non-coercive process in which the willingness and 
commitment of participating parties is key to its success (Galtung, 1975). 
2. Peace-building is broader than other conflict management approaches as it 
involves long-term political, economic, and social provisions to address the 
root causes of a conflict (Galtung, 1975). 
3. Peace-building is an interdependent effort that involves not only the 
official diplomats but also civilians, NGOs, and grassroots organizations. 
One of the guiding principles of peace-building, especially in intra-state 
conflicts, is to mobilize existing indigenous capacities for peace. For that 
reason, coordination of peace-building activities at different levels of society 
is of utmost importance (Heinrich 1997; Biewbrauwe & von Tongeren 2002). 
4. Peace-building focuses on prevention. Ultimately, the purpose of peace-
building activities is “to insure against and to prevent a relapse into a violent 
conflict” (Doyle & Sambanis 1999, p.5). 
 
Outcomes and Methods 
 
   A successful peace-building effort must lead to certain outcomes. Utilizing 
the list developed by Search for Common Ground (2002), we suggest that a 
successful peace-building program may be exemplified by any one of the 
following desirable outcomes:  
1) Conflict resolution that involves community-based initiatives and 
second track diplomacy. 
2) Civilian participation in the policy process. 
3) Physical security that includes demobilization, disarmament, 
demining, protection of the civilian population, and police and 
security force reform. 
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4) Environmental security that includes options such as minimal threat 
to resource depletion or human migration. 
5) Economic reconstruction that includes infrastructure development, 
market reform, economic and financial institutions, small business 
and micro-enterprises, and credit assistance. 
6) Personal security that includes human rights and the reduction of all 
forms of racial and communal violence.  
7) Institutional/civil capacity building that includes government 
capacity building, NGO capacity building, implementation of peace 
accords, and dealing with probity/corruption. 
8) Government and democratic development that includes electoral 
assistance, civic education and training, judicial reform and training, 
and media development and training. 
9)  Meeting basic needs such as food, shelter, health, and relief of 
suffering. 
10)  Social reconstruction that includes reintegration of 
refugees/combatants, social services such as health and education, 
peace education, and access to information. 
   Having identified the desirable outcomes of peace-building, we need to ask 
how best to devise strategies to reach these desired outcomes. A large 
number of activities may lead to these outcomes. For example, Search for 
Common Ground identified 24 operational methods for peace-building. 
These methods include mediation and facilitation, dialogue workshops, 
conflict resolution institution building and training, policy forums, joint 
action projects, cross-ethnic cooperation within professions, back-channel 
negotiations, domestic shuttle diplomacy, community organizing, court-
based mediation, education in schools, storytelling forums, inter-ethnic 
kindergartens, reduction of stereotypes, radio programs, TV programs, 
children’s TV programs, video-based dialogue, journalist training, cross-
ethnic team reporting, publications, arts and culture, sports, and awards.  
   In this paper, we argue that mediation is one of the most effective peace-
building strategies to produce the desired outcomes mentioned above. 
Mediation is flexible and adaptive, and these very features make it an 
effective strategy of peace-building in all phases of conflict. Mediation can 
be used to prevent escalation of conflict into violence (preventive 
diplomacy); it can be used to terminate violence (conflict management); or it 
can be utilized during the post-conflict phase (post-conflict reconstruction). 
In short, mediation can advance the cause of peace-building in a way that 
other strategies can not. To understand the relevance of mediation in peace-
building, we have to understand its nature and the factors that influence its 
success. 
 
Peace-Building and Mediation 
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   The relationship between mediation and a successful transition from war-
like behavior to more cooperative interactions is frequently mentioned, rarely 
defined, and widely misunderstood (Bercovitch, 1989). Intervention in 
conflict situations can be preemptive or reactive.  As a multi-dimensional 
process, peace-building involves various conflict management attempts at 
different levels of society. These management attempts usually relate to some 
aspect of mediation or other forms of non-coercive intervention by a third 
party. 
    Mediation is one of the most extensively utilized conflict resolution tools. 
Although the underlying assumptions and values that inform the process may 
differ significantly from place to place, various communities with different 
cultural traditions have resorted to mediation in their efforts of building 
peace between them (Bercovitch, 1992). This cross-cultural application of 
mediation makes it an acceptable and familiar peace-building tool and adds 
to its strength as an effective mechanism to lay the foundations for peaceful 
relations (Bercovitch & Houston, 1993). 
   Despite being one of the most frequently employed conflict management 
mechanisms, different scholars have defined mediation differently, focusing 
on its various dimensions. Chris Mitchell defines mediation as any 
“intermediary activity… undertaken by a third party with the primary 
intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake 
between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior” (Mitchell 
1981, p. 287). Chris Moore defines it as “an extension and elaboration of the 
negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, 
and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to 
assist contending parties in voluntary reaching their own mutually acceptable 
settlement” (Moore 1986, p.6). 
   Mediation is a complex and dynamic interaction between mediators who 
have resources and an interest in the conflict or its outcome, and an interest 
in the protagonists or their representatives. Mediation may take place 
between states, within states, or between groups of states, organizations, or 
individuals. Mediators enter conflict to help those involved achieve a better 
outcome than they would be able to achieve by themselves. What mediators 
do, can do, or are permitted to do in their efforts to resolve a conflict may 
depend largely on who they are and what resources and competencies they 
can bring to bear. Furthermore, mediation efforts in the context of peace-
building are highly dependent on who the parties are, the nature of their 
interaction, the context of the conflict, and what is at stake. 
   Much of the work on mediation identifies it merely as a reactive process in 
which mediators can help in the post violent phase with a cease-fire, a peace 
settlement, or the implementation of some dissociative arrangements. 
However, mediation can be utilized at other stages of the conflict. It can be 
initiated: before the actual fighting takes place (preventive diplomacy); at the 
early stages of the conflict when the casualties are still low; later in the 
conflict when the casualties are high, to terminate violence; or even after the 
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signing of an agreement to facilitate transition from war-like behavior to 
establishing peaceful relations and reconstruction of the social fabric of 
communities (post-conflict reconstruction). 
   Within the context of peace-building efforts, successful mediation requires 
not only a cessation of fighting, but also comprehensive peace-building 
efforts that aim at reviving a country’s economy, establishing participatory 
systems of government and accountability of the administration, improving 
judicial and police systems, disarmament, and demobilization of former 
combatants and their sustainable social, psychological and economic 
rehabilitation, among others (Heinrich 1997). To understand how mediation 
can reach the desired outcomes of peace-building identified in this paper, we 
must understand the factors that influence the mediation process.  
   All conflicts respond differently to different conflict resolution 
mechanisms. A conflict resolution approach that is sensitive to the particular 
requirements of a conflict and aims at determining the right context, the 
proper strategy to be adopted, and the right timing would help us understand 
when mediation may be successful. We therefore propose to analyze the role 
mediation plays in peace-building from the perspective of a contingency 
approach. 
   Mediation is clearly affected by the context and characteristics of each 
conflict situation. The specific rules and strategies of each context, the 
beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and symbols that make up an international 
conflict affect the mode of behavior adopted by a mediator, and to a large 
extend explain the success or failure of mediation. There is a contingent, 
reciprocal relation between the nature of conflict, the performance of 
mediators, and conflict outcomes. Each influences, and is in turn, influenced 
by, the other. Contingency approaches take into consideration these aspects 
of the conflict resolution process and attempt to identify factors that 
influence the success of mediation under particular conditions. This approach 
treats the outcomes of mediation efforts (be they successful or not) as 
dependent, or contingent, upon the context of a conflict and the manner of 
behavior, the process, within its environment. 
   Within the framework of the contingency approach, factors that influence 
the outcome of mediation can be divided into two main categories. The first 
focuses on subjective aspects of the mediation process such as motivation 
and behavior of the parties and the mediator, as well as the resources that 
third parties can bring to the process. The second category focuses on 
structural factors, such as the nature of the dispute, power parity, internal 
cohesiveness of affected communities, international and regional 
environments, and coordination between different initiatives. Let us examine 
these factors. 
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Factors Influencing the Success of Mediation in Peace-Building Efforts 
 
A. Subjective Factors 
A-1. Willingness, Commitment, and Motivation of the Parties and the 
Mediator: For mediation to be successful in reaching the desired outcomes of 
peace-building, parties to a conflict must be willing, committed, and 
motivated to accept and engage in mediation. When disputants are not 
receptive to mediation or believe that they can get what they want through 
unilateral action, the likelihood of a successful outcome is very low. 
Effective mediation requires consent, high motivation, and active 
participation. When peace-building is seen as a continuing process to 
transform the societies of conflicting parties towards peaceful relationships, 
willingness and motivation become crucial for the sustainability of the 
process.  Motivation in mediation can be further divided into two categories: 
disputant motivation and mediator motivation. 
 
A.1.(i) Disputant Motivation in Peace Building 
   From the perspective of a mediator, a number of features can indicate the 
parties’ genuine interest in the process. If both parties request mediation, the 
chance that mediation will be successful is higher then when only one party 
requests mediation (Bercovitch 1984: Hiltrop 1989). Third parties also have 
important roles to play.  
   Adversaries in conflict have a number of motives for desiring mediation: 
(a) mediation may actually help them reduce the risks of an escalating 
conflict and get them closer to a settlement; (b) each party may embrace 
mediation in the expectation that the mediator will actually nudge or 
influence the other party; (c) both parties may see mediation as a public 
expression of their commitment to an international norm of peaceful conflict 
management; (d) they may want an outsider to take much of the blame 
should their efforts fail; or (e) they may desire mediation because a mediator 
can be used to monitor, verify, and guarantee any eventual agreement. One 
way or another, parties in conflict have pretty compelling reasons for 
accepting, initiating, or desiring mediation. 
 
A 1 (ii). Mediator Motivation in Peace Building 
   Traditional approaches to mediation assume that parties to a conflict and 
the mediator share one compelling reason for initiating mediation: a desire to 
reduce, abate, or resolve a conflict. This shared humanitarian interest may be 
genuine in only a few instances of mediation, but normally even this interest 
intertwines with other, less altruistic, motivations. Different mediators have 
different interests in a mediation outcome. When the mediator is an 
unofficial individual (e.g., President Carter in North Korea in 1994), the 
motives for initiating mediation may include a desire to: (a) be instrumental 
in changing the course of a long-standing or escalating conflict; (b) gain 
access to major political leaders and open channels of communication; (c) 
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put into practice a set of ideas on conflict management; and (d) spread one’s 
own ideas and thus enhance personal stature and professional status. The 
presence of one or more of these motives (which may be conscious or 
unconscious) in an opportune situation provides a very strong rationale for an 
individual to initiate unofficial mediation. 
   Where a mediator is an official representative of a government or an 
organization, as is often the case, another set of motives may prevail. Such 
persons may wish to initiate mediation because: (a) they have a clear 
mandate to intervene in disputes (e.g., the charters of the Arab League, the 
Organization of African Unity [now the Africa Union], and the Organization 
of American States each contain an explicit clause mandating that their 
members seek mediation in regional disputes); (b) they may want to do 
something about a conflict whose continuance could adversely affect their 
own political interests; (c) they may be directly requested by one or both 
parties to mediate; (d) they may wish to preserve intact a structure of which 
they are a part (e.g., the frequent mediation attempts by the United States in 
disputes between Greece and Turkey, two valued NATO member-states); or 
(e) they may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own 
influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict or by gaining 
the gratitude (and presumably the political goodwill) of one or both 
protagonists (e.g., the frequent efforts by the United States to mediate the 
Arab-Israeli conflict). 
 
A.2. Mediator Strategies and Behavior: Considerable attention has been 
devoted to mediation strategies and behavior, since scholars see these aspects 
as the most useful criteria for evaluating the success of mediation. Mediator 
activities were organized conceptually to describe mediator behavior in terms 
of various preordained roles and tactics (Gulliver 1979; Laue 1990; Mitchell 
1993; Rubin 1981; Stulberg 1981, 1982) or phases (Folber & Taylor 1984; 
Mitchell 1981; Moore 1986). In an exhaustive review of the literature, Wall 
(1981) identified more than a hundred specific mediation functions and 
behaviors. All these forms of behavior arise from negotiators’ concerns about 
being unable to reach an agreement, and their stated purpose is to change, 
modify, settle, or resolve a conflict. Enacting these behaviors constitutes the 
“heart” of mediation. 
   The most useful taxonomy of mediator behavior that can be applied to 
international mediation analysis is based on the identification of three 
strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention 
(Bercovitch 2000). These are communication-facilitation, procedural, and 
directive strategies (see Bercovitch 1992, 2000; Bercovitch & Wells 1993, 
Bercovitch et al. 1991). These strategies are based on assumptions derived 
from Sheppard’s (1984) taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the 
content, process and procedure of conflict management. 
   The choice of any form of mediation behavior or strategy is rarely random. 
Rather, it is influenced by factors peculiar to the conflict and internal to the 
 29
mediator. Mediators try to vary their behavior to reflect the conflict at hand. 
In low-intensity conflicts, for instance, communication strategies may be 
more effective; high-intensity conflicts may call for more active, 
manipulative strategies. Time pressure, mediator rank, and previous relations 
between the parties all may determine the choice of a strategy. To be 
effective, mediation strategies and behavior must be truly congruent with the 
nature of a conflict and the objectives and interests of a mediator. Although 
the parties are key factors in conflict management, Bercovitch finds the 
mediation environment to be the strongest indicator of mediation behavior, 
followed by the nature of the actual mediation event (Bercovitch 2000). 
   Whichever strategy mediators use, their underlying objectives in any 
conflict are to change: (a) the physical environment of conflict management 
(e.g., by maintaining secrecy, or imposing time limits, as President Carter did 
at Camp David); (b) the perception of what is at stake (e.g., by structuring an 
agenda and/or identifying and packaging new issues); and (c) the parties’ 
motivation to reach a peaceful outcome by, for example, using subtle 
pressure. Any international conflict presents opportunities for some form of 
mediation and peace-building. To be effective, however, mediation and the 
broader process of peace-building must reflect the reality of the conflict and 
the resources of the parties involved. In the context of peace-building efforts, 
mediator strategies and behavior must take into consideration other conflict 
resolution initiatives and activities at different levels of society. Coordinating 
of these different efforts and establishing a dialogue with other actors (i.e. 
NGOs and other local actors) becomes crucial. To that extent international 
mediation is truly a contingent and reciprocal political activity.  
 
A.3. History of Enmity Between Rivals: When heavy losses had been 
experienced during previous conflict behavior, lessons may be drawn by each 
state regarding the efficacy of coercion as a way of dealing with conflict. If 
coercive methods were successful in achieving basic objectives in the past, 
there is good reason to believe that decision makers may find it an attractive 
option in their present conflict. This will have a major negative impact on 
mediation and peace-building. If, on the other hand, mediation takes place 
within a context of two states or actors who traditionally have dealt with their 
conflicts non-coercively, it seems self-evident to suggest that the chances of 
a successful mediation would be that much higher. 
   Deutsch claims that states involved in a negative interdependence, as states 
in an enduring conflict typically are, tend to use coercion to manage their 
conflicts (Deutsch 1973, 1994). Leng demonstrated empirically that states in 
repeated conflicts develop a power orientation and use increasingly more 
coercive methods for dealing with their conflict in each successive flare up 
(Leng 1983). Neither the attitudes nor the conflict management behavior of 
such actors in conflict are likely to change much. Mediation in this kind of 
context can have little impact, with peace-building efforts hampered by 
enormous obstacles. 
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   Based on their data, Bercovitch and Houston suggest that the history of 
enmity between conflicting parties can be evaluated under three categories: 
the number of disputes with other parties, parties’ previous relationships, and 
the level of hostility (use of force, threat of force, war) (Bercovitch and 
Houston 1996). Findings from their research suggest that history of hostility 
and use of force have a negative impact on conflict management efforts, and 
under these circumstances mediation is less likely to be successful. Thus, 
mediation in the context of peace-building efforts must take the history of 
hostility into account, address grievances, and suggest ways to move 
forward. To have any chance of success, mediation must be complemented 
by initiatives (e.g., dialogue groups, interethnic and interfaith groups, healing 
workshops, problem solving workshops, and so on) that aim to overcome the 
burden of history and establish peaceful relations. 
 
A.4.Timing: One of the most important aspects of mediation in the context 
of peace-building is the timing of the mediation effort. If initiated at the right 
or ripe time, mediation attempts have a greater chance of success. For that 
reason, determining the right time for mediation in conflict situations has 
triggered intense and arduous study. Northedge and Donelan stated that 
mediation attempts can be successful “when there exists a concatenation of 
circumstances already tending toward an improvement of the situation” 
(Northedge & Donelan 1971, p. 308). Zartman, on the other hand, suggested 
that a distinct moment of ripeness could be assessed according to the 
dynamics of a conflict, specifically its combination of plateaus, precipices, 
deadlocks, and deadlines (Zartman 1985). This argument is supported by 
Touval (1982), Edmead (1971), Kriesberg and Thorson (1991), while others 
such as Ott (1972), Pruit (1981), Rubin (1981), and Moore (1986) suggested 
that mediation will be more successful if it is initiated well into a conflict, 
when costs have become intolerable and both parties accept that they may 
lose too much by continuing their dispute.  
   When we talk about the duration of the conflict we refer to the period after 
the dispute has been transformed into violent conflict and open hostilities 
have started. However, ripe moments in conflicts do not necessarily 
correspond to a linear conception of time, but are rather linked to the number 
of fatalities and the belief that the continuation of violence will lead nowhere 
but deadlock. Ripeness is thus “associated with conditions where parties 
realize that their attempts to solve the problem and pursue their goals alone 
are unlikely to succeed at an unacceptable cost”  (Zartman 1985, p. 219). 
This situation, which is long term and characterized with no prospect of 
escape through escalation of the conflict, has been referred to as “mutually 
hurting stalemate” (Zartman 1985, p. 216).  
   Bercovitch and Houston find that most mediation efforts are undertaken 
approximately 36 months after the violence erupts. However, their data also 
suggest that mediation efforts have a 75 percent chance of success if it takes 
place during the fourth and sixth weeks of the fighting (Bercovitch and 
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Houston 1996). As stated earlier, however, mediation can be undertaken at 
all phases of a conflict. The ripe moments in conflicts provide “windows of 
opportunity”, usually short-term instances in which signing an agreement 
such as the Oslo Accords is considered sufficient. However, sustaining the 
window of opportunity is also crucial for peace-building efforts to be 
successful in the long run. For that to happen, mediators should closely 
monitor developments on the ground that can undermine the implementation 
of the agreements such as activities of opposition groups, and develop 
strategies to keep the ‘window of opportunity’ open by supporting actors and 
activities working toward building peace. 
 
B. Structural Factors 
B.1. Identity of the Mediator and Resources Available:  Parties to a conflict 
and mediators may invest considerable personnel, time, and resources to 
mediation. Given the inevitability and omnipresence of conflict, a limited 
range of widely accepted procedures for dealing with it, and the unwelcome 
reality of the scope of its potential destructiveness, it is hardly surprising that 
so many actors, each adopting different strategies and tactics, are keen to 
mediate and undertake peacemaking activities.  
   Mediators can range from individuals, states, regional or international 
organizations. Individuals who are not government officials or political 
incumbents can carry out individual mediations. Although individual 
mediation exhibits greater variety and experimentation than other forms of 
mediation, it essentially consists of only two kinds: formal and informal. 
Informal mediation refers to the efforts of mediators who have a long-
standing experience with, and a deep commitment to, international conflict 
resolution (e.g., Carter in North Korea in 1994) or to the efforts of 
knowledgeable scholars whose background, attitudes, and professional 
experience give them the opportunity to engage in mediation with real 
conflict parties (Burton, 1968; Doob, 1971; and Kelman, 1992). Such 
individuals approach a conflict as private citizens, not as official 
representatives. They utilize their academic competence, credibility, and 
experience to facilitate communications, gain a better understanding of the 
conflict, and work toward its resolution.  
   Formal mediation, on the other hand, takes place when a political 
incumbent, a government representative, or a high-level decision maker acts 
in an individual capacity to mediate a conflict between the official 
representatives of other states (e.g., Dennis Ross in his role as the State 
Department’s Special Middle East Coordinator, and Richard Holbrooke in 
Bosnia). Though formal mediation is less susceptible to the impact of 
personality, its loss of flexibility is more than matched by its immediacy of 
access to influential decision makers. As such, formal mediation is often 
indistinguishable from diplomatic intercourse; its range of roles is more 
limited than that of informal mediation but its impact on outcomes is more 
direct. 
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   Institutions and organizations may also serve as mediators. Three kinds of 
organizations play an important role in the area of peacemaking and conflict 
resolution: regional, international, and transnational. Regional and 
international organizations such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), and the 
United Nations represent ensembles of states that have signified their 
intention to fulfill the obligations—including those of formal mediation—of 
membership as set forth in a formal treaty. Transnational organizations (e.g., 
Amnesty International) represent individuals from different countries who 
have similar knowledge, skills, or interests, and who meet on a regular basis 
to promote their common interests through various means, including 
informal mediation. In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation in the 
mediation of institutions and organizations such as the UN or the European 
Union (EU). These organizations have also become, in the modern 
international system, very active participants in the processes of mediation, 
peace-making, and peace-building.  
   Mediation by states can be distinguished along the lines of small states and 
large states. Each claims legitimacy and authority on the basis of different 
attributes. Small states such as Algeria, Switzerland, New Zealand and 
Austria (Slim, 1992) have facilitated a disproportionate number of 
international mediations. Their size and presumed lack of clout make them 
appear non-threatening and ideally positioned to carry out mediations 
between adversaries. Small states usually wait for an invitation to mediate. 
When they do intervene, their efforts tend to be confined to regional 
conflicts, and their strategies tend to be mostly low-profile strategies of 
dialogue and communication. This is where small states can be most useful 
in mediation efforts. 
 
B.2. The Internal Characteristics of the States Involved: The internal 
characteristics of the actors involved affect the peace building activities 
significantly. The internal characteristics of parties refer to structural 
properties of states and how these affect their predisposition to engage in 
coercive or non-coercive forms of conflict management. The nature of the 
political system has attracted the most attention recently (Maoz & Russett 
1992; Ember, Ember & Russett 1992; Dixon 1993). Democratic states are 
more inclined to use peaceful methods of conflict management (because of 
internal cultural and political norms, liberal experience or electoral 
constraints) unless their direct security interests are threatened, whereas non-
democratic states are more likely to utilize coercive methods of management.  
Mediation between two democratic actors is therefore more likely to be 
effective than mediation between other kinds of polities. Much of peace-
building and mediation takes place in regions where democracy is not the 
norm. This is a major complicating factor.   
   Another factor that may have major influence on mediation in the context of 
peace-building is the internal coherence of each party. A mediator's job is 
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hardly likely to prove easier if the incumbent government of one of the 
adversaries is experiencing an insurgency, rebellion, or other serious internal 
threat. Mediation has a better chance of success when adversaries are 
recognized as the legitimate spokesmen for their parties. Disunity or lack of 
cohesion within a state make it difficult for both the adversaries as well as the 
mediator to engage in meaningful forms of conflict settlement because a state's 
representatives lack power or authority to make decisions or concessions. 
Failures of many conflict management attempts in Lebanon, Cyprus, Angola, 
and Somalia illustrate this point only too well. The more clearly identifiable 
and united the parties are, the higher the chances of successful mediation and 
peace-building (Modelski 1964; Burton 1968). 
 
B.3.The Nature of the Dispute: There is a general agreement in the literature 
that "the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the nature of 
the dispute" (Ott 1972, p.597). The importance that adversaries attach to the 
issues in dispute will naturally affect the choices of conflict management 
modes and the chances of a successful mediation. When vital interests are 
affected (for example, issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity), 
intermediaries will be unlikely to have much impact on the dispute.  
   The nature of a conflict or the characteristics of its issues are clearly crucial 
in determining how it can be managed (Diehl 1992). Certain issues such as 
beliefs, core values, and territorial integrity have a high saliency, and are apt 
to encourage decision makers to accept higher levels of costs. This makes it 
much more difficult to manage such conflicts through traditional diplomatic 
methods (Snyder &Diesing 1977). Conflicts over salient issues are likely to 
be long lasting and to entail the use of coercive methods as a way of reaching 
an outcome. Other aspects such as the number of issues in a conflict, the 
rigidity with which they are perceived, whether they relate to tangible 
interests (e.g., conflicts over resources) or intangible ones (e.g., conflicts 
over values) may also affect both the duration and the method of termination 
(Deutsch 1994). In their analysis, Bercovitch et al found that 76.1 percent of 
these conflicts involve tangible issues such as territory and resources 
(Bercovitch et al, 1991). 
   The literature also links the effectiveness of mediation to the nature of the 
issues in dispute. Ott sees the "absence of vital national security interests, 
particularly questions of territorial control" as a necessary precondition for 
successful mediation (Ott 1972, p.616). Randle contends that "should a dispute 
affect vital security interests of the parties, no amount of mediation by a third 
party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities" (Randle 1973, p.49). Lall 
argues that "it is one of the principles of international negotiation that when 
territory is at stake, the party in possession tends to resist third party 
involvement" (Lall 1966, p.100). They all indicate that the parties' perceptions 
of the issues are a key factor in determining whether or not to accept a 
mediation initiative and whether or not it will have much success. 
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  When rivals are divided across religious or ethnic lines, it becomes much 
harder to resolve the conflict and initiate a peace-building process, as these 
issues touch on the identities of the parties. When that is the case, mediators 
should make an effort to address these issues and redefine the conflict as a 
‘positive-sum’ rather then a ‘zero-sum’. Incorporating traditional and 
religious leaders, and widening the sphere of peace-building activities 
become particularly important in these types of conflicts. 
   One of the important factors related to the nature of a conflict is the amount 
of fatalities involved. The number of fatalities in conflicts has a direct affect 
on the mediation attempts. Bercovitch et. al found that when fatalities in a 
conflict are less then 500 people mediation efforts are more likely to be 
successful (32.4 percent) (Bercovitch et. al 1991). When fatalities are 
between 5001 and 10000, the success rate was 14.4 percent. This finding 
lends support to the “hurting stalemate” argument. 
 
B.4. Power Capabilities: Power capabilities of states can be linked to 
different conflict management behaviors. A conflict between two equally 
strong countries may be prolonged, for example, because both have the 
material and human resources to carry on and the willingness to tolerate high 
costs. These contextual factors directly affect a party’s disposition to engage 
in different forms of conflict management, and the manner in which a 
conflict will terminate. 
  The effects of some contextual factors on the origin, character and evolution 
of a conflict have been documented quite extensively (Stoll, 1993). A 
number of propositions linking the duration, intensity, fatalities, and issue 
prominence to effective mediations (Bercovitch 1989; Bercovitch & Langley 
1993) received considerable theoretical and empirical support. Other studies 
linked the parties’ internal characteristics (Gregory 1994) or power 
capabilities between them to different forms of conflict management by third 
parties. 
  Bercovitch et al suggest that 46 percent of conflicts take place when there is 
low power disparity between the parties (Bercovitch et al, 1991). Most 
mediation efforts take place when the parties have different levels of power. 
The success rate of mediation was lowest (4.3 percent) between two 
countries with high levels of power disparity, while in mediation that takes 
place between two large powers indicates a mediation success rate of 50 
percent.  Power disparity is an important factor that affects both the process 
and outcome of mediation. When there is a power disparity between 
conflicting parties, it becomes important to create a balance between the 
disputants, at least in the mediation process. Furthermore, empowering the 
weaker party through strengthening its civil society is crucial to the peace-
building process (Bercovitch & Wells, 1993). 
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C. Coordination Between Different Initiatives and Different Actors 
   One of the significant characteristics of peace-building is that it is an 
interdependent process in which various conflict management mechanisms 
and various actors can be involved. In addition to official and nonofficial 
mediation efforts, conflict resolution scholars recognize that establish a 
sustainable cooperation and peaceful relations between rival communities, 
there is a need to work within and across communities. This requires a 
‘multi-track’ approach to ending violent conflict, especially in intractable 
conflicts. These tracks include, but are not limited to: a) governmental peace 
making through diplomacy; b) non-governmental peace-making through 
conflict resolution; c) business peace-making through commerce; d) private 
citizen peace-making through personal involvement; e) research, training and 
education for peace-making through learning; f) activist peace-making 
through advocacy; g) religious peace making through faith in action; h) 
funded peace-making through resource provision; and, j) communication and 
media peace-making through information (Diamond & McDonald 1996; 
Merkel, 1994). 
    What is evident in these works is the recognition and utilization of local 
structures that can contribute to peace-building. Thus, developing familiarity 
with cultural and local structures and actors become an important aspect of 
peace-building efforts. External actors such as non-local NGOs and human 
rights groups, humanitarian aid agencies, regional non-governmental 
structures, international humanitarian and development agencies, research 
institutes and voluntary associations, government actors, and the UN should 
work with various local actors and structures. These local structures and 
actors may include traditional authoritative personalities such as elders or 
religious leaders; associations, women’s groups, youth groups, local NGOs, 
and human rights organizations; local institutions such as religious 
communities, the courts, the police force; or local governmental structures 
such as district and regional councils, executive officers (Heinrich 1997). All 
this will make peace-building more inclusive and thus more likely to 
succeed. 
   This approach suggests that mediation must not be seen solely as a short-
term, isolated event, but as one of the dimensions of peace-building efforts in 
general. Integrating peace-building efforts at different levels of the society is 
crucial for it to be successful. For that reason, establishing a sustainable 
dialogue between different groups and coordinating conflict resolution and 
peace-building efforts is of the utmost importance. This requires mediators to 
follow developments concerning peace-building efforts at different levels of 
the society and to incorporate these developments into its process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
   Often the talk about conflict management through negotiation or mediation 
focuses on one isolated instance only. We study that instance and draw 
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lessons from it. In reality, conflict management should be thought of much 
more as a seamless process in which various actors play different parts, and 
the whole experience coheres into one whole process. The importance of 
peace-building is that it forces us to think in terms of multiple efforts of 
conflict management and to take a longer term perspective. Thinking about 
peace-building means thinking about structural changes, not de-escalation or 
violence abatement only. Peace-building connotes a more generic, longer 
term approach designed to undo a cycle of violence, not just break its pattern. 
   In this paper we have argued that a number of measures may be undertaken 
to implement a program of peace-building. These measures include 
intervention, humanitarian assistance, truth commissions, economic 
restructuring, multi-track diplomacy and many other forms. One of the most 
important of these measures is mediation, which is central to peace-building. 
Mediation may be undertaken at any phase of a conflict, and it can be used to 
undo the damage of violence or as a precursor to a more sustained dialogue. 
It can help to institutionalize a more cooperative pattern of interaction and be 
instrumental in developing more democratic institutions. Many of us 
normally see mediation only as a process that brings about a ceasefire or a 
political agreement, but mediation is part and parcel of a more holistic peace-
building approach.  
   We should see mediation as a broad process that supplements other 
processes of conflict management. Rather than treat each process in isolation, 
we should look at them within the overall framework of peace-building. To 
do so, we need to understand how mediation works, the factors that influence 
it, and how best to utilize it. Once we appreciate these issues, we can see how 
crucial mediation is to the viability of any peace-building program. In the 
current international environment there could be few more urgent tasks. 
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CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING:  
A PEACE PROCESS  
 
Jessica Senehi 
 
Having said having done 
What pleases me 
I go right I go left 
And I love the marigold. 
   These lines were written by Robert Desnos, a leading poet of the French 
surrealist movement. Surrealism was an artistic movement of 1924−1936 
which valued the imagination, plumbing the wisdom of the unconscious, and 
a creativity unfettered by reason and convention. Desnos was known for his 
agile imagination and his experimental style. He was also a journalist, 
produced radio shows, and wrote advertising jingles.  
   During WWII, Desnos was active in the French Resistance. In 1994, he 
was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to Buchenwald. Despite being 
tortured, he refused to give up the names of fellow resistance fighters. He 
joined the other prisoners in the camp who had been taken from their homes, 
stripped of their possessions and clothes, separated from their families, and 
denied basic human rights.  
   One afternoon, Desnos and other prisoners were taken by some camp 
guards and crowded onto the bed of a truck. Everyone knew they were being 
taken to their death. Traumatized and weakened by lack of food, the 
prisoners were mostly silent. The guards did not look at the faces or into the 
eyes of the prisoners. 
   After the prisoners had been taken off the truck at the place where they 
were to be killed, suddenly and with enthusiasm, Desnos seized the hand of 
one of the prisoners, a young woman, and said that he would read her palm. 
With exuberance, he foretold a wonderful romance, children, and a long life. 
The young woman laughed, and others put their hands forward. Desnos 
began to tell other fortunes filled with joy and promise. The prisoners 
became animated and began talking among each other about the romances, 
children, and hopes that they did have. They laughed and cried.  
   One guard began to cry. Hearing these stories, the guards could no longer 
deny the prisoners’ humanity, and were unable to go through with the 
executions. They put the prisoners back on the truck and returned them 
unharmed for the time being, and some lives were saved.  
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   Desnos, however, died of typhoid in 1945 at age 45, at Theresienstadt in 
Czechoslovakia, shortly before the camps were liberated.5 
Having said having done 
What pleases me 
I go right I go left 
And I love the marigold. 
Peace and Conflict Studies and the Humanities 
 
   Since the inception of the peace studies and conflict resolution fields, 
theorists and practitioners have recognized the significance of both 
imagination and an analysis of culture for understanding social conflicts and 
their resolution. In 1976, Theodore Lentz called for generating a great moral 
imagination to promote loyaltynot only to one’s own nationbut to the 
people of all nations and the future. Elise Boulding (1990) argues we need to 
imagine a global civic culture in order to attain it, and John Paul Lederach 
(1999) writes that imagination for peace-building requires courage, implying 
that we are constrained in significant ways by conventional modes of 
thought. Thus, Johan Galtung (1990) calls for analyzing the cultural 
justifications of violence, and John Burton and Frank Dukes (1990) call for 
questioning the underlying assumptions that drive social thought and action 
in order to effect social transformation. Valuing so-called “folk” culture and 
subaltern voices is also important. John Paul Lederach (1996) argues that it is 
critical to value indigenous knowledge and modes of cultural representation 
in order to appropriately intervene in cross-cultural contexts. Recently, Johan 
Galtung (2002) stated that one of the main goals for peace activists is to 
facilitate and amplify the voices of those who are not being heard.  
   This paper examines the role of cultural productionspecifically, 
storytellingin the processes of social conflicts and their transformation. 
Social conflicts are broadly conceived to encompass conflicts at various 
levels (between states, within states, and within communities) as well as 
social divisions characterized by inequality, oppression, and/or a lack of 
mutual recognition (for example, divisions along the lines of ethnicity, 
gender, sexuality, social class, or global regions). This paper is based on an 
understanding of intergroup conflicts as complexthat is, involving both 
objective and subjective components that interdepend. We must examine the 
powerful economic, political, and institutional forces that shape persons’ 
lives in ways that are often oppressive and dehumanizing. But we must also 
see persons as meaning-makers and agents in order to understand how social 
                                                 
5 In her 1996 article in Utne Reader, “Can Imagination Save Us?” Susan Griffin 
reports hearing about this incident from her friend Odette and cites these lines of 
poetry. I retell this story here in my own words. Similar reports can be found 
elsewhere although they do not refer to this exact incident (see, for example, Hirsch, 
1998).  
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systems and identities are created, interpreted, accepted, resisted, and 
changed. This is also critical because intergroup conflicts, while usually 
about tangible interests, always involve a crisis of meaning. As Lederach 
(1996) puts it: “Conflict emerges through an interactive process based on the 
search for and creation of shared meaning” (p. 9). In this paper, I address the 
role of what I call constructive storytelling in peace-making and peace-
building by (1) defining constructive storytelling, (2) examining storytelling 
in relation to several factors in intergroup conflictsknowledge, identity, 
socialization and education, emotion, morality, memory and time, and 
geographic space, and (3) identifying transcultural storytelling. 
 
Constructive Storytelling 
 
   Storytelling is language. Encompassing vocabulary, grammar rules, norms 
of communicative behavior, and narrative formslanguage is society’s most 
complex symbolic system. As such, language encodes the culture of a 
particular community, including shared understandings of identity, power, 
history, values, and utopian visions.  
   Storytelling is also narrative. A subset of language, narrative is both simple 
and complex. While they can be distinguished by several features (e.g., 
Burke, 1945), narratives can simply and sufficiently be defined as “someone 
telling someone else that something happened” (Smith, 1981), and narratives 
can be recognized and constructed by children as young as three-and-a-half 
years old (Peterson and McCabe, 1991).  
   Narratives may relate events or be explicitly fictional. But narratives are 
not pure fact or pure fiction. A fictional narrative may be used to 
persuasively express an idea that the narrative sees as true. Appalachian 
storyteller Kathy Coleman (1996) reports her grandmother’s saying about 
stories: “Well, if they ain’t true, they oughta be.” Meanwhile, personal and 
group’s histories are constructed and interpretive. Historical accounts are 
selected, framed, and usedoften to make a point about the present and the 
future (e.g., Consentino, 1982; Scheub, 1996; Tonkin, 1992). While the 
relationship between narrative and truth is complex, not all narratives are 
equal; they may be evaluated, and some deemed better than others (Haraway, 
1989). Within a particular context, meaning is negotiated through narratives 
and certain versions will not have currency with the group and will not be 
circulated (Myerhoff, 1992; Urban, 1996).  
   Narratives serve as a rationale for action. Because cultural narratives 
encode the knowledge that everyone in the group buys into, they can be 
reframed to comment critically and persuasively on social life. Narratives 
operate in the world and get results; they have narrative potency (Raheja and 
Gold, 1994). Because access to this process of meaning-making is so 
significant and so unequal, Foucault argued that power precedes politics. 
Those who generate narrativesstorytellers broadly conceivedare in a 
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position of relative control in the process of the social construction of 
meaning (Bauman, 1986); they have narrator potency.6  
   Narratives can be related in a number of media such as books, periodicals, 
film, and video have the ability to disseminate knowledge widely. However, 
access to expression in these media is restricted and difficult. Storytelling, as 
I use it here, refers specifically to a sub-type of narrationthe relating of 
narratives in person, orally (or by signing), to an audience of at least one 
(Ryan, 1995). The medium of storytelling is potentially available to everyone 
because everyone is able to tell a story and no equipment is required. Thus 
storytelling is a readily attainable means whereby persons can access at least 
some narrator potency. In Central America, for example, for a prostrate 
populace, testimonio literaturebased on the spoken narrative of life 
experienceboth expressed and effected resistance to oppressive regimes 
(Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Harlow, 1987; Menchu, 1984; 
Zimmerman, 1995). While storytelling may seem by definition small-scale 
and therefore insignificant, storytelling has the potential to be empowering 
because it is profoundly accessible.  
   First, the storyteller is accessible to her or his audience in ways that the 
narrator of a textbook, a film, or TV news is not. Unlike an interview in a 
video documentary, for example, storytelling is a direct interpersonal 
interaction, and can generate and sustain person-to-person relationships in 
immediate and dynamic ways. The proximity of the storyteller to the listener 
can engender feelings of closeness, community, and security. Post-
storytelling dialogue among storyteller and listeners is often a part of the 
storytelling process. The audience may directly challenge or critique the 
storyteller. In the medium of storytelling, the power relationship between the 
narrator and audience is more in balance and allows for the possibility of a 
collaborative process of meaning-making.  
   Second, stories are intellectually accessible. Literacy is not required. 
Special training or experience is not required to appreciate stories. Children 
as young as three-and-a-half years old and persons with severe cognitive 
deficits can understand stories (e.g., Peterson and McCabe, 1991). This may 
make stories seem infantile and far afield from weighty affairs of state, but 
rather this is a clue to stories’ significance. Storytelling (as narrative) is a 
methodology for both apprehending and presenting knowledge; that is, 
storytelling is an analytical methodology that almost everyone can employ to 
some degree. Stories are a means of socializing and educating youth in all 
societies. Information necessary for survival and making society has to be 
able to be understood by and communicated by all members of the 
community. The ability to tell and understand stories is probably a critical 
capacity with which humans are innately endowed.  
                                                 
6 I make a distinction between the potency of the narrative itself and the power of the 
narrator’s ability to narrate. This is to clarify that Raheja and Gold’s (1994) concept 
of narrative potency encompassed both of these.  
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   Third, stories are accessible because they are low-tech. No special 
equipment or training is required so access to storytelling is not restricted by 
economic class. Even in the restricted circumstances of oppression and 
slavery; storytelling can be a means of comfort, survival, resistance, and 
maintaining cultural identity.  
   What was related about Robert Desnos at the beginning of this paper is a 
story about stories. For me, it illustrates two ways in which storytelling can 
be significant for conflict resolution, peace-making, and peace-building. 
First, the storytelling described above invites a paradigm shift; it catalyzes a 
transformation. Second, because it requires no special equipment or training, 
storytelling is technically and intellectually accessible, and therefore 
potentially empowering. Storytelling is a resource even when stripped of all 
possessions and in the face of overwhelming power; as James Scott (1990) 
puts it: “short of killing its bearer, the human voice is irrepressible” (p. 163).  
   This is not to diminish the power of social and political violence to cause 
trauma and death to individuals and whole groups of people. Such violence 
may threaten the security and integrity of persons’ identities and psyches that 
results in fear and internalized oppression that suppresses the human voice 
(e.g., Fanon, 1963). But the boundary of one’s mind may also be the last 
standa place that remains illegible and uncontrollable to the dominator. 
Therefore, the individual voiceexpressing one’s own experience and 
possibly also representing the similar experience of othershas the potential 
to be a critical means of empowerment. 
   Also, of course, storytelling and other forms of discourse do not always 
generate peaceful relationships among and within communities. Storytelling 
and other modes of expression may, in fact, intensify social cleavages and 
mistrust and perpetuate structural violence. Thus, I make a distinction 
between destructive versus constructive storytelling. Based on a review of 
literature in the field, the cornerstones of peace are understood to be power 
balance, mutual recognition, critical awareness, and sometimes acts of 
resistance (Senehi, 2000). Constructive storytelling is associated with 
positive peace; destructive storytelling is associated with its antithesis. 
Destructive storytelling is associated with coercive power (“power over” 
rather than “power with”), exclusionary practices, a lack of mutual 
recognition, dishonesty, and a lack of awareness. Destructive storytelling 
sustains mistrust and denial. Constructive storytelling is inclusive and fosters 
collaborative power and mutual recognition; creates opportunities for 
openness, dialogue, and insight; a means to bring issues to consciousness; 
and a means of resistance. Such storytelling builds understanding and 
awareness, and fosters voice. 
   It may not always be immediately evident whether a particular instance of 
storytelling is more or less exclusionary. Sometimes a particular group might 
create a closed setting where they can feel free to air certain experiences 
without retribution, for example, at an all-lesbian gathering. Such 
environments may seem exclusionary, but paradoxically allow for the 
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inclusion of these voices in a publicalthough not fully public 
conversation. And it might not always be clear whether or not storytelling is 
emancipatory. What is critical is to examine how storytelling takes place 
for example, who creates the stories and whose interests do they serve?  
 
 
Factors in Intergroup Conflicts 
 
   This paper is based on an understanding of intergroup conflicts as 
complexthat is, involving both objective and subjective components that 
interdepend. Structural violence engenders cultural violence, and cultural 
violence engenders structural violence (Galtung, 1990). Protracted social 
conflicts play themselves out on multiple social planes: geographically, in the 
economic system, in politics, in law, in educational access and curricula, in 
interpretations of history, linguistically, and in religious and cultural 
practices. The dynamics of conflict in these numerous social arena intersect 
and reinforce each other to perpetuate the conflict and the negative 
relationship between groups (Byrne and Carter, 1996). Intercommunal 
conflicts can become encoded in each group’s identity and culture in an 
intensifying cycle of rigidification, separation, and distortion (Northrup, 
1991). The intercommunal conflict permeates social life. 
   To recognize the complexity of intercommunal conflicts is not only 
analytically sound, but has practical implications. Conflicts’ complexity is 
double-edged. Complexity contributes to conflict perpetuation and 
intractability. But simultaneously, this suggests multiple arenas for 
intervention, multiple agents of intervention, and multiple intervention tasks 
in a dynamic process of social change (e.g., Kriesberg, 1991). Improving the 
relationship between groups facilitates sustainable problem-solving, and 
successful problem-solving builds mutual trust and confidence and improves 
intergroup relationships (e.g., Kelman, 1998; Rothman, 1997). Interventions 
directed at one factor in a conflict can affect other factors as well. 
Consciousness-raising and efforts to change attitudes can lead to new 
policies, laws, and institutions; and new policies, laws, and institutions can 
lead to new cultural norms in a dialectical process of social change. By 
naming in detail the ways in which intergroup conflicts are driven and 
perpetuated makes it possible for people at all strata of society to participate 
more consciously to determine their own culture, address critical concerns, 
and conceive of modes of resolution. 
   In this section, the significance of storytelling for seven factors in 
intergroup conflicts are examined. Throughout the discussion, a distinction is 
made between destructive discourses (encompassing all narrative media, 
including storytelling) and constructive storytelling (focusing only on the 
medium of storytelling) with the emphasis on constructive storytelling 
because that is the focus of this paper. What is always at issue in this 
distinction are processes of domination versus peacethat is, coercive power 
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versus shared power, dehumanization of the other versus mutual recognition, 
dishonesty and unawareness versus honesty and a critical consciousness, and 
resistance and agency versus passivity and hopelessness in the face of social 
injustice.  
 
 
Knowledge 
   Language is a means through which communities develop and articulate 
their worldview. The knowledge encoded in language and culture facilitate 
common understandings of experience and form the naturalized truths for a 
particular community (Narayan, 1989). These norms make life predictable 
and secure rather than frighteningly random (Northrup, 1989). The social 
process of constructing meaning is critical to peace-making and peace-
building because conflicts can be understood as a contestation of meaning 
(Lederach, 1996). In the case of intractable inter-communal conflicts, the 
conflict becomes encoded in each communities’ cultural knowledge, 
involving understandings of self and other, interpretations of history, goals 
for the future, and norms regarding how to go about addressing conflicts.  
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Power relations between and within 
communities are encoded in language (e.g., Foucault, 1972). These power 
relations are often reflected in what are seen as more legitimate or politically 
powerful discourses: mass media versus what has a lesser audience or no 
audience (Randall, 1991), discourses from within academia versus from 
without (Foucault, 1972; Franklin, 1978), and “high culture” and “literature” 
versus “low culture” and “folklore” (Bakhtin, 1986; Franklin, 1978; Gates, 
1988; Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Roberts, 1989). Only those in power 
may have access to producing knowledge, and therefore authoritative 
discourses may serve the interests of power rather than truth. As a result, 
cultural knowledge and history may exclude or misrepresent whole groups of 
people, and collective trauma may remain unacknowledged and therefore 
unhealed.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. In a peaceful community, all persons have 
access to processes for developing knowledge, and research goals serve the 
interests of all groups. In peace, all feel their story is told and heard. Because 
storytelling is accessible, story-based interventions and projects can be a 
means for facilitating more voices into the public transcript.  
    Storytelling as the spoken narrative of life experience has given a voice of 
resistance to whole groups otherwise excluded from the “authoritative” 
discourse of First World journalism, academia, and literature (e.g., 
Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Randall, 1991). For example, in Central 
America, for a prostrate populace, testimonio literaturebased on the spoken 
narrative of life experienceboth expressed and effected resistance to 
oppressive regimes (Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Menchu, 1984; 
Harlow, 1987; Zimmerman, 1995). This body of social and political history 
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includes the 1984 autobiography of Guatemalan social activist and Nobel 
Peace Prize (1992) winner Rigoberta Menchu Tum.  
   Sometimes there is silence or unawareness around conflict issues. Groups 
sharing a certain difficult situation or set of experiences may literally 
establish a community-base, power-base, and knowledge-base through 
sharing their stories (Plummer, 1995). This knowledge, embraced and shared 
by group members, literally builds a sense of community. Such community-
building is a means of empowering individuals and groups to address 
problems that were previously latent. In the 1960s, through small 
consciousness-raising groups, middle-class white women recognized that 
their individual experiences were not idiosyncratic but were shared by others 
and shaped in significant ways by social factors. Women saw themselves as 
connected in a common struggle and were able to mobilize for political and 
social change. In this kind of process, the personal story becomes the 
political story. This may change how groups think about themselves, each 
other, and the world. 
   In 1946 in the aftermath of WWII, the Caux Palace Hotel in the Swiss Alps 
became Mountain House, a setting for reconciliation and peace-making, and 
since that time more than 250,000 persons have attended conferences or 
encounters there (Henderson, 1996). Increasingly, citizen-diplomats are 
coming together across profound divides to understand social conflicts 
through interpersonal conversationswhether in the context of “study 
circles,” “public conversations,” “dialogue groups,” “problem-solving 
workshops,” or other encounters. Such interventions involve personal 
storytelling and inevitably become a process of collaboratively developing 
mutual recognition and social knowledge (e.g., Schwartz, 1989). Harold 
Saunders (1999) argues that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of 1993 
would not have been possible without interpersonal dialogue directed at 
addressing conflict issues as well as everyday intergroup interactions 
involving “countless Israelis and Palestinians” over the preceding 20 years 
(p. xx).  
 
Identity 
   Stories create and give expression to personal and group identity. The very 
process of storytelling and narration fosters empathy as listeners identify 
with the characters in a story. Elizabeth Fine and Jean Haskell Speer (1992) 
discuss the power of performance to shape and model identity. The principle 
of performance, they argue, is identification—the sharing of identity—rather 
than rhetorical deliberation: “Cultural performance both imitates cultural 
identities and perpetuates identities as a web” (p. 10). 
   Cultural production is crucial to national identity because it articulates and 
engenders the nation’s identity, history, and vision (Anderson, 1983). A 
community’s expressive traditions encode a body of shared knowledge to 
which persons are intellectually and emotionallyeven morally 
committed. Because they are accessible, fluid, and used contextually, stories 
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can be a means of reformulating cultural notions in order to comment 
critically and persuasively on social life. Thus, group narratives have 
political import. Usually, intergroup conflicts are framed in identity terms. In 
long-standing intractable conflicts, the conflict itself becomes a part of group 
identity (Northrup, 1989). Identity-based violence may involve forced 
assimilation or punishment by murder, expulsion, marginalization, or 
oppression based on one’s identity (Galtung, 1990). 
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Because political domination depends on 
culturally-defined social difference, high literature is used by dominant 
classes to make social difference appear natural or justified (e.g., 
Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Said, 1993). As a result, social conflicts can 
be rendered less visible and are therefore less easy to address, and people 
may participate in the oppression of others and even in their own oppression 
in ways of which they are unaware. A community’s folk stories can encode 
highly negative images of the enemy (Snyder, 1978; Volkan, 1988, 1996). In 
Nazi Germany, folklore studies became an instrument of racist state ideology 
(Dow and Lixfeld, 1994; Lixfeld and Dow, 1994). Minority groups may be 
stereotyped in film, television, books, and other media portrayals. When 
there is social inequality among groups in a society, disempowered groups 
may not have access to dominant and powerful media of cultural production, 
and in this way their identity within the wider community is made invisible 
or threatened with erasure.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. However, because the process of listening 
to a story involves walking in the narrators’ shoes and because stories 
translate well across culture, mutual recognition is fostered when people 
listen to each other’s storieseven across cultural divides and in the context 
of social conflicts. Mutual recognition does not refer to a universalizing view 
where one party embraces another party as essentially the same as the self. 
Claims of a common humanity can rationalize an assimilationist position that 
subordinates particularities to dominant prototypes (West, 1990). Rather, the 
concept of mutual recognition encompasses the willingness of parties to 
engage in dialogue. This should include a struggle to articulate and examine 
differences. While developing understanding across boundaries of cultural 
difference may never be complete or unproblematic, it seems that trusting 
relationships require a desire on the part of all parties to recognize the dignity 
and experiences of the other.  
   For example, in Burundi, contemporary poetry and storytelling 
performance provide a means for developing a shared culture “as a necessary 
first step” in ending and recovering from cycles of severe intergroup violence 
there (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, 1997). In the case of long-standing inter-
communal conflicts, developing a shared historical narrative may be a means 
for bridging conflict and developing a shared identity that encompasses 
diversity without erasing it (Kelman, 1998). Dan Bar-On (2000) and others 
have brought people from different sides of divides together in seminars 
called “To Trust and Reflect” where persons’ shared their personal 
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experiences and listened to those of others. Evaluations of these seminars 
emphasized the value of the storytelling that this space made possible: 
“Hearing the stories of the ‘other’ and learning more about their pain and 
suffering, something that left an impact on me. Storytelling and the care, 
support, safety and protection of the TRT group to others which made it easy 
to open up and trust” (Maoz, 2000, p. 152). 
   Persons’ telling stories about their experience is also a means through 
which identity groups may come into existence as part of a process of 
consciousness-raising and political mobilization to address a latent conflict. 
Kenneth Plummer (1995) argues that an interaction between telling sexual 
storiese.g., coming out stories and rape storieshave helped create and 
build communities where these stories can be told. At the same time, this 
storytelling leads to political action, and when it occurs in more public 
settings (such as TV talk shows), it challenges the social order by increasing 
acceptance for and understanding of marginalized persons and groups.  
 
Socialization 
   Stories are a means of socializing children in all cultures. Stories told in 
childhood may be connected with intense bonds of love that the child has for 
her or his caregiver(s) during the time of life when she or he is most helpless. 
Such storytelling is also a process of political socialization and teaches about 
identity, power, and inter-group relations. Family storytelling is also a means 
through which inter-communal conflicts and identity-based prejudice are 
transmitted through the generations.  
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Images of the enemy and political information, 
encoded in cultural parades and festivals attended by families, may be fused 
with childhood affections that would make them hard to question or 
challenge (Wadley, 1995). For example, a poor white boy growing up in 
Durham, North Carolina, during the 1940s longed for closeness with his 
remote alcoholic father, a closeness that was only achieved when his father 
talked to him about the organization that he lovedthe Ku Klux Klan 
(Davidson, 1996). That boy, Claiborne Paul Ellis eventually became a 
leading member of that white supremacist organization although he later 
renounced the KKK after participating in sustained dialogue and befriending 
black civil rights advocate and his previous enemy Ann Atwater. 
   Stories encode and transmit everyday understandings of conflict and what 
to do about it. Stories may glorify and/or justify violence to recruit military 
volunteers, child soldiers, and martyrs. Militarism is so endemic to U.S. 
culture that the end of the Cold War alone could not alter this political 
culture (Enloe, 1993). Louis Snyder (1978) argues that the Grimms’ Fairy 
Tales (1812) influenced the construction of twentieth-century German 
nationalism and militarism. Snyder argues that whether consciously or 
unconsciously, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm emphasized in their recrafting of 
the tales a set of values that played a significant role in the socialization of 
future generations and the acceptance of Nazism by many German people 
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nearly a century later. These values included “respect for order, belief in the 
desirability of obedience, subservience to authority, respect for the leader and 
the hero, veneration of courage and the military spirit, acceptance without 
protest of cruelty, violence and atrocity, fear of and hatred for the outsider, 
and virulent anti-Semitism” (p. 51).  
   Modern educational institutions may deny identity needs in ways that are 
exclusionary. Educational curriculum may omit the achievements and 
perspectives of certain groups of people. Textbooks may misrepresent history 
or the experience of particular groups. Sometimes public education is a harsh 
means for resocializing indigenous persons and immigrants. In educational 
institutions, silence of faculty and administration around issues such as drop-
out rates and the lack of job opportunities may confuse students and prevent 
a critical awareness (Fine, 1989).  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. Many have called for peace education as 
an alternative means of political socialization to create alternative visions of 
conflict resolution and to promote the development of a peaceful world (e.g., 
Brock-Utne, 1985; Reardon, 1993). Storytelling, which is a significant means 
of socializing children across cultures, can play an important role in this 
process. In Mozambique, the UNICEF-funded “Circle of Peace,” used 
traditional music, art, and drama to teach peace-building to children 
(Kolucki, 1993; Lederach, 1997). In response to the U.S.-Iraq war in 1991, 
storyteller Margaret Read MacDonald (1992) collected Peace Tales: World 
Folktales to Talk About. Interestingly, MacDonald (2001)who had traveled 
throughout the world telling stories, collecting stories, and doing 
collaborative storytelling projectsreports that it was difficult to find “peace 
tales” because stories throughout the world tend more often to be about 
triumph and militarism. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., 
New York City storyteller Laura Simms (2002) collected traditional stories 
in her book, Stories to Nourish Our Children in a Time of Crisis. Sometimes 
new stories are developed: in Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919-1933), 
political activists wrote alternative utopian fairy tales (Zipes 1989).  
   Children and youth may take part in crafting these stories themselves and 
articulating their experiences of conflict as part of a process of healing and 
envisioning a better future. Recent conflicts throughout the world have 
impacted child survivorsincluding the children of systematic rape in the 
former Yugoslavia; child soldiers; and children who have witness the deaths 
of family, friends, and neighbors. Mladi Most, which means “Youth Bridge,” 
is a community center in Mostar, Bosnia, for Bosniak and Croat youth 
between the ages of 16 and 25; there, Austrian photographer Uli Loskot 
mentored youths in a collaborative project of photographing images of war 
resulting in an international exhibit of their work, “Crucible of War 2000.” 
Child survivors of the genocidal violence in Rwanda tell their stories through 
drawings in Witness to Genocide put together by Richard Salem (2000), a 
mediator and former journalist after visiting Rwanda’s National Trauma 
Center in Kigali in 1997.  
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   Peace education also encompasses developing awareness regarding the 
causes of conflicts and modes of conflict resolution, both interpersonally and 
for wider social contexts. Peace education may also involve “teaching 
tolerance”to quote the title of the Southern Poverty Law Center magazine 
for teachersand teaching about interpersonal and social conflicts and what 
to do about them. Importantly, curriculum and teaching practices should 
reflect the interests and needs of students, and not be a means of reproducing 
oppression (e.g., Bourdieu and Passerson, 1977; Freire, 1970). For groups 
who feel they are not represented within educational institutions and 
curricula, storytelling at home is an alternative means of education and a 
means of resistance (e.g., Cruikshank, 1998; Parks, 1994; Roberts, 1989). 
 
Emotions 
   Stories simultaneously engage mind and heart. Through storytelling and 
other cultural rituals, information and argument is conveyed, but gains added 
power through the emotional impact of the story that is sensed and felt by 
participants (Urban, 1991). However, because of their ability to arouse 
emotions, stories are often suspect and associated with the irrational.  
   In conflict, emotions may get in the way of addressing a problem or 
conflict cautiously and morally. Intergroup conflicts and violence are fueled 
by powerful emotions of fear, mistrust, anger, hatred, and grief as well as 
self-loathing. Such emotions reflect a negative and destructive relationship 
between self and other.  
    DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. When political debates about present needs 
become associated with symbols and narratives of national identity, they 
become harder to challenge (Horowitz, 1986). Stories may tap into intense 
emotionsfor example, the love, grief, and anger associated with the violent 
death of a loved onein order to foment hatred. Or, narratives justifying 
violent interventions may draw on memories of past humiliations. When 
collective trauma (and all the emotions subsumed therein) remain 
unacknowledged, fear and mistrust intensify; this can serve as an obstacle to 
a group’s healing and moving forward.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. Addressing emotions is critical in post-
conflict peace-building. When a collective historical trauma remains 
unacknowledged, this can be an obstacle to the traumatized group’s healing 
and inter-group rapprochement (Brooks, 1999). Storytellingin the context 
of truth commissions, dialogue groups, or interpersonallycan be a means 
of facing history and healing in the aftermath of inter-communal violence 
(e.g., Bar-On, 2000; Belton, 1999; Minow, 1998; Saunders, 1999). In a 
Tanzanian camp for Rwandan refugees where refugees were told not to 
discuss their experiences, women cured their insomnia by telling the stories 
of the atrocities they had experienced to a “story tree” at the suggestion of a 
psychologist working there (Anderson and Foley, 1988).  
   Storytelling in a safe place, such as the home, among persons who share a 
common hardship or experience of oppression, can be an occasion when their 
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perspectives, silenced elsewhere, become prominent. This can be both 
emotionally comforting and a form of resistance. Such a safe place becomes 
a site where people are no longer objects, but rather can regain their “human-
ness” and engage in subject-subject dialogue in order to comment upon, 
interpret, strategize about, and heal from their difficulties (hooks, 1990).  
   Stories’ ability to touch the heart makes them a powerful tool for social 
change (Henderson, 1996). Thus, stories can exert moral pressure (Coles, 
1989). Gandhi argued that to encourage personal transformation in others 
“you must not merely satisfy reason, but you must move the heart also” 
(cited in Barash, 1991, p. 560). 
   Storytelling also connects people in ways that bring individuals and groups 
affirmation and pleasure. Professional U.S. storyteller Bill Harley (1996) 
stated that even more profound than stories’ role in education or protest, is 
the “joy” experienced in the storytelling interaction. This builds bonds of 
community among people as they share laughter and tears. This kind of 
community-building occurs in dialogue groups and similar encounters (e.g., 
Bar-On, 2000). Storytelling can be a means of comfort and hope during 
hardship. It is a powerful means of community building that can help create 
bonds among people during post-conflict peace-building.  
 
Morality   
   Stories, even personal stories, always imply how things should be. They 
have moral import. All religions encompass a body of stories that encode 
understandings of right and wrong. Storyteller and theologian Megan 
McKenna (1998) states that all stories have the purpose of  “transformation, 
conversion, or change.” Stories are about envisioning what should be in order 
to shape social thought and action to bring that about.  
   Issues of morality are relevant to conflict in several ways. Conflicts framed 
in moral terms are particularly difficult to resolve. When the opposing party 
is viewed as immoral, this affects the willingness to resolve and choices 
regarding how a particular conflict will be addressed. On the other hand, a 
moral vision is often what compels persons to serve in conflict as 
intermediaries, advocates for the disempowered, and voices for peace, often 
in the face of physical threat and at great personal cost.  
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Cultural violence is that which justifies 
structural and direct violence (Galtung, 1990). Powerful narratives can make 
ideology appear natural in order to rationalize social injustice. Framing a 
conflict in moral terms without an effort to understand the perspectives of the 
other party can be a part of the process of demonizing the enemy.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. Robert Coles (1989) argues that stories can 
evoke a “moral imagination” that calls persons to question their assumptions 
and make choices that are motivated by unselfish ends. Such stories can be a 
means of resistance and a compelling call for the redress of wrongs. They 
might describe moral approaches to conflict resolution and problem-solving. 
Coles (1993) writes about how one black nine-year-old girl, Ruby Bridges, 
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empowered by the biblical stories told to her by her aunt, was able to face 
angry crowds of white parents with courage and forgiveness to be the first 
(and, for several months, the only) black child in a school desegregated by 
court order but not yet by practice. This storytelling is also part of a complex 
process of knowledge production, socialization, and even emotion, and it 
involved the personal agency of both Ruby and her aunt. The stories Ruby’s 
aunt told were selected from among many biblical stories, were told in the 
context of a loving relationship between the child and her elder relative, and 
discussed in relationship to the significant social events that were affecting 
their lives. 
 
Time and memory 
   Stories, as narrative, have a dimension of time that mimics the dimension 
of time in life (Narayan, 1989). However, stories can also be understood to 
disrupt the linearity of time. Through stories, persons visit the past; this may 
involve, for example, remembering a loved one. Also, narratives draw on the 
past in order to envision the futurein the context of present needs and 
intentions (Sheub, 1996; Tonkin, 1992). The past, present, and future 
mutually determine one another as parts of a whole (Carr, 1996). 
   Issues of time, memory, and history are significant in intergroup conflicts 
because the conflict is often framed as being about past events that have 
disrupted relationships. Memories of past conflict are passed from generation 
to generation by means of stories. Conflicts may involve a claim to a glorious 
or at least different past. Reconciliation and post-conflict peace-building may 
involve coming to terms with and healing from the past. Through stories, we 
visit, interpret, mourn, and treasure the past. Meanwhile, at stake may be the 
future. When memories are shared in public setting, they become part of a 
historical record and culture, and they can have moral and political import. 
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. During times of political crisis, narrative’s 
disruption of time can be part of a process of “time collapse”where the 
antagonisms, injustice, and violence of even centuries past are experienced 
intensely in the presentand exacerbate intergroup conflict (Volkan, 1998). 
In Northern Ireland, Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries draw on stories of 
historical victories and massacres to legitimate political violence. 
Interpretations of history may be inaccurate or incomplete in ways that 
justify inequality, dismiss groups of people, or foment intergroup tensions.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. During years of apartheid in South Africa, 
oral historians and storytellers drew on the past in conscious ways in order to 
articulate various social and political arguments for the Xhosa people in 
resistance to their government in the present and with specific objectives for 
the future (Scheub, 1996). This expressive and analytical tradition created a 
channel of meaning that kept awareness and consciousness of the conflict 
high. Individuals’ interpretations of experience and actions informed the 
stories, and the stories affected individuals’ interpretations and actions. 
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   Beginning in April 1996, the amnesty hearings of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission have been a process of developing historical 
knowledge in the aftermath of political, intergroup violence. In these 
hearings, persons report their experiences, which is a process of interpersonal 
storytelling. While the trials were attended mostly by black South Africans, 
they have been aired on national TV. An ongoing cultural backdrop, the trials 
could be seen on TV monitors in hotel lobbies. While this process may have 
several limitations and is not wholly satisfactory, the TRC has provided the 
space for survivors of political terrorism and violence to include their 
experience as part of a very public record. It will be difficultif not 
impossibleto dismiss these testimonies in the future. As of November 
2000, the TRC recorded tens of thousands of statements, received 7,112 
applications for amnesty, rejected 5,392 applications, and granted 849. The 
material bases of the conflict were also addressed by the TRC, which 
included in its report a call for big business to offset past poverty caused by 
apartheid policies through a one-time levy of one percent of their capital. 
   Long-standing intergroup conflictssuch as in South Africa, the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, and in Northern Irelandthe perspectives of each group 
are grounded in historical narratives with divergent meanings. Developing a 
shared historical narrative may be necessary for transforming the intergroup 
conflict and allowing for a shared vision of the future (Kelman 1995).  
  
Geographic space 
   Geography (so tangible) and stories (so intangible) at first may seem 
unrelated. But stories are often tied to geographic places which have cultural 
and symbolic significance for persons and particular communities (e.g., Lane 
1988). Particular locations figure prominently in religious, national, and 
historical narratives. Narratives also encode cultural norms regarding the 
relationship between humans and the natural environment.  
   Geography, of course, is significant for intergroup conflicts as many 
involve overlapping claims for sovereignty over a particular territory. 
Conflicts occur between persons and settlers, and between waves of settlers 
to a region, all of whom over time develop powerful ties to place. Arguably, 
such conflict bases are especially resistantif not wholly resistantto 
anything but a zero-sum outcome (Agnew, 1989).  
   DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Identity and geography are often fused in a 
group’s historical narrative. Such narratives may justify territorial claims in 
us/them terms. Different cultural worldviews, encoded in narratives, may 
reflect wholly different ways of looking at the environment, leading to 
conflicts about environmental issues.  
   CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. Storytelling as a conflict resolution 
method to promote a reinterpretation of space is certainly a very unexplored 
area. However, a recent issue of the journal Orion contained examples of 
how storytelling (in both written and oral forms) was being used for 
restoration of local communities and natural areas. In an urban Tuscon 
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neighborhood, youths gathered local stories from the past and present about 
their community (Eisele 2001). As part of this process, for these youths, an 
increase of regard for the locality went hand-in-hand with an increase of self-
regard; again, identity and geography intertwine. Increasingly in the U.S., 
communities are consciously defining and affirming their knowledge about 
their regionboth drawing on the knowledge of naturalists; the spoken 
narratives of elder residents; and the efforts of local writers, poets, and 
artistsin order to inspire and shape future decisions regarding the lands 
(e.g., Adams 2001, Nelson and Klasky 2001, Teter 2001, Wilson 2001.) As 
Constance Mears, the book designer of At Home on Fidalgo (Adams, 1999) 
about Fidalgo Island in Washington State, put it: “‘Our stories are threads 
that anchor us into the land. They’re like invisible roots that go deep in and 
when people have those, they take care of their place’” (cited in Adams, 
2001, p. 11). As groups in long-standing conflict begin to craft shared 
historical narratives, they may simultaneously develop shared identities and a 
cooperative vision of place. 
 
Transcultural Storytellers 
 
   Storytellers are typically seen as addressing their own cultural audience: 
Walter Benjamin (1868) characterized storytellers as either farmers, who 
relate the knowledge of the local community, or seafarers, who share the 
stories of their adventures when they come back home. But it is possible to 
also conceive of a storyteller who enters into an environment where she or he 
is largely an outsider and tells stories of her or his community of origin; such 
storytellers represent their community to others. And, in fact, throughout 
history, storytellers have often served as ambassadors and diplomats (e.g., 
Hale, 1999). 
   Such storytelling is relevant to understanding conflict practice. This paper 
is a call to recognize, value, examine, and invent such interventions. There is 
no one formula. Storytellinga particularly flexible and available medium 
lends itself to perhaps an infinite variety of applications.  
   In Belfast, both Catholics and Protestants are part of a yarnspinners’ group 
(or, storytelling guild) established by storyteller Liz Weir to help build 
community across the sectarian divide. Weir (1996) believes that in the 
modern world, storytelling is critical for bringing people together on a 
personal level: “You don’t ask a person who they are when they come to a 
storytelling group. But you know. The stories we tell show who we are.” The 
storytelling guild provides a context where people can build relationships on 
a personal level by simply telling tales or stories about their lives. Ireland is 
known for its storytelling. But, in this situation, in a community 
characterized by sectarian separation and conflict, Weir is using the 
indigenous storytelling tradition in a new, transcultural context. Through this 
process, a broader, shared identity is developed. 
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   Conflict resolution practitioner, scholar, and educator John Paul Lederach 
has also taken on the role of storyteller. Lederach and his friend and 
colleague Herm Weaver, a college professor and singer, have used a story 
and song as “a small response” to terrorism and war in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks in the U.S. (Shenk, 2002). The story tells about how a high 
school changed the world by reaching out to Middle Easterners in their 
community. Lederach stated, “This is a true story except for the parts that 
haven’t happened yet” (cited in Shenk, 2002). As a result of hearing this 
story performed by Lederach with musical accompaniment and singing by 
Weaver, high school students took action: they began learning the Arabic 
language, established a sister-school relationship with a high school in the 
Middle East, invited Arab community members to speak, and gathered 
blankets for Afghan refugees.  
 
Conclusion 
 
   Stories have power. They operate in the world and get results (Raheja and 
Gold, 1994). However, power and stories are also constrained. Stories 
operate within a context of ideological, economic, and power constraints. We 
must examine how we can facilitate cultural spaces where peoplefaced 
with social upheaval and conflicts or in the aftermath of violence and 
tragedycan participate in building communities and inter-communal 
relationships characterized by shared power, mutual recognition, and 
awareness in order to work together to shape the future. 
   Storyteller and theologian Megan McKenna (1998) states that all stories 
have the purpose of transformation, conversion, or change: “Stories were 
meant to, first, tell you the truth. But to posit it in such a way that you must 
decide whether that’s the truth you abide by, and whether that’s the truth you 
tell with your life, and that’s that story that makes you come true. When it 
comes down to it: Storieseven when they just confirm something that we 
already believe and feelare about making us make that a reality. So I mean 
we talk about “happily ever after.” It only gets to be “happy ever after” if you 
do something with it.” 
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ENVIRONMENTAL WORK AND PEACE WORK: 
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CASE 
 
Julia Chaitin, Fida Obeidi, Sami Adwan, and Dan Bar-On 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper, based on a larger study that was carried out by a joint 
Palestinian – Israeli research team before and during the Al Aqsa Intifada, 
examines Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that have worked on joint environmental projects. We focus here on three 
jointly run Palestinian – Israeli NGOs, 16 Israeli organizations and 12 
Palestinian organizations that engaged in cooperative work, looking at the 
kind of work they did, their perceptions of the causes of environmental 
damage and its connection to the conflict, their perceptions of the roles of 
NGOs within their societies, and obstacles encountered in cooperative work. 
Data about the NGOs were collected through face-to-face audio taped 
interviews, their publications, and from their websites. Results showed that 
while the Israeli and Palestinian NGOs agree that joint work is needed to 
address ecological problems, they differ in their reasons for working 
together, their perceptions of the sources of environmental deterioration, the 
roles that NGOs should be taking within their society, the relationship of the 
Israeli – Palestinian conflict to the state of the environment, and the effect 
that a final peace agreement would have on solving these problems. It was 
concluded that the “environmental narratives” of the two sides differ greatly, 
and that the establishment of a “culture of peace” is a very long-term 
process. 
 
Introduction 
   The Palestinian – Israeli conflict has torn apart the Middle East for over 
one hundred years, since the beginning of modern Zionism when European 
Jews began immigrating to the region (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). While 
most of the joint Israeli - Palestinian history has been one of bloodshed, after 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, it appeared as if there 
was a real move toward peace. The outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada at the 
end of September 2000, however, brought to the limelight the anger and 
frustrations felt by Palestinians concerning their perception of the peace 
process. The renewed cycle of extreme violence has resulted, at the time of 
this writing, in the deaths of close to 1300 Palestinians and 500 Israelis (The 
Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: 
B’tselem, 2002). 
   This paper looks at a different kind of “casualty” of the peace process – 
Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that, during 
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the peace era, worked together on projects aimed at enhancing not only the 
regional environment but also the development of peaceful relationships 
between the neighbors as well. After the outbreak of the Intifada, most of this 
work came to a standstill.  
   In this paper, we look at results of a pilot study undertaken by a research 
team of two Palestinians and two Israelis from PRIME (Peace Research 
Institute in the Middle East) – a jointly-run Palestinian – Israeli non-
governmental organization (NGO) that carries out research aimed at 
enhancing reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. We 
offer here an overview of jointly run NGOs and separate Palestinian and 
Israeli NGOs that have engaged in cooperative environmental work. We 
present the perceptions of these organizations regarding the connection 
between the environment and the conflict and peace process. We look at the 
issues and activities on which they focused, their understandings of their 
rolse in their respective societies, their perceptions of the causes of 
environmental damage and its connection to the conflict, and obstacles 
encountered in cooperative work. We also offer some theoretical 
understandings and practical aspects of NGO work relevant for the 
Palestinian – Israeli conflict. We will begin with a short review of the 
literature concerning the role of NGOs, in general, in societies in conflict, 
and in Israel and the Palestinian Authority in particular.  
 
The Role of NGOs in Recent Years 
 
   Since the 1980’s, there has been an increase in the work and influence of 
non-governmental organizations across the globe. While these organizations 
have no legal control over territory or peoples, many government officials 
accept and recognize their worth. The definitions of NGOs vary, as do their 
appearance (Weiss & Gordenker 1996). Here we define NGOs as non-profit 
organizations that abstain from participation in state power, identifying four 
ideal types: Campaign organizations, that concentrate on mobilization of its 
members and the public; Expert organizations, that provide consultation 
services and public dissemination of information; Humanitarian 
organizations, that directly support people in need; and Grassroots 
organizations, comprised of self-organizing citizens who undertake local 
projects. While this is a useful categorization tool, in reality it is often 
difficult to clearly differentiate the types.   
   There are close to twenty five thousand known NGOs in the world, in all 
political fields (Union of International Associations 2002). While NGOs 
mostly originated in Western democracies, they later emerged in societies 
with more totalitarian systems of government. While today they are a 
culturally transcendent universal phenomenon, NGOs have not lost their 
local and regional specifics, in part due to their ability to adopt endogenous 
traditions of self-organization (Dardy de Oliviera & Tandon 1994). 
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   NGOs attempt to deter institutions from acting in ways perceived as being 
detrimental to society and they can work in ways that are either “top down” 
or “bottom up”. They do so in the forms of: (a) "internationalising politics", 
in which NGOs pressure their governments to pressure other governments to 
change attitudes and practices on certain issues; (b)"trans-national politics", 
in which NGOs form networks to simultaneously achieve similar changes in 
other states and to influence international debates (Keck & Sikkink 1998) 
and; (c) "supranational politics", in which the organization assumes a 
multinational form and establishes its own head office.  
   There is consensus among researchers that NGOs often succeed in exerting 
political influence (Clark 1995; Spiro 1995) by introducing topics into 
international debate, by agenda setting, fighting for new norms, proposing 
and facilitating negotiations, or pressuring reluctant governments to make 
changes. Through such means as "second track" processes, NGOs also try to 
bring about changes in behavior of government or citizens by taking direct 
action themselves, such as providing aid for people in need through 
humanitarian and development organizations.  
 
Environmental and Social Justice NGOs 
 
   NGOs specializing in environmental and social justice issues have become 
visible in the world arena. For example, there are “expert” NGOs that have 
won over state bureaucracies and the public to their causes after determining 
the need for a specific environmental action. NGOs also provide information 
or apply pressure (Rucht 1996; Lahusen 1996) to steer negotiation processes 
over environmental issues into certain directions, then translate their aims 
into action and into a tightening up of regulations (Gehring 1994; Haas 
1992).  
   There is evidence that social justice NGOs working within their societies 
have been successful in fighting for the human rights of indigenous peoples. 
For example, the Guatemalan umbrella NGO, Unidad de Accion Sindical y 
Popular (UASP), has undertaken activities on a number of social justice 
issues, including lobbying for the rights of Mayan groups (McCleary, 1996). 
Other research on human rights NGOs has shown that cooperative networks 
of international, national and local organizations have often contributed to a 
change of political and legal circumstances in states in which human rights 
have been systematically violated (e.g., Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999).  
   The effectiveness of local organizations working on these issues is difficult 
to measure. Since these NGOs work on a smaller scale and are far less 
documented than the big and supra-national organizations, they are often out 
of the public eye. This makes it especially important to concentrate more 
research on this type of organization. 
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Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace Work 
   Peace NGOs involved in global networks develop “value communities” to 
pursue objectives in a culturally transcendent way (Muller 1998). For 
example, while human rights organizations may differ in the importance they 
place on individual and collective political and social rights, they all demand 
habeas corpus rights. Consensus concerning core rights and objectives that 
are jointly pursued is the first element needed for the emergence of such a 
value community. The second element is rooted in practice. NGOs hold to 
the principle that ordinary citizens, and not only official power holders, have 
the right to act for public issues. This orientation cuts across specific political 
preferences, transcending the cultural differences between them. The third 
element is the pursuit of intercultural dialogue, which is necessary for 
successful networking, which can create a common reference system and a 
basis for discourse from the different groups' value repertories.  
   These elements show that people are able to adjust values, perceptions and 
language from different environments and historical experiences, and to 
overcome cultural and ethno-specific images of the “enemy”. This is 
necessary if NGOs are to play a role in peace building (Lane 1995) and in the 
development of a "culture of peace" - a value orientation and practice of 
dialogue directed towards bridging gaps (Ropers 1995). NGOs can help 
conflicting parties by serving in a mediating function. This is especially 
important when the actors are either unable or unwilling to engage in 
dialogue, often the case in acute phases of a conflict (Weiss & Nazarenko 
1996). NGOs that develop in societies ripped by conflict often try to first 
cooperate with NGOs from the other side, and then bring back their 
experiences to their own societies (Lederach 1994).  
   In different phases of violent conflicts, NGOs engage in other kinds of 
activity (Weiss & Nazarenko 1996). During the acute phase of a conflict, 
NGOs usually pressure political leaderships to end the violence, to enter into 
negotiations, and counter lack of connections on the political level with the 
beginnings of a social dialogue. During the peace-building phase, NGOs try 
to increase their societies’ abilities for peace and to strengthen dialogue with 
the conflict partner. This is difficult since cooperation entails coping with 
obstacles such as: cultural differences between the partners and different 
delimiting identities rooted in contrary narratives of the conflict and its 
history (Faure & Rubin 1993; Wedge 1986); asymmetric relations between 
the partners with regard to power, competence and resources; security 
problems facing both sides (Posen 1993); and calculations of costs and 
benefits unfavourable for cooperation (Holl 1993). 
   An example of how NGOs can aid peace-building efforts in a society 
recovering from an ethnic conflict comes from the case of Bosnia – 
Herzegovina. Gagnon (1998) reports that international and local NGOs have 
used four strategies to work toward the prevention of further violence: 
changing the political structures and institutions of the society; party building 
and civic education; building local non-political party NGO capacity; and 
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reconstruction and development as a means of strengthening the community 
and civil society. He also notes that more successes occurred when 
international NGOs funded activities developed by local NGOs that reflected 
the people’s real needs and concerns. However, Demichilis (1998), who also 
studied NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reported that international NGOs 
often failed in their work, due to their tendency to become embroiled in local 
politics, their constant advertisement of their work – which often caused bad 
feelings among the population who felt that reconstruction of their society 
was being taken out of their hands and orchestrated by international 
organizations – and due to competition among the organizations to be 
“number one.” Demichilis notes that for NGOs to be successful, there is a 
need for a concerted coordination of activities, and that they must support 
local NGOs and people so they will be able to continue with the work once 
the internationals have gone home.  
   There are other ways in which NGOs can also help in peace-building work. 
NGOs working toward dialogue enhancement can engage in conflict 
management and in joint social projects to demonstrate the material benefits 
of peace to society and to change its calculations of benefits (Weiss & 
Nazarenko 1996). As soon as the conflict partner is no longer perceived as a 
threat, but rather as a partner with common interests, peace becomes 
attractive. This enlarges the "Peace Constituency" (Lederach 1995) - the 
circle of those who support peace. This strategy, which makes it easier for 
the sides to reconcile their interests (Senghass 1992), parallels knowledge 
gained from mediation research that has shown that it is important to 
distinguish between positions that are often tied to identities and interests in a 
conflict.  
   However, scholars/practitioners are not in complete agreement on whether 
separation is possible when it comes to issues of one’s identity. This is 
because one’s identity is seen as being deeply connected to the relationship 
that exists between partners. As a result, some researchers aver that issues of 
identity cannot be marginalized; they must be tackled (Bar-On 2000 a). This 
is especially true of the Palestinian - Israeli case, since the identities of the 
two peoples are interdependent; neither side appears able to define its own 
separate identity without relating to the “enemy” (Kelman 1999).  
   The centrality of addressing issues of identity when undertaking peace 
work crucial to any approach we take. We believe that groups involved in a 
protracted and violent conflict that decide to enter into cooperation for their 
mutual benefit need to devote part of the time to a dialogue about their 
relationships. The repression of different experiences and points of view may 
pose a latent danger and destroy cooperation during critical points of the 
project (Francis & Ropers 1997). 
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Non-governmental organizations in peace projects in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict 
   NGO peace work in the Palestinian Authority (PNA) and Israel has taken 
two forms: (a) the “peace movement”, whose activities are directly related to 
peace seeking, and (b) joint, practice-oriented projects in different social 
realms that pursue peace through indirect means. Before the Oslo 
agreements, NGOs tended to initiate contacts across the conflict line and 
exert pressure on their governments to begin negotiations. In the next stage, 
NGOs continued to act as pressure groups during the often-difficult peace 
process. However, it became more important for them to help prepare their 
societies for peaceful coexistence and mutual co-operation (Zartman 1998).  
   At a conference, organized by PRIME in 1999, over 40 Israeli and 
Palestinian NGOs convened, some of which had been involved in 
cooperative projects (Adwan & Bar-On 2000; Maoz 2000a). While most of 
these NGOs were working solely within their own societies, they showed 
willingness for cooperation. The NGOs that were engaged in cooperative 
projects were working in the educational, economic, human rights, and 
health, social, and environmental policy realms.  
   Adwan & Bar-On (2000) noted results in joint economic and political work 
that the cardinal problem was found to be the asymmetrical relations between 
the groups. Asymmetry between the NGOs, which reflects the distribution of 
power in the Israeli-Palestinian context, was evaluated by examining levels 
of experience within the organizations, degree of professionalism, 
availability of resources, and the degree to which organizations are 
embedded in a developed civil society (for a discussion of asymmetry, see 
Maoz 2000b, in press). The Israeli partners were found to have the advantage 
in all of these respects.  
   A second difficulty found in the joint work was rooted in the bad relations 
that have often existed between the two peoples. In joint projects, the 
Palestinian participants tended to focus on the low regard with which the 
Israelis often treat their people, and to make this the central issue during their 
work. This behavior often caused the Israeli side to become defensive, and as 
a result, the actual topic of cooperation often got lost.  
   The third problem concerned language. Since, in general, the Israelis and 
Palestinians do not know one another’s language, English remains the 
working language. Here the Israelis also tend to have the advantage, 
increasing asymmetric relations. Hidden behind this inability to speak the 
other’s language was a fourth problem, a deeper one of cultural differences. 
Israelis tend to be less aware of cultural differences than the Palestinians, and 
this ignorance causes them to make mistakes in joint projects, such as not 
being sensitive to Palestinian cultural norms concerning proper male – 
female public interaction. This has led to more misunderstandings and bad 
feelings.  
   The fifth problem concerning joint work was the Palestinians’ limited 
freedom of movement due to security measures imposed by the Israeli 
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government and military. This was connected to the difficult problem of 
disengaging the political disturbances from the joint work.  
   Based on the above knowledge, PRIME undertook a pilot study of 
Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs. We chose to focus on 
environmental NGOs since joint ecology work was seen as promising for 
peace building due to its ability to be a border-transcending objective for 
both Palestinians and Israelis. A second reason is connected to the ecological 
conditions of the region: the land is densely populated, semiarid, suffers from 
a water shortage, and has problematic waste management and sewage 
systems. In addition, although levels of development in Israel and in the PNA 
differ, intensive agriculture and industrial development have damaged the 
environment. From a theoretical point of view, we hoped that this study 
would lead to information important for civil society actors involved in the 
peace process. From a practical point of view, we assumed that if we found 
the environmental NGOs successful in their joint work, this could lead to the 
development of a culture of peace between Israelis and Palestinians. 
   Due to limitations of space, we will focus here on NGOs that have worked 
on collaborative projects. We looked at their reasons for doing so, their 
understandings of the connection between the state of the environment and 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process, and obstacles 
encountered in this work.  
 
Method 
 
   In April 2000, we convened to plan the study. The research methods 
changed over time for two main reasons. First, as we gathered information, 
we learned which organizations were worthwhile to interview and how to 
better go about collecting the information we were interested in. More 
importantly, the outbreak of the Intifada made further data collection 
impossible, and made our regular joint staff meetings, almost an 
impossibility.  
 
The Sample 
The Joint Sample: We interviewed the three jointly run Palestinian-Israeli 
NGOs that deal with the environment. These included IPCRI – The Israel 
Palestine Center for Research and Information, FoEME – Friends of the 
Earth Middle East and PIES – Palestinian Israeli Environmental Secretariat.  
The Palestinian Sample: Representatives from thirty-seven Palestinian NGOs 
from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, were 
interviewed face-to-face, in their offices, and/or by telephone. The 
Palestinian team obtained a list of environmental NGOs from the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation. During the interviews, the team 
asked their interviewees to suggest additional names of NGOs for 
interviewing. The Palestinian environmental NGOs were categorized 
accordingly: 
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• Organizations that have cooperated with Israeli NGOs.  
• Organizations not-yet cooperating with Israeli NGOs, but willing 
to cooperate. 
• Organizations unwilling to cooperate with the Israeli side in the 
meantime or in the near future.  
   Results from the 12 NGOs that have cooperated with Israeli partners, and 
that agreed to be written about, are presented here.  
The Israeli Sample: In the overall Israeli sample, 19 NGOs, two academic 
institutions, and one Government Organization (The Parks Authority – 
interviewed due to its cooperative work with Palestinian partners) gave face-
to-face, tape-recorded interviews. The criteria for choosing the organizations 
to be interviewed in depth were:  
a) The organization engaged in cooperative work with 
Palestinians.  
b)  Other NGOs considered them important in the Israeli 
environmental context.  
c) The organization had been in existence for many years and/or 
was well known in Israel for its work. 
d) The NGO focused on different issues and/or different 
populations.  
   Most of the interviews were held in the offices of the organizations, but 
three took place in cafes (at the requests of the interviewees). Two key Israeli 
environmentalists were also interviewed to get an overall picture of the 
Israeli environmental movement. While the Israeli team conducted short 
interviews with an additional 10 organizations by telephone or electronic 
means, these NGOs are not presented here. This paper presents results on the 
16 NGOs that have engaged in cooperative work. The joint organizations that 
were interviewed are presented in Table 1, the Palestinian NGOs are 
presented in Table 2 and the Israeli organizations are presented in Table 3.  
 
Instruments: 
Data Collection: To learn about the NGOs, we formulated an interview guide 
(see Table 4 for the questions posed to NGOs that engaged in joint work). 
While we usually succeeded in covering the issues in the guide, it was not 
always possible to do so, due to time limitations and/or requests of the 
participants to talk about topics they deemed important. In general, after 
explaining the study, the interviewers let the NGO representatives talk freely. 
Questions were asked when the interviewee brought up a subject, or at the 
end, if the questions had not been addressed. At the end of the interviews, 
participants were asked if they had any suggestions concerning people/ 
organizations to interview. On the Palestinian side, the interviews were 
conducted in Arabic. On the Israeli side, 17 interviews were conducted in 
Hebrew and 5 in English. Both teams also learned about the NGOs by 
collecting written materials and publications from the organizations and by 
exploring their websites. These materials provided a “public” window into 
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the organization, and their utilization often saved time during the interview. 
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and four hours. 
Data Analysis and Procedure: First, each team mapped the environmental 
NGOs in their societies (finding there to be approximately 100 on each side). 
We compiled our lists by using Internet searches, talking to umbrella 
organizations and the ministries of environment, and by getting information 
from environmentalists. Acting on this information, we then decided to carry 
out in-depth interviews with the jointly run NGOs and with approximately 40 
organizations altogether (an equal number on each side). Although we used 
the interview guide developed for the study, we did not always receive 
answers to our questions about specifics of their joint activities. We attribute 
this to two main reasons. First, the NGO representatives, who were limited in 
the amount of time they could devote to the interview, wanted to present 
certain information about their organizations. We were consistently 
respectful of this request. Second, we were dealing with sensitive matters; if 
we did not receive detailed information about joint activities, we did not 
pressure the representatives to answer because we did not want them to feel 
that we were being critical of their work. Based on the interviewees’ 
tendencies to talk in generalities, we planned to do some joint observations of 
NGOs engaged in cooperative activities to see for ourselves what these 
projects looked like.  
   The teams gathered their information separately, meeting together every 
few weeks to exchange ideas and summaries of the interviews that had been 
prepared in English so all staff members could read them. These summaries 
included the interview conversation plus information about the NGO 
garnered from the organizations’ websites and/or publications. While these 
were not word-for-word transcripts, they were quite extensive and often 
contained direct quotes. This stage continued through September, 2000. 
When the Intifada began at the end of that month, further data collection, 
including our planned joint observations, became impossible.  
   After a month into the violence, when it became clear that there was not 
going to be a quick resolution of the conflict and that we could no longer 
continue on as planned, we decided that each team would analyze what they 
had managed to collect. As a result, the analysis processes were not identical 
for the two teams. While this was far from optimal, we believed that it was 
important to complete what we could. Even though we worked separately, 
we kept up some telephone and e-mail contact, sending our analyses to all 
team members for review and comment. We also succeeded in meeting twice 
in Jerusalem, since traveling to PRIME’s offices in Beit Jala was too 
dangerous.  
   Despite the differences in data analysis, each side wrote a one-page 
summary of each NGO, and compiled tables with descriptive information 
about the organizations. Each team also wrote a summary report of the NGOs 
it had interviewed, based on answers to the questions that the NGO 
representatives had given during the interview and on the information that we 
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had collected from their websites and publications. We also did more 
analytical work, trying to understand the NGOs’ views on the roles of their 
organizations within their societies, their perceptions of the “other”, and 
other issues related to the success or failure of their environmental – peace 
work (Adwan & Bar-On 2000).  
   In this paper, we focus on organizations that had engaged in cooperation. 
Using the sources of data collection noted above, we present the foci of their 
work, target populations, scope of activities and major projects, reasons for 
engaging in cooperative work, obstacles encountered in this joint work, 
perceptions of the state of the environment and its association to the ongoing 
conflict, and their perception of the influence of the peace agreement on the 
environment.  
    
Results 
 
   We will begin with the jointly run NGOs, and then move on to the 
Palestinian and the Israeli NGOs. Due to the current very sensitive political 
situation in Israel/PNA, we will present the Palestinian and the Israeli results 
without identifying which specific NGOs made specific comments.  
 
An Overview of Jointly Run NGOs (presented alphabetically) 
Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME) 
   In our study, a number of interviewees from both sides stated that this 
organization was an important link for NGOs who wanted to work on joint 
projects. Since its inception in 1994, FoEME, an umbrella organization for 
environmental NGOs in the PNA, Israel, Egypt and Jordan,  has focused on 
many environmental issues, all chosen jointly by their Middle Eastern 
partners. These projects are seen as having a social and economic impact for 
people of the region, reflecting FoEME’s manifest holistic view of the 
environment. This perspective was evident from their stated objectives, from 
their project diversity that aimed at improving the quality of the environment 
for different populations in the different countries, and from their extensive 
international networking. From the analysis of the interview, and from what 
was learned about FoEME from other environmentalists, FoEME appeared to 
be a creative organization in that it used a variety of methods and projects to 
further peace and help preserve the environment. We also found FoEME to 
have numerous links with government institutions, with organizations in all 
member countries, with universities and research centers, and with 
international NGOs. When our informants spoke of FoEME, they mentioned 
respect for their work and high level of professionalism.  
   FoEME has reached marginal populations to enhance capacity building, 
and the NGO appeared to be sensitive to their needs. An example of this type 
of work was their Renewable Energy Demonstration Program, a solar energy 
feasibility study that aimed at promoting sustainable communities by creating 
a “solar bridge for peace building” that would help develop clean energy for 
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domestic purposes, industrial needs and for water pumping. To reach 
different communities, FoEME established installations in Palestinian, 
Jordanian and Egyptian villages and in an Israeli kibbutz. 
   FoEME aimed to change the political status quo and to empower the 
Palestinians, as well as to strengthen the peace between Israel and Jordan, 
and Egypt. Evidence of this comes from their projects which took into 
account the needs of the member states such as their large scale Dead Sea 
Basin project and their study of the environmental impact that the 
Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) would have on the region. 
Israeli-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) 
   IPCRI, a jointly run Palestinian-Israeli policy-making think tank that was 
established in 1989, has focused on environmental as well as social issues, 
seeing the two realms as connected to one another. This is evident in that the 
environmental section is one of 5 departments that work on a number of 
social and political issues. Environmental issues are selected on the basis of 
their perceived importance to both Palestinians and Israelis. Programs have 
developed based on information gained at three “Shared Environment” 
conferences, which were held between 1994 – 1996, in which Palestinian and 
Israeli environmentalists discussed issues such as water management, 
industrialization, hospital waste management, agricultural trade and 
management of open spaces.  
   An example of a creative project that meshes with the overall goals of 
IPCRI is their environmental resolution-mediation program. This program, 
during the year and half of violence, managed to bring the participants from 
both sides together at one meeting in Turkey, and is currently jointly training 
Israelis and Palestinians to become arbitrators in environmental conflicts. 
IPCRI’s environmental section also works at reaching populations that tend 
to be marginalized to enhance capacity building. For example, they are 
working on involving women’s groups in environmental work and they are 
training Palestinians to become environmental professionals.  
   IPCRI has always proclaimed that it aims to change the political status quo 
and to empower the Palestinians. To achieve this goal, they devote much of 
their time  trying to influence decision-makers on both sides to work toward 
peaceful resolution of the conflict. Based on statements made by Israeli and 
Palestinian environmentalists, IPCRI is very well respected and perceived as 
experts at their work. 
Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat (PIES) 
   Until the outbreak of violence, PIES dealt with issues that encompassed 
environmental and social components. Since their establishment in 1997, 
they developed over 20 programs – although not all of them received 
funding. Much of their work has been in education with student groups, 
summer camps, youth groups and school projects. However PIES has not 
limited itself to educational work; it also helped bring together Palestinian 
and Israeli businessmen to learn and implement ISO 14001 – internationally, 
environmentally safe production standards. PIES also instigated a  
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Palestinian – Israeli team to work on environmental policy initiatives that 
hopes one day to present their findings to decision-makers in both Israeli and 
Palestinian governments.  
   Based on information from other environmentalists and from PIES itself, 
we understood that, at times, the organizations experienced some difficulties 
in implementing their work. The reason for this appears to be tied to their 
relative inexperience: PIES is a younger organization – both organizationally 
and in the environmental field -  than IPCRI and FoEME. PIES’ activities 
appear to be aimed at changing the status quo and at empowering the 
Palestinians. As in the above cases, other environmentalists noted their 
respect of PIES, stating that they did important work and that they were 
helpful in establishing contacts between environmental groups from the two 
societies. 
 
The Effect of the Al Aqsa Intifada on the Joint NGOs 
   After the eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada, we contacted the jointly run 
NGOs to see if they were still continuing their work. We learned that the 
FoEME office in East Jerusalem closed soon after the start of the Intifada, 
while their office in Amman remained in full operation. After the staff 
worked from their homes for a while, they opened two offices in Tel-Aviv 
and Bethlehem and hired additional staff for their offices and their fieldwork 
– comprised of equal numbers of Palestinians and Israelis. Their experts from 
both sides continue to meet, with more public events taking place in parallel 
fashion. IPCRI continued its work to keep dialogue open between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis. Like FoEME, they too had to relocate their 
offices from war-torn Bethlehem, and moved temporarily to safer Jerusalem. 
In the beginning, the political situation made it impossible for joint 
environmental projects to proceed. However, as IPCRI adjusted itself to the 
new situation, they began to implement some projects, most notably their 
training of environmental mediators. Concerning PIES, we were informed 
that this NGO could not carry out their planned activities after the Intifada 
began, and that the Israeli director left the organization in February 2001 
“…since there was no work….” However, the Palestinian director of PIES 
has remained with the organization and keeps in periodic contact with Israeli 
colleagues from environmental NGOs.  
   In summation, then, these jointly run NGOs were, on the whole, seen by 
Israeli and Palestinian environmentalists as being important players in the 
cooperative world. They aimed to change asymmetrical relations between the 
Israelis and Palestinians by working on a number of issues, with different 
populations, including marginal ones. However, the Al Aqsa Intifada had a 
major impact on the ways in which they could work. Offices had to be 
relocated, work often had to be done in parallel fashion, and there were 
changes in personnel. After the initial breakdown of peace talks and outbreak 
of violence, FoEME and IPCRI managed to continue on with their work to 
some degree, perhaps due to their ability to maintain their links with their 
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Palestinian and Israeli colleagues, their international contacts, and their 
diversity in activities.  
 
Overview of the Cooperating Palestinian Environmental NGOs 
 
   Twelve NGOs that participated in joint work agreed to be included in this 
study. The oldest of these organizations was established in the fifties, but 
most were founded in the late eighties and nineties. These NGOs focus on a 
number of areas including: protection of environment and water resources; 
development of educational and training programs and programs for 
environmental awareness; clean-up campaigns, tree planting; development of 
the rural and agricultural sector; scientific studies of water, soil and energy; 
conservation of wildlife; and consultation services and lobbying. All of the 
NGOs stated that the biggest environmental problem for the Palestinians was 
water. This was seen as being tied to Israeli control of the water resources, 
preventing the conducting of adequate studies to diagnose specific problems 
and find feasible solutions. The NGOs targeted different groups: farmers and 
rural populations, children, women, and decision makers. All 12 of the 
Palestinian NGOs have cooperated on projects with the Israelis on the 
national level as well as on local ones, and three of these NGOs have ties to 
international organizations. 
   When representatives from the Palestinian NGOs that had engaged in joint 
work with Israeli environmentalists were asked why they did so, they all 
stated that such work was necessary for protection of the environment and 
for exchange of important ecological information. The conditions most often 
stated as being important for engaging in joint work with Israelis included: 
the Palestinians must be treated as peers; the project must meet the needs of 
both sides; the Israeli partners are expected to state that they are against 
settlements in the occupied territories and Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem; 
the Israelis must commit themselves to providing the Palestinians with 
environmental facts about Israel; the project is suitable for the current 
situation; and that the Israeli partners are able to demonstrate an ability to 
solve environmental problems. The NGOs in our study stated that, for the 
most part, they saw the experience as being positive and that it met the needs 
of both sides. 
   When asked whether the conflict had hurt the environment, the Palestinian 
representatives unanimously answered yes. A number of Israeli practices 
were noted as having harmed the environment. All of the NGOs stated that 
confiscation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements was a major 
contributor to the deterioration of the environment. Since the 1967 war, all 
successive Israeli governments have either confiscated, or declared as closed 
areas, land in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The organizations 
remarked that Israeli settlements in the PNA have also led to the 
demolishment of houses, uprooting of thousands of trees and construction of 
numerous by-pass roads, for the sole use of Israeli settlers to link them to one 
 77
another while avoiding contact with the Palestinians. These practices have 
fragmented both Palestinian land and people, leading to overcrowding of 
urban areas and loss of open space.  
   A second negative effect of the conflict, noted by 9 of the NGOs, is the 
depletion of water resources, such as over pumping of the Gaza coastal 
aquifer, redirection of the Jordan River, and the transportation of water from 
one water basin to another. Palestinian interviewees stated that while the 
Israelis are digging new wells, Palestinians are blocked from using existing 
ones and only have access to 15 percent of the water.  
   Pollution was the third problem cited by all of the NGOs. Eight NGOs 
noted that wastewater from at least 9 Israeli settlements had been discharged 
to the nearby valleys without treatment, with 11 Palestinian localities being 
harmed by these actions. Three NGOs stated that they knew of at least two 
Israeli settlements that released its sewage and chemical waste from 
industrial plants into Palestinian valleys in both the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip and that solid waste from Israelis was being dumped on Palestinian 
land, fields, and roads. Seven representatives from the Palestinian NGOs 
stated that the Israeli government had constructed at least seven industrial 
zones in the West Bank, which often result in the flow of industrial 
wastewater into adjacent Palestinian lands. They noted that industrial solid, 
and often hazardous, waste generated by these factories is often collected and 
dumped in areas near Palestinian villages.   
   Deforestation and uprooting of trees was another consequence of the 
conflict noted by 10 of the Palestinian interviewees. They said that a great 
percentage of forests had been cut down in the territories, usually as a 
consequence of Israeli establishment of military bases, settlements, and by-
pass roads. Four of our interviewees spoke about military practices in the 
agricultural areas inside Palestine and the destruction of agricultural lands, 
especially during the crop and harvesting seasons, which were also cited as a 
problem. The lack of an environmental infrastructure in the Palestinian lands 
was noted by three of the NGOs as one of the major consequences of the 
conflict. No sanitary systems, wastewater treatment systems, or sewage 
systems were built during the 30 years of occupation.  
   The Palestinian environmental NGOs unanimously asserted that a 
comprehensive peace process would help in bringing about a change for the 
better in the environment. However, 7 of the 12 organizations stated that the 
Oslo peace process had not helped this process. Six noted that it was not the 
current peace process, per se, that had had a positive effect on the 
environment, but rather the establishment of the PA that had been a result of 
the process. The reason given for the failure of the Oslo peace process to 
strengthen the environment was that during the period of interim agreements, 
the Palestinians saw the establishment of new Jewish settlements on their 
lands, and a continuation of the Israeli negative practices against the 
Palestinian environment. The Palestinian informants stated that they felt that 
the Israelis were not living up to the peace agreement commitments. 
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However, all of the NGOs agreed that a comprehensive peace would create 
trust for joint projects, and that these projects could be an instrument for the 
enhancement of peace. 
 
Overview of the Israeli Environmental NGOs 
 
   All but one of the 16 Israeli NGOs that engaged in cooperative work with 
Palestinian partners were founded in the 1990s, most after the onset of the 
Oslo peace process. The organizations differed in size, scope, membership, 
and issues that they address, targeting many different populations such as 
children of all ages, students, minorities (such as Bedouin and Arab citizens 
of Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories), and business people. 
The activities most often undertaken by these organizations center on: 
protection of beaches; sustainable development; management of water 
resources; empowerment of Palestinian populations; activities against the 
construction of the Trans-Israel highway; environmental awareness and 
educational programs; training programs for environmental professionals; 
activism; activities for business people; and studies of wildlife, 
desertification, water, pollutants, and health issues. All of the NGOs in this 
sub-sample engaged in networking on the international level. The critical 
environmental problems noted by these Israeli organizations included water 
quality and shortage, sustainable development, and public transportation. The 
NGOs cited two main problems: the importance of widening the circle of 
activists for the environment and of having more success at influencing 
policy makers.  
   When the Israeli representatives talked about their willingness to cooperate 
with Palestinian partners, 6 of the organizations stated that cooperative work 
was a major focus of their work, seeing it as important for achievement of 
peace and a cleaner environment. Eleven NGOs said that they see 
environmental protection as even more important than cooperation with the 
Palestinians, even though they did also highly value cooperative work. 
Therefore, when problems arise during cooperation, if these problems 
interfere with the environmental work, taking care for the environment 
should take precedence over carrying on the collaborative projects.    
   All of the Israeli NGOs that stressed cooperation as the main focus of their 
work noted that they see the Palestinian partners as their peers and that it is 
important that the project meets the needs of both sides. These organizations 
appeared to be attuned to the asymmetric power relations that exist between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians and they stated that they tried to create equal 
relations in their work. Palestinian problems were seen as being Israeli 
problems; for example, 5 of the NGOs stated that when their Palestinian 
partners had trouble getting permission from the border police to enter Israel, 
the Israeli partners would personally intervene to get that permission. The 10 
NGOs that had engaged in cooperative projects, but that did not view these 
activities as being essential to their work, differed from the 6 NGOs that did, 
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in that they generally did not appear to be as aware that asymmetry between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians could explain why joint work was so difficult 
at times.  
   The representatives from the 6 Israeli NGOs who said that cooperative 
work was one of their major aims also noted their sensitivity to the political 
situation, acting in ways that suited the political climate. Fifteen of the 16 
NGOs evaluated this work as being mostly positive. They noted the 
importance of having and keeping up personal contacts. However, the 
interviewees stated that while there was an opening up of dialogue between 
the Israelis and Palestinians during the projects, they did not believe that 
enough real progress in solving environmental problems was being made.  
   All of the cooperating NGOs agreed that there is a connection between the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the damage that has been caused to the 
environment. However, none of the organizations saw the conflict as being 
the main reason for neglect. Eleven interviewees stated that Israelis tend to 
have such low regard and understanding for potential environmental dangers 
that even if there was no conflict, Israel would not be in a much different 
place environmentally then where it is today. While the conflict, therefore, 
was definitely seen as having a negative impact on the ecology, it could not 
carry the primary blame for environmental problems faced by Israel and 
Palestine today.  
   There were a number of reasons given for the connection between the 
conflict and the negative impact on the environment. These reasons included 
the Israeli governments’ overriding concern with problems of security over 
other social issues (noted by 6 organizations). This means that much money 
has gone to defence instead of to other purposes – including environmental 
issues. Four NGOs stated that the military has also caused damage, both in 
Israel and in the PNA, for example, when the IDF has uprooted trees in the 
territories in the name of security, or has left potentially toxic waste in open 
areas. Four NGOs also noted that expansion of settlements was detrimental 
to the shared environment; nature has been destroyed to build houses and 
roads that circumvent Palestinian villages. Water has also been poorly 
managed, often leaving Palestinians without enough good water while the 
Israeli government overextends the water supply in the settlements. Another 
reason given for disregard and/or damaging of the environment, which was 
noted by 11 NGOs, was unchecked “modern” development, which did not 
take the needs of the environment into consideration.  
   The Israeli representatives from the NGOs were asked how they thought a 
peace agreement would affect the environment. Six organizations believed 
that it would have both a positive and negative effect, 6 believed that it 
would positively help and four stated that they believed that a peace 
agreement could lead to further deterioration. This was based on the belief 
that a peace agreement would bring about more unchecked development, 
such as an increase in private cars that would travel between both countries, 
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causing increased air pollution, and an expansion of environmentally bad 
joint industries.  
 
Obstacles Encountered in Joint Work 
 
Obstacles Encountered by the Palestinians 
   Despite the overall positive evaluation, the NGOs stated that they did face 
obstacles in their joint work. According to the Palestinian interviewees, these 
included: lack of real dialogue between the sides; cultural differences; 
political disturbances, which often affected their freedom of movement; lack 
of information from Israelis concerning environmental problems within 
Israeli borders; attitudes toward publicizing of activities; and, finally, 
psychological problems.  
   When speaking about dialogue problems, 9 cooperating Palestinian NGOs 
noted that they often felt that each side “had its own agenda”, especially 
when working on applied studies. As a result, each side worked according to 
its own schedule and plans, basically only meeting at the end, in order to 
combine their data. This kind of working relationship often resulted in an 
imbalance not only in the work patterns, but also, in turn, in the final project 
results.  
   Another difficulty encountered in joint work was termed cultural 
differences, especially problematic in environmental summer camps held for 
Israeli and Palestinian youth, in which teenage boys and girls interacted with 
one another. The spokespeople for three of the Palestinian NGOs noted that 
Palestinian society tends to be conservative, and this is not always the case 
with Israeli society. For the Palestinians, the Israeli girl and boy adolescents 
appeared to be more open in their behavior with one another, than is 
normative for the Palestinians, engaging, at times, in practices that are 
considered to be shameful, prohibited and /or unacceptable in their society 
and culture. The Palestinian interviewees who had this experience felt that 
the Israelis were insensitive to this cultural difference, and that this caused an 
undercurrent of problems during the joint activities. 
   Five NGOs noted that political disturbances, closure of PNA areas, and 
outbreaks of the conflict negatively affected the cooperative projects in two 
main ways: the Israeli authorities often limited the Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement and the Palestinian Authority often issued directives to the 
Palestinian NGOs to cease joint work with the Israelis until the tense and 
violent period had passed. Another obstacle to be overcome was lack of 
information. One Palestinian NGO stated that they had problems completing 
their projects since they felt that the Israelis were not always forthright 
concerning environmental facts within Israel. This lack of information 
prevented them from carrying out their work in a manner they believed 
would truly benefit the environment. 
   A differing perspective on the publicizing of joint projects was yet another 
obstacle mentioned by most of the cooperating Palestinian NGOs. Ten NGOs 
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said that they saw the Israelis as being interested in publicizing joint projects 
in order to show the world that the two sides were cooperating, even during 
tense political times. In doing so, the Palestinian NGOs, in this study, stated 
that they thought that the Israelis were trying to influence international 
opinion, and at times, they found this disturbing.  
   Finally, 10 of the Palestinian interviewees noted that there were 
psychological obstacles that needed to be overcome. They stated that the 
years of occupation have made it very difficult for them to see the Israelis as 
anything else but occupiers and confiscators of their land, and demolishers of 
houses. Therefore, they believed that it would take time before they could 
truly see them in a different light and that while it was important for the 
Israelis to understand this, they did not appear to be sensitive to this issue.  
 
Obstacles Encountered by the Israelis 
   The obstacles to joint work mentioned by the Israeli NGOs included: 
political disturbances and problems with freedom of movement for the 
Palestinians, security measures which negatively affected the smooth running 
of activities, problems around “talking environment” or “talking conflict”, 
language barriers, instability in keeping up long-term partnerships, and 
different cultural norms when it came to taking action.  
   Eleven of the cooperating Israeli NGOs noted that upsurges of violence 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis often disrupted their work. This 
would lead to closures or curfews of PNA areas, and to a restriction in 
movement for the Palestinian partners, either because the Israeli military 
would not let them pass or because PNA officials issued orders to the NGOs 
to desist working with Israelis. When freedom of movement was obstructed, 
Israeli representatives said that they often intervened personally at the 
borders, in order to get military permission for their partners to enter Israel. 
During very violent times, activities were postponed or cancelled – either 
because the Palestinian partners were unwilling or unable to participate. 
Three NGOs also noted that venues of conferences were changed to neutral 
regions (e.g., Turkey) in order to solve this problem. 
   Tied to the first problem is the general issue of security. Eight of our Israeli 
informants told us that, at times, activities had to be planned and re-planned 
in order to meet security demands set forth by Israeli authorities and 
requirements of Palestinian and Israeli organizations involved in the 
activities. This problem was especially acute when children were involved; 
given security measures, it was often very difficult to find a venue for group 
activities that would be acceptable and suitable for the activities planned.  
   A more serious obstacle to undertaking joint activities was the issue of 
content of the meetings. Seven of the Israeli NGOs felt that the Palestinians 
were often more interested in talking about the conflict, stressing Israel’s 
responsibility for infringement of their human and civil rights, than on the 
environment – the manifest reason for meeting. While the environmentalists 
understood this need on the part of the Palestinians, seeing the importance of 
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dedicating part of their time together to discussing these issues, they felt that 
this had the effect of limiting the amount of real work on the environment 
that needed to be done, and that, at times, also put them on the defensive. 
   A language barrier was another obstacle mentioned by 5 of the 
organizations. Most of the activities had to be conducted in English in order 
to make communication possible. This proved to be very difficult when the 
activities centered on children or people who came from rural areas and/or 
had limited formal education. Often the participants would speak through a 
translator, which slowed down the process and made cross communication 
extremely difficult. This often led to participants working side-by-side, rather 
than together on a given project. Three of the Israeli interviewees also noted 
that an additional obstacle to joint work was that the Palestinian partners 
often changed on them. For example, they would hold one seminar, and 
when they met again to continue their work, a new group of Palestinian 
participants would come to the meeting. This lack of continuity was cited as 
limiting environmental progress. 
   The last obstacle, noted by 5 of our Israeli interviewees, was the difference 
in norms accepted by the Israelis and those accepted by Palestinians 
concerning the role of NGOs in civil society. While the Israelis tended to see 
themselves as willing to partake in “civil disobedience” and to protest 
government actions and policies detrimental to the environment, they 
mentioned that the Palestinians tended to “toe the PNA government line” – 
behavior that they found to be at odds with the essence of NGO work. While 
some of the Israeli participants understood that the Palestinians’ political and 
social situation did not permit them to be as outspoken as they could, at times 
– even noting that this had been the case for Israelis in the early days of 
statehood – they felt that this behavior kept the parties from undertaking the 
environmental work they had set out to do. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
   We embarked on our study of environmental NGOs in Israeli and the PNA 
in order to learn not only what issues interest regional environmentalists, and 
how they deal with them, but also to learn how their work relates to the 
conflict and peace building efforts. The renewal of violence between the 
sides prevented us from completing our data collection and analysis as we 
would have liked, leaving many questions unanswered. In spite of this, we 
see a number of points and tentative conclusions that can be put forth.  
   To begin with, it is fair to say that the environment has become an 
important issue for civil actors in both societies. This has led to the 
establishment of many NGOs on each side, many since the mid 1990s, when 
the Oslo peace process opened the door for many new ventures. We found 
that the sides agree, that for too many years, significant damage has been 
done to the environment and that immediate steps must be taken to forcibly 
address these issues. Furthermore, there is also consensus among these 
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NGOs that the issues that affect one country affect the other. Therefore, 
sharing of knowledge and pooling of resources is needed, to at least some 
extent, if the problems are to be solved. This assumption, reminiscent of the 
claim made by Holl (1993) and the UNESCO reports (1998) concerning the 
benefit of pursuing joint goals, as opposed to unilateral interests, made it 
possible for Israeli and Palestinian NGOs to work together on a variety of 
projects that reached a variety of populations.  
   In spite of the agreement that the environment needs serious looking after, 
the Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, which were presented in this paper, did not 
wholly agree on the sources of the ecological deterioration, or on the ways 
that this deterioration could be stopped, including their part in these efforts. 
While the Palestinian NGOs did not believe that it is possible to disengage 
the conflict and the state of the environment from one another, the Israeli 
environmentalists did not always hold this view. These differences in 
perception have led to different explanations concerning the roots of 
environmental deterioration, the willingness to work with the other side on 
joint environmental projects, the obstacles to be overcome in joint work, and 
the connection between resolution of the conflict and improvement of the 
environment. We also experienced the consequences of these differences 
firsthand as we worked on our study. For example, the Palestinian team was 
confronted with over 10 NGOs that refused to participate in our study when 
they were told that it was a joint Israeli – Palestinian venture. They stated 
that participation would legitimize the asymmetric relationships between the 
two peoples, something that they were not yet prepared to do. Furthermore, 
after the onset of the Al Aqsa Intifada, none of the Palestinian NGOs that had 
participated in our study agreed to provide any more information. While the 
Israeli team did not succeed in securing interviews with all of the NGOs that 
it approached, these were never the reasons given for non-participation, 
neither before nor during the Al Aqsa Intifada.  
   Perceptions of environmental issues are reminiscent of other issues 
connected to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. Scholars, working from a 
variety of disciplines on the conflict (e.g. Adwan & Firer 2000; Bar-On 
2000b; Bickerton & Klausner 2002; Kelman 1999; Said 1990), have noted 
that the Palestinian and Israeli narratives concerning the history of the region, 
legitimate claims to the land, roots of the conflict and the reasons for its 
insolvability are diametrically opposed to one another. As a result of these 
opposite perceptions, Palestinian environmentalists see the Israeli occupation 
of Palestinian lands, and their general disregard for the Palestinian people, as 
being the reasons that so much damage has been caused to the environment, 
whereas Israeli environmentalists see deterioration of the environment as 
being a result of general ignorance, disregard and low priorities on the part of 
state institutions.  
   This difference in understanding does not remain solely on the theoretical 
level, but affects the practical level as well. Cooperating Palestinian NGOs 
do not see the point of “talking environment” without “talking occupation”. 
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The Israelis, however, tend to see “talking conflict” as a detour from “talking 
environment.” In our opinion, these differences not only reflect problems in 
communication between the two sides but also reflect the asymmetric power 
relationships that exist between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Gidron & 
Katz 1998; Rouhana & Kelman 1994; Suleiman 1997) and can be explained 
in the following way. 
   When the organizations were engaged in their joint work, during the last 
years of the 1990s, the Israeli NGOs enjoyed a social-political context very 
different from that of their Palestinian counterparts. They had emerged from, 
and were embedded in, a developed civil society that had a stable economy 
and an established infrastructure. Furthermore, Israel still retained a great 
degree of military and civil control over Palestinian people and lands. The 
social environment was different for the Palestinian NGOs, however; the 
PNA was in the throes of nation building, it had just begun to build its 
infrastructure and much of its land, peoples and institutions were still under 
Israeli occupation. Of the two sides, the Israeli NGOs were clearly the 
dominant party and, at times, some of them appeared to be oblivious to the 
life conditions of their Palestinian partners. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
learn that during cooperative projects, the sides often held different 
conceptions of “reality”, especially concerning whether or not the conflict 
was nearing its end, and how they should go about their joint work. This can 
help account for the tendency of the Israeli NGOs to perceive the conflict as 
near its end, almost part of the past, and for their desire to address other 
issues, such as the environment, that had been overlooked for years, without 
dwelling on the occupation. On the Palestinian side, however, the 
organizations still saw their societies as being embroiled in the conflict, with 
its end still out of reach. Therefore, they tended to object to Israeli NGO 
behavior that appeared to them to be trivialization and/or ignoring of 
problems of oppression and inequality that still affected their everyday lives 
and did not see the point in talking about improving the environment that 
without discussing the continuing occupation.  
   This asymmetry in beliefs, practices, and realities can help explain why the 
Israelis were unable, at times, to understand the importance of making time 
for the Palestinians to openly talk about their negative feelings and 
experiences that they encountered over the years of occupation (Shikaki 
1998). In addition, we believe that the differences mirrored great unease, on 
the part of the Israeli environmentalists, when Palestinian partners accused 
Israelis of having purposely harmed the Palestinian environment. Therefore, 
while we believe that the reasons given by the Israeli NGOs for the poor state 
of the environment definitely capture many truisms, their relative 
minimization of the effects of the conflict on the environment may be a 
defense mechanism that they employed when confronted with the Palestinian 
allegations.  
   As Gidron and Katz found in their 1998 study, the Palestinian 
environmental NGOs interviewed for our study constituted the minority 
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group in their relationships with the Israeli organizations. They possessed 
less resources, influence, and experience than the Israelis, and they were 
working in a society that is in a very different developmental stage. It is no 
wonder, therefore, that these differences in power relations and life 
circumstances lead the Palestinians to see the Israeli occupation of their lands 
as being tied to the poor state of their environment while they lead the 
Israelis to attributing other factors to environmental damage and neglect. 
This may also explain the differences in foci of environmental work; whereas 
the Palestinian NGOs tended to focus on issues directly connected to the 
occupation, such as land confiscation, the Israeli NGOs focused on more 
“neutral” and post-conflict issues, such as public transportation. 
   Our results also showed that when the two sides came together for joint 
work, they tended to do so for different reasons. The Palestinian NGOs 
emphasized that they engaged in cooperative projects with Israelis, not 
mainly because this work was important for the furthering of peace efforts, 
but because it was necessary for combating environmental damage and for 
preventing further deterioration. The Israeli NGOs, however, tended to link 
environmental work to peace work, seeing it as a boundary transcending 
process that could help solidify the peace process (Lane et al. 1995; Muller 
1998). From this, we tentatively conclude here that, in spite of the effort and 
hard work that went into the projects carried out by the environmental NGOs 
from both sides, they did not really succeed in building “value communities” 
that helped them pursue their environmental objectives in culturally 
transcendent ways (Muller 1998). Furthermore, they had also not yet 
achieved a “culture of peace” (Ropers 1995) – a condition that may be 
important for NGOs working in societies in conflict that are trying to help 
the peace process along. This becomes even clearer when we note that since 
the renewal of violence, there have been very few instances of joint 
environmental/peace work. 
   As a final point, we will relate to the different perceptions that the 
Palestinian and Israeli NGOs appeared to hold concerning their role within 
their societies. Whereas the Israelis tended to hold a more traditional view of 
NGOs (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Weiss & Gordenker 1996), as 
organizations that work outside the realm of state power, and are often at 
odds with official power holders, the Palestinian NGOs appeared to 
distinguish to a much lesser degree their work from that of the PNA 
government. This was evident in their avoidance of criticizing their 
government, of acting in accordance with directives handed down by the 
Authority during times of crisis, and their reticence about engaging in acts of 
civil disobedience. This result leads us to the understanding that, at the 
present, the social structures of the two societies differ so much from one 
another that environmentalists working within Israel and the PNA hold 
essentially different definitions of the role that NGOs should be playing. We 
see this difference as not merely a semantic one, but as one that also 
demands to be jointly explored by parties engaged in cooperative work. 
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Perhaps after the PNA achieves official statehood, the Israeli occupation is 
ended, and a significant reduction in violence occurs, the Palestinian NGOs 
will reassess their role, adopting the more commonly held definition of 
NGOs.  
 
Endnote 
 
   Attempting to complete this study during the Al Aqsa Intifada was very 
difficult for us, from both a professional and emotional standpoint. The 
Palestinian researchers often found themselves in life-threatening and 
frightening situations and the Israelis could offer little more than small words 
of comfort. We were all exposed to the violence, which surrounded us, and to 
the intransigence of political leaders on both sides. As a result, the 
importance of our project paled in comparison to the meaning that the daily 
killings, maiming and destruction was having for our region. Perhaps the 
main conclusions that we have reached from this joint venture is that the 
good relationships, which appeared to characterize the Palestinian and Israeli 
environmental partners, were so fragile, that once there was a renewed 
eruption of violence, the desire and ability to keep up any level of 
cooperative work virtually disappeared. This has led us to the deeper 
understanding that achievement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis is 
a very long, difficult and multi-layered process. It is a process that not only 
demands time, but also deep long-lasting changes in perception concerning 
the other side. As long as the social and political relationships do not 
significantly change between the two peoples, then these joint ventures will 
remain susceptible to the forces that would pull them apart.  
 
References 
 
Adwan, S., & Bar-On, D. The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in  
Peace Building between Palestinians and Israelis. Jerusalem: Peace 
Research Institute in the Middle East and the World Bank, 2000. 
Adwan, S. and Firer, R.The Narrative of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict In  
History and Civics Textbooks and Curricula Statement. Georg Eckert 
Institute: Braunschwieg, Germany, 2000. 
Bar-On, D. “Cultural identity and demonization of the other: Lessons from  
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” In A.Y. Shalev & R. Yehuda, eds. 
The International Handbook of Human Response to Trauma (pp. 115 
– 125), NY: Plenum Press, 2000a.  
Bar-On, D. (ed.) Bridging the Gap: Storytelling as a Way to Work through  
Political and Collective Hostilities. Hamburg: Korber-Stiftung,  
2000b.  
Bicketeron, I.J. & Klausner, C. L. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli  
Conflict. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002.  
Clark, A.M. (1995). “Non-governmental organizations and their influence on  
 87
international society.” Journal of International Affairs, 48, Winter, 
1995, pp. 507-525. 
Dardy de Oliveira, M. & Tandon, R. (eds.) Citizens, Strengthening Global  
 Civil Society. Washington: Civicus, 1994. 
Demichelis, J. NGOs and Peacebuilding in Bosnia’s Ethnically Divided  
Cities. United States Institute of Peace Special Report, 1998. 
Faure, G. O. & J.R. Rubin (eds.). Culture and Negotiation. Newbury  
 Park/London/New Delhi, 1993. 
Francis, D. & Ropers, N. Peace Work by Civil Actors in Post-Communist  
Societies. Berghof  Occasional Paper No. 10. Berlin: Berghof  
Institute, 1997.  
Gagnon, C. International Non-Governmental Organizations in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Report prepared for Columbia University Project on 
Evaluating Western NGO Strategies for Democratization and the 
Reduction of Ethnic Conflict in the Former Communist States, 1998.  
Gehring, T. Dynamic International Regimes: Institution for International  
  Environment Governance, Frankfurt/Main, 1994. 
Gidron, B. & Katz, S. The International Study of Peace Conflict Resolution  
Organizations: Preliminary Findings. Paper presented at the Third 
Conference of the International Society of Third Sector Research, 
Geneva, 1998. 
Haas, P.M. “Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy  
coordination.” International Organization, 46 (1), pp.1-35, 1992.  
Holl, J.E. “When war doesn't work.” In R. Licklider (ed.) Stopping the  
Killing: How Civil Wars End (pp. 269 – 291). New York/London,  
1993. 
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in  
International Politics. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press,  
1998. 
Kelman, H. (1999). Transforming the relationship between former enemies:  
A social-psychological analysis. In R. Rothstein, (Ed.), After the 
Peace: Resistance & Reconciliation. (pp.193-205). London: Lynne 
Rienner.  
Lahusen, C. “Grundmuster und Kontextfaktoren globalen kollektiven  
Handelns” Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, 9 (2), pp. 
42-51, 1996. 
Lane, E. “‘Agenda for peace' and NGOs.” Peace and the Sciences, 25, pp.  
 28-55, 1995. 
Lederach, J.P. Building Peace, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided  
 Societies. Tokyo: UN University, 1994. 
Lederach, J.P. Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across  
 Cultures. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 
Maoz, I. “Issues in Grassroots Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation: A Report on  
the Discussion Panels on NGOs.” In Adwan, S. & Bar-On, D., eds. 
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace Building 
 88
between Palestinians and Israelis, The Peace Research Institute in 
the Middle East Conference. Beit Jala, Israel/PNA, 2000a.  
Maoz, I. “Power relations in inter-group encounters: A case study of Jewish- 
Arab encounters in Israel.” International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations, 24: pp.259-277, 2000b. 
Maoz, I. “Participation, control and dominance in communication between  
groups in conflict: Analysis of dialogues between Jews and 
Palestinians in Israel.” Social Justice Research, in press. 
Muller, H. Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen, Ein Gegenentwurf zu  
  Huntigton. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer TB, pp.236-240, 1998. 
Posen, B. “The security dilemma in ethnic conflict.” Survival, 35 (1), 27-47,  
  1993. 
Risse, T., Ropp, S. & Sikkink, K. The Power of Human Rights: International  
Norms and Domestic Change. New York: Cambridge, 1999.  
Ropers, N. Friedliche Einmischung, Strukturen, Prozesse und Strategien zur  
  Zentrum für konstruktive Konfliktbehandlung, Report No.1, pp. 37- 
 42, 1995. 
Rouhana, N., & Kelman, H. “Promoting joint thinking in international  
conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian continuing workshop.” Journal of 
Social Issues, 50, pp. 157-178, 1994. 
Rucht, D. “Multinationale Bewegungsorganizationen: Bedeutung,   
Bedingungen, Perspektiven, Internationale Kampagnen.” 
Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, 9 (2,), pp. 30-41, 
1996. 
Said, E. “Zionism from the standpoint of its victims.” In D.T. Goldberg, ed.  
Anatomy of Racism (pp. 210 – 246), Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990. 
Senghaas, D. Friedensprojekt Europa. Frankfurt/Main, 1992.  
Shikaki, K. “The internal consequences of unstable peace: Psychological and  
political responses of Palestinians.” In R. Rothstein, ed. After the 
Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation. London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990. 
Spiro, P. J. “New global communities: Non-governmental organizations and  
their influence in international decision-making institutions.” The 
Washington Quarterly, 18, Winter, pp. 45-56, 1995. 
Suleiman, R. “The planned encounter between Israeli Jews and Palestinians  
as a microcosm: A social-psychological perspective.” Studies in 
Education, 1(2), pp. 71-85, 1997 [in Hebrew]. 
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories:  
B’tselem (May 22, 2002). Statistics. URL http://www.btselem.org 
UNESCO. Consolidated Report to the United Nations on a Culture of Peace:  
  CORR, UNESCO, Executive Board, 1998.  
Union of International Associations (May 22, 2002). International  
 89
organizations by type (Table 1). Yearbook of International 
Organizations 1999/2000 edition. URL 
http://www.uia.org/uiastats/ytb199.htm 
Wedge, B. (1986). “Psychology and the Self in Social Conflict.” In E.E. Azar  
& J. Burton, eds. International Conflict Resolution: Theory and 
Practice (pp. 56 – 62), Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986.  
Weiss, T.G.& Gordenker, L. (eds.) NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance,  
  Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 
Weiss, A. & Nazarenko, A.Strategies and Needs of NGOs Dealing with 
Ethnopolitical Conflicts in the New Eastern Democracies. Berghof 
Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 
1996. 
Zartmann, W. Negotiation as a mechanism for resolution in the Arab-Israeli  
Conflict. Paper presented at Peacemaking and negotiations in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 17-19 Nov. 1998. 
 
Table 1: Jointly Run Palestinian and Israeli NGOs 
 
Name of 
Organization 
Objectives Main activities 
Friends of the 
Earth Middle 
East (FoEME) – 
umbrella 
organization for 
NGOs in Israel, 
PNA, Jordan and 
Egypt 
Furthering regional 
sustainable development 
& peace; protection of 
the environment; 
creation of necessary 
conditions for lasting 
peace; capacity building 
& information sharing 
 
 
Networking, conferences & 
workshops,  projects 
focusing on transboundary 
ecosystems (e.g., Dead Sea 
Basic, sustainable tourism 
for the Gulf of Aqaba); 
renewable energy project; 
environmental impact of 
the Mediterranean Free 
Trade Zone, renewable 
energy demonstration 
program, environmental 
awareness programs; 
Middle Eastern 
environmental newsletter; 
independent environmental 
assessments of new 
projects associated with the 
peace process; evaluation 
of  relationship between 
investments & sustainable 
peace with governments, 
private investors, financial 
institutions & the media 
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Israel/Palestine 
Center for 
Research and 
Information 
(IPCRI) 
Work toward peace 
through dialogue & 
negotiation, 
development of 
mechanisms for 
attainment & 
sustainability of peace, 
influencing policy & 
decision-makers. 
Objectives of 
environment section -- 
concentration on joint 
preservation of 
environment, equality in 
knowledge, management 
of resources & resolution 
of environmental 
conflicts.  
Conferences on water 
management, hospital 
waste management, 
agricultural trade, 
industrialization, 
management of open 
spaces; expert meetings, 
research on air pollution, 
lead emissions, hazardous 
waste & micro-nutrient 
deficiency, publications, 
extension of library and 
data-base, involvement of 
women in environmental 
projects, courses on 
environmental issues, 
Environmental Mediation 
Center, small projects for 
water and waste 
management 
Palestinian Israeli 
Environmental 
Secretariat (PIES) 
To forge Palestinian-
Israeli commitment to 
joint environmental 
protection by bringing 
together people from 
different sectors; to 
develop shared discourse 
& re-orientation of 
attitudes concerning the 
"other"; to promote 
sustainable development; 
to create mechanism for 
development of joint 
environmental projects 
that will upgrade the 
environmental 
infrastructure; to support 
Palestinian & Israeli 
NGOs in carrying out 
joint projects; to 
influence decision 
makers 
Educational Programs – 
environmental summer 
schools for Palestinian and 
Israeli youth, Nature 
Knows No Boundaries, 
One Blue Sky Above Us; 
training courses for 
teachers; sustainable 
environmental Programs – 
ISO 9000 & ISO 14001 for 
Israeli and Palestinian 
business people; Student-
to-Student Projects; 
Palestinian-Israeli 
Environmental Policy 
Initiative; Community 
Environmental Advocacy; 
Palestinian center for 
environmental research in 
Jericho. 
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Table 2 – Cooperating Palestinian Organizations and Areas of Interest 
(alphabetically ordered) 
 
Name  Main areas of interest 
Applied Research Institute of 
Jerusalem 
Soil, water, air & other environmental 
elements studies 
Association of Environment 
Protection 
Environmental awareness programs & 
environmental summer camps 
Center for Agricultural 
Services 
Developing the agricultural sector  
Environmental Protection and 
Research Institute  
Research & development programs in 
environmental and public health issues. 
Green Peace Association Environmental awareness campaigns, 
Marine & fishery research programs, 
waste management & protection of natural 
reserves 
Palestinian Agricultural Relief 
Committees 
Developing the agricultural sector & 
improving rural areas 
Palestinian Hydrology Group Groundwater, surface water, public 
awareness training programs 
Palestinian Society for the 
Protection  
of Environment and Nature 
Environmental awareness programs  & 
environmental summer camps 
Soil, Water and Environment  
Institute 
Water, wastewater & soil analysis 
Water and Environmental 
Development Organization 
Research in the environmental field, 
consultancy, training & education 
Water and Environment  
Studies Center 
Applied research in the fields of water, 
wastewater & soil. 
Wildlife Palestine Society Conservation & management of 
biodiversity, education & promotion of 
wildlife and nature 
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Table 3: Classification of Cooperating Israeli Organizations with their 
Main Activities (alphabetically ordered in each category) 
 
Cooperation Not the Main Focus Cooperation Important 
B’tselem – water study of the 
Occupied Territories 
Arava Institute for Environmental 
Studies (AIES) – training of 
environmental professionals, 
scientific research, environmental 
awareness, policy making 
Coalition for Public 
Transportation – activities against 
construction of trans-Israel highway 
Blaustein Institute for Desert 
Research (Ben Gurion University) 
– Rangeland Project 
Galilee Society – health related 
environmental issues among 
Palestinian-Israeli population, data 
collection, advocacy 
Hebrew University – Joint 
Palestinian – Israeli management of 
aquifer 
Green Action – civil disobedience 
actions against globalization, trans-
Israel highway, waste management, 
beach deteroriation 
International Center for Bird 
Studies (Migratory Birds Know No 
Boundaries) – research & 
educational activities 
Greencourse – national university 
student organization involved in 
activities against trans-Israel 
highway construction, waste 
management, globalization 
Living Weave – educational wildlife 
projects 
Heschel Center – educational 
center, training of environmental 
professionals 
Negev Institute for Peace and 
Development – empowerment of 
Palestinian people in many different 
areas 
Israel Economic Forum for the 
Environment – “green standards” 
for Israeli & Palestinian businesses 
Life & Environment – umbrella 
organization of Israeli environmental 
& social NGOs 
Sustainable Jerusalem – 
sustainable development in greater 
Jerusalem 
Sustainable Negev – sustainable 
development of the Negev, joint 
water project with Palestinian 
partners 
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Table 4: Environmental NGO Questionnaire Guide 
Information and background about the director/interviewee 
Who are they?      Profession      Experience in environmental issues    
Full/part time employment 
 
Part 1 - General information about the NGO: 
Organization name Address  Phone & fax numbers  E-
mail & web site addresses 
Contact People  Date of foundation Objectives of this NGO 
 
Main activities 
Completed projects and projects for near future. 
Funding sources  
Scope  
Experience with cooperation? If yes move to part 2, if no move to part 3 . 
 
Part 2 – Questions for NGOs that have experienced cooperation  
What are the reasons that made this organization dedicated to protect the 
environment? 
Who were/are your partners? 
How long have you been cooperating?  
List of completed work and projects you have done together 
Describe a project(s) that you have done together. How was it initiated & 
contact made? Who was responsible for the planning (one side, two sides, 
together)? How many people from each side participated? Describe the 
actual event – did people work together or separately? What was good about 
the activity? What was problematic? Based on your experience, would you 
like to plan a future joint project with the group? Do you have any projects 
planned with these partners in the near future? 
What were the motivations and reasons of this cooperation?  
Did you publicize your interests in cooperation? If yes, how? If no, why not? 
In general, do you sum up your experiences with joint projects as negative or 
positive? Please explain. 
What obstacles have you encountered during your cooperation? How did you 
deal with them?  
What events have been helpful? 
Do you intend to continue this cooperation or expand it? 
 94
What were the advantages and disadvantages of this cooperation? 
 
Part 3 – Questions for all 
Does your NGO have a mechanism for evaluating projects? If so, what is it? 
If not, how do you evaluate your work?  
Do you think that there is a connection between the conflict and the damage 
that has been done to the environment? If yes, please explain why, giving 
examples if possible. 
Do you think that resolution of the conflict will help improve the 
environment? If yes, please explain how you think this will happen. If no, 
why not? 
Do you think that joint ecological project will enhance the peace process? 
How? 
 
 
Contact information: Dr. Julia Chaitin, Kibbutz Urim, D.N. Hanegev, 
ISRAEL. e-mail: jchaitin@bgumail.bgu.ac.il 
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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEBANESE ATTITUDES 
TOWARD PALESTINIAN RESETTLEMENT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
 
Simon Haddad 
 
Abstract 
 
A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social distance 
on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using comprehensive cross-
cultural survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all 
Lebanese sub-groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes 
toward resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social 
distance is inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes 
toward the prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. These findings indicate on one hand, that the majority of Sunnis 
and Druze respondents endorse communal ties with Palestinians and 
approve their permanent economic, social and political integration. 
However, social distance influence political attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, namely in the case of Christian and Shii groups. Hence, for 
most Lebanese the question is about their own political survival not 
Palestinian resettlement If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will 
create a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of 
the society.  
 
Introduction 
 
   After half a century in the shadows, the Palestinian refugee issue has 
assumed a central place in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the initiation of the 
Middle East peace process in 1991.Following the discussions in Madrid, it 
has become clear that a satisfactory solution regarding the future of 
Palestinian refugees residing in Arab host countries is imperative for a 
durable peace in the Middle East. Pending a political solution that determines 
their fate, more than five million Palestinians continue to be refugees in 
various Arab countries. Although host population-refugee interaction vary 
proportionally to rights and restrictions accorded to Palestinians, Palestinians 
living in most parts of the Arab world have been considerably integrated 
(Aruri and Farsoun 1981; Brand 1988; Davis 1996; Arneberg 1997).  
   An exception is Lebanon, which continues to be the most reluctant of hosts. 
Lebanese officials seem concerned that Peace with Israel would eventually 
lead to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in the country. They worry 
that this cannot take place without further eroding the country’s precarious 
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demographic composition. After two decades of civil war, Palestinian 
presence has been the subject of much controversial debate ranging from 
statements calling for their comprehensive deportation to more careful and 
pragmatic propositions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure 
form of permanent residence. And while almost all segments of society-
politicians, religious leaders, political parties and scholars- joined the 
discussion, it is important to devote attention to public attitudes vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians and the prospect of their permanent settlement in Lebanoni. 
    Debate regarding the fate of Palestinians residing in Lebanon resurfaced 
with the confirmation in the Oslo Agreement that there is an agreement to 
settle the Palestinians in the countries where they actually reside. If a solution 
is reached regarding the Palestinians' presence, it will not provide for their 
return. Lebanese positions range from statements calling for their wholesale 
removal to more measured and accommodating suggestions that they be 
granted civil rights and a more secure form of residency. Not only the 
permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is outlawed under 
Lebanon’s constitution, but also public statements by Lebanese officials 
continue to itinerate a refusal to permanently integrate the refugees. Lebanese 
President Emile Lahoud confirmed this point when addressing a conference 
for Francophone countries in Canada that” all the Lebanese people agree that 
the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees is a time 
bomb”(Blanford 1999, p.18). Other examples of this common political 
position are a remark by a prominent Shii Lebanese politician, Abdallah Al-
Amin (Al-Majallah 1995): "The talk about settling the Palestinians does not 
concern us in any way. We say that the Palestinians must return to Palestine, 
as we are unable to absorb or settle anyone." Former Minister of Education 
Michel Eddeh (Al-Nahar November, 1999) concludes: " Lebanon refuses the 
implantation of the Palestinians on its territories, since this foreshadows the 
country's division." Sunni MP Ahmed Karami (Al-Nahar July, 1999) 
expressed his categorical opposition “While the foreign media have been 
suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese, we 
think that the Lebanese people, because of their unity and solidarity, can stop 
any resettlement plan”. 
   Although writings about Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon are numerous, 
most of them tend to be first, very much descriptive or mainly concerned 
about the refugees legal and socio-political standing (Salam 1994; Sayigh 
1994; Arzt 1996; El-Khazen 1997). Second, only rarely are studies 
nationwide and cross-cultural, with a concern of discovering what conditions 
social and political relationships. Third, and perhaps most important, there 
has been little research in which the individual Lebanese is the unit of 
analysis, and accordingly very few systematic databased investigations that 
focus on the link between the social and political orientations of ordinary 
Lebanese citizens toward Palestinian presence (Khashan 1994; Haddad 
2000). 
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  To these deficiencies may be added the dearth of information about the 
relationship between social attitudes held by the Lebanese towards 
Palestinians and their indefinite settlement in Lebanon. In order for 
Palestinian resettlement to be feasible, there needs to be general consensus in 
the country, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of this 
position among the different sectarian groups. In a multi-confessional state 
that recognizes the primacy of religious communities, any decision or policy 
must satisfy all communities to be workable. Second, there should be overall 
low levels of intolerance for Palestinians in the population. In our view, 
minimal social integration and weak inter-communal bonds between 
Lebanese and Palestinian groups are a major obstacle to achieving 
resettlement without disrupting peaceful coexistence in the country. These 
two elements constitute a conceptualization of social distance that is 
appropriate to the Lebanese. Accordingly, to contribute to an understanding 
of whether and how social distance toward Palestinians influence the way 
that ordinary Lebanese think about resettlement, this study uses cross-
sectional survey data from Lebanon to examine the degree to which social 
distance account for variance in attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in 
Lebanon.  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Study 
 
a-Relevant Theoretical Considerations 
   Immigration, involving long-term relocations of people across national 
borders, is a timely issue of sensible and academic importance. The act of 
leaving one's native country and settling in another country has immediate 
and long-term consequences for both immigrants and members of immigrant-
receiving nations. Immigration presents a range of challenges, and the 
challenge of managing immigration successfully--in ways that facilitate the 
achievement and well being of immigrants, that benefit the country 
collectively, and that produce the cooperation and support of members of the 
receiving society--is critical for nations and individuals (Dovidio and Esses 
2001). These issues have been framed academically largely in terms of 
economics, politics, and resource management. As a consequence, they have 
been studied extensively by economists, sociologists, political scientists, 
demographers, historians, and geographers (e.g., Borjas 1999; Cohen & 
Layton-Henry 1997; Hirschman, Kasinitz, & DeWind 1999; Rumbaut, 
Foner, & Gold 1999).  
   While an estimated 80 million migrants, almost 2 percent of the world's 
population, live permanently or for long periods of time outside their 
countries of origin (Castles 1993, p. 18) in most cases, and even European 
nations have seen harsh, often violent, reactions to these new minorities 
(Pettigrew 1998, p. 77). As Solomos and Wrench (1993) indicate, "In many 
societies in contemporary Europe, questions about migration and the position 
of minorities are amongst the most hotly contested areas of social and 
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political debate. Developments in Britain, France and Germany over the past 
decade have highlighted the volatility of the phenomenon and the ease with 
which it can lead to violent conflict" (p. 4). Even immigration that clearly 
and objectively benefits a nation as a whole does not necessarily have the 
same consequences for all segments of the population (Borjas 1999; Castells 
1997). Immigration may thus be perceived as threatening and undesirable by 
subsets of a population (Cohen 1997). Opposition to immigration may vary 
systematically as a function of perceived competition across time and for 
different segments of the receiving society (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong 
1998). Many continue to view the new minorities as not belonging - even the 
growing numbers of the second- and third-generation who have lived only in 
the host nation. They view the new minorities as "a people apart" who violate 
traditional values and for whom they feel little sympathy or admiration and 
tend to discriminate against them (MacEwen 1995). Discrimination comes 
about only when individuals or groups are denied equal treatment (Allport 
1954, p.51)  
   Both direct and indirect discrimination are involved (Pettigrew 1998, p. 
79). Direct discrimination, where blatantly prejudiced people may oppose 
immigration categorically, is straightforward and sets up spatial boundaries 
of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of immigrants. It occurs at points 
where inequality is generated, often intentionally. That is when steps to 
exclude members of a certain group from our neighborhood, school, 
occupation or country are taken. A classical example is provided by surveys 
of Black/White interracial contact in the United States. Scholars assert that 
White acceptance of Blacks across a range of formal and informal settings. 
Preferred social distance or pro-integration sentiments among Whites 
measured their acceptance concerning bringing a Black person home for 
dinner, allowing Blacks into the neighborhood, and permitting interracial 
marriage (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner 1996).  
   Indirect discrimination involves people with more subtle biases who may 
oppose the immigration of certain groups of people (i.e., stigmatized racial or 
ethnic groups) but justify their exclusion on the basis of reasons other than 
prejudice, such as economic reasons (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). It 
operates when the inability to obtain citizenship restricts the opportunities of 
non-EU minorities in most institutions. It restricts their ability to get suitable 
housing, employment, and schooling for children. A visa is required for 
travel to other EU countries. In short, the lives of non-citizens are severely 
circumscribed (Wilpert 1993). Castles (1984) contends that the newcomers 
are established as a problematic and stigmatized outgroup, suitable for low-
status jobs but not for citizenship. Wilpert goes further. She asserts that 
Germany's institutions are based on "a dominant ideology, which distributes 
rights according to ethnic origins..." (Wilpert 1993, p. 70). The revealing 
comparison is between the almost two million Aussiedler and the 
Gastarbeiter. Officials regard the former as kin often on the thinnest of 
evidence, though since 1996 a language test must be taken. Aussiedler 
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readily become citizens and receive favorable government treatment. Yet 
even third-generation Turks, who are at least as culturally "German" as the 
Aussiedler, are largely denied citizenship and given unfavorable treatment.  
 
b-Obstacles to Palestinian Integration in Lebanon  
   There are no definitive figures concerning the number of Palestinians in 
Lebanon today but estimates suggest that the actual size of the Palestinian 
community is close or even 400 thousand or more than 10 percent of the 
country’s populationii. Because of the lack of census data and civil status 
records, political motives tend to distort accurate figures. 
   For the first few years following their arrival in 1948, Palestinians refugees 
were given material and moral support, but since then their treatment has 
deteriorated. Early governmental response was that the Palestinians are not 
allowed to stay indefinitely in the country and Lebanese authorities refused 
to discuss any solution that would open the door for the Palestinians to 
become assimilated or naturalized. In fact, the Lebanese government has 
made every effort to make life uncomfortable, and Lebanon unwelcoming, 
for the Palestinian community (Natour 1996, p.60). This policy is practiced 
consistently and with obsessive fervor to make sure that those Palestinians 
wishing to remain in Lebanon are unable to do so, under unbearable 
economic and political circumstances (Sayigh 2001). 
   Consequently, not only Palestinians were denied basic refugee or 
immigrant rights (Westin 2001), but also they have been in most cases the 
victim of official discrimination, social derogation and exclusion: First, 
restrictions on political rights and naturalization have ensured that 
Palestinians have been excluded from public institutions of social life and 
from the legal rights and protections the state affords to its citizens. 
Officially, the Palestinian community does not call for Lebanese citizenship, 
but those who can acquire it do so. In the past several years, around 50,000 
Palestinians have been naturalized in Lebanon. In 1994, citizenship has been 
granted to another 27,000 who were mostly Shii residents of Southern border 
villages who had Palestinian refugee status (Shaml 1997); the rest were 
Sunnis who, for reasons not made public, were naturalized in 1995, perhaps 
to balance out the Shii naturalization. Maronite protest ensured that the few 
remaining Palestinian Christians without Lebanese citizenship were then 
naturalized (Peteet 1999). In addition, travel restrictions on Palestinians were 
always tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents issued by the 
government were temporary. Accordingly, the greatest majority remains 
stateless and is treated as foreigners, since Lebanese law prevents 
Palestinians from buying propertyiii. 
    This leads us to the second type of governmental restraints, which has to 
do with economic integration in the labor market. This is where Lebanese 
and Palestinians meet, interact, and develop mutual interdependence. 
Palestinians are classified as special case category foreigners along with Sri 
Lankans, Thais, Filipinos, Kurds and Syrians, who together constitute 
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Lebanon's imported working class. A harsh policy referred to as 
“strangulation” of Palestinians is accomplished by extremely restrictive 
options that provides for employment only by permit and the near-total 
absence of social welfare provisions (Peteet 1997). Obtaining a work permit 
remains a complex and lengthy process that offers neither social security nor 
insurance benefits nor a regular wage increase, and becomes invalid when its 
holder is laid off the job. Moreover, employment in large institutions is 
largely closed to Palestinians because it is governed by sectarian rules. 
Palestinians, however, explicitly are forbidden to work in virtualy more than 
70 qualified professions such as medicine and law. These restrictions force 
them to work in the informal sector with low wages, insecurity and no 
benefits. On the other hand, and as a preventive measure to discourage them 
from remaining in the country, official policy has made it difficult for the 
younger generation to continue post-compulsory school studies, even if 
international assistance has helped to provide secondary school places for 
some. The normal public schools are closed to Palestinians, while private 
schools charge fees that are often beyond their means (Hammarberg 2000). 
   Third, legally enforced segregation in housing ensures that not only are 
Palestinians in Lebanon confined to well defined, circumscribed and 
surveilled camps but they are also prevented from urgent reconstruction work 
in the camps, which contribute to their insecurity. Restrictions on building 
and reconstruction in the camps have resulted in severe overcrowding. 
Refugees have been banned since 1992 from bringing in any kind of building 
material into camps "Not even stones to cover our graves, says a camp 
official” (The Economist 2000). Since the government did not show the 
slightest interest in integrating the refugees, Lebanon remains the only host 
country where the quota of camp inhabitants is still higher than 50 percent  
   Finally, and perhaps most important, Lebanese prejudice put into practice 
receives additional evidence from Palestinians’ perceptions of their situation 
in Lebanon. By definition, Palestinians are held in low regard by Lebanese 
and are often subject of negative stereotypes, hatred and hostility. 
Palestinians also recognized the differences between Lebanese and 
Palestinians in social prestige and socio-economic conditions. According to 
Peteet “there are several problems in distinguishing Palestinians from 
Lebanese and confining them to homogeneous enclaves” (Peteet 1996, p.28). 
However, until the late 1960s, the majority of Lebanese citizens did not 
manifest blatant prejudice or outright rejection for Palestinian refugees who 
came to Lebanon in 1948 and who share language and culture with their 
Lebanese hosts. In fact, many Palestinians have formed strong social and 
economic ties, through a long history of intermarriage and trade, to their host 
country. According to one Lebanese official (Brynen 1997), for example, 
fully one-quarter of third generation Palestinians in Lebanon has one 
Lebanese parent.  
   Although, urban Palestinian camps, which were scattered allover Lebanese 
territory had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas by the mid-seventies, 
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Lebanon’s official policy contributed, through deliberate spatial containment, 
to create and sharpen communal distinctions. During the 1950s, tight vigil by 
the army curtailed movement for Palestinians. Later, with the dissolution of 
state authority in the 1970s and 1980s, local Lebanese militias crafted and 
imposed boundaries where a fluidity of space and social relations once 
prevailed between Lebanese and Palestinians (Cutting 1988). In postwar 
Lebanon, Palestinian refugees describe their lives in terms of abnormality. 
Aside from shortages of shelter, food, safety and access to medical care and 
education, they have constant doubts about the security of residence. In fact, 
not only were Palestinians landscaped out of Palestine, but also the erasure 
continues in exile. A Palestinian lawyer, echoing popular sentiment, has 
written, " that there are those who believe that the group known as 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will stop existing within a few years (Al-
Natour 1993, p.41).” The refugee experience did not include the usual 
minority attributes of difference in language, religion and culture. Palestinian 
marginality is contingent, to some extent, on the concept of a Lebanese 
nation and society, however problematic, that excludes them. This negative 
identity held by their hosts prompted some observers to characterize the 
Lebanese society as minestrone rather than a melting pot, and encouraged the 
Palestinians to stress their culture, tradition and own identity (Koltermann 
1997). 
c-Basic Views on Palestinian Resettlement 
   Despite growing opposition to Palestinian resettlement, many think that 
Lebanon will have to face the reality of settling the Palestinians in it. Under 
the best circumstances, it might be possible to ensure that 250,000 to 300,000 
of them leave, but Lebanon will find itself compelled to absorb at least 
100,000 of them (Abd-al-Samad 1995; Khoury 2000). At the same time, 
there is very little support in Lebanon, at either the official or popular level, 
for the permanent resettlement of a significant number of Palestinians. In 
general, Lebanese authorities avoid raising this issue because it causes 
internal divisions, not about the principle of rejecting the settlement of 
Palestinians, but about the way in which this policy should be carried out. 
Some people in Lebanon believe that the presence of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon will created demographic, economic, social, and sectarian disorders. 
More specifically, Lebanon’s opposition to resettlement rests on three major 
perceived political and historical arguments (Solh 1999):  
* Economic: Lebanon's geographical area is very small in relation to its 
population. The Lebanese area that can be settled and exploited, after 
eliminating the mountains and deep valleys, is very small. This makes it 
unable to assimilate the Palestinian refugees, especially following the 
devastation inflicted by the civil wariv. Former Minister Michel Edde adds 
that it is “impossible” for Palestinian refugees to settle in Lebanon. “The 
economic situation is very difficult and people are emigrating due to the high 
rate of unemployment” (Daily Star, 30/12/2000). 
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* Political and Historical:  Granting the refugees sanctuary was undertaken 
as a humane, emergency measure; it was never intended to be permanent, the 
situation of the Palestinian refugees in the existing camps in Lebanon is 
basically different from their situation in some Arab countries where they 
live, work, and enjoy medical and educational security (Boueiz 1994). After 
more than 50 years, Lebanese see themselves as having paid a much higher 
price for the Palestinian cause than any other country. There are harsh 
memories of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s in which the Palestinians 
were blamed for dragging the country into bloodshed. Lebanese feel they 
cannot be asked to pay more in the form of the consequences incumbent on 
settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.  
* Demographic: Lebanon is a multi-confessional country with seventeen 
officially recognized sects. Lebanese belong to three main sects: Muslim, 
Christian and Druze. The Lebanese sectarian structure is very delicate. 
Palestinians citizenship would further skew the already shaky balance both 
between Christians and Muslims, and between Sunni and Shia Muslimsv. 
Any imbalance will have a political, social, economical, and security impact 
on it. Ever since, Lebanon found himself host to a large and overwhelmingly 
Muslim refugee population, the Christians anticipated that the largely 
Muslim refugees might threaten their economic and political dominance, and 
assumed demographic majority. They feared and still fear their presence 
could upset the sectarian balance and political status quo by serving as a 
focal point for the growing discontent of Lebanon's Muslims and their 
eventual political mobilization for a greater share of power and national 
resources. Lebanon’s Shiis concur; out of fear that Palestinians will tilt the 
Muslim Lebanese balance in the wrong direction. (The Economist 1992, 
p.45) 
   In fact the government still proclaimed the Palestinian refugees to 
constitute the greatest menace to national security. In this context, the 
immense number of mostly Muslim refugees was seen as highly explosive, 
threatening to blow up the entire political system of their host country. 
   The intensity of anti-Palestinian feelings, judged by the intensity and 
salience of hostile attitudes publicly expressed, prompted a journalist to 
characterize Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians as ranging between two 
poles: indifference at one level and negativity at the other, with negativism 
varying between active hostility and passive dislike (Zeine 1994). 
Notwithstanding more concrete evidence are provided from cross sectional 
surveys of Lebanese groups (Khashan 1994; Haddad 2000). Previous 
research findings on the permanent settlement of Palestinian in Lebanon have 
pointed out that attitudes expressed by the Lebanese have been found to be 
highly non-supportive of resettlement, attitudes towards the Palestinians are 
variable, but usually negative. However, the relationship between attitudes 
towards the Palestinians as individuals or group and support for resettlement, 
which is the focus of the present report, has not been examined. 
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Methodology 
 
   In all, 1073 adult individuals, 688 male and 385 female respondents 
responded to these questions. The survey was carried out in late December 
1999 and January 2000, using a face-to-face interviewing procedure. The 
response rate (based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared 
with households contacted) was 80 percent.  
   The sample included five occupational sub-groups, selected on the basis of 
quota sampling necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not 
possible due to lack of accurate demographic data pertaining to the 
characteristics and the urban distribution of the population. Because the 
sample is non-probabilistic, it is important to describe its characteristics and 
to note that, in some respects, they differ from those of the larger Lebanese 
population over the age of 18.The sex distribution of the sample consisted of 
64 percent male and 36 percent female. The lower proportion of women in 
the study reflects their marginal position in the Lebanese society dominated 
by males as well as their limited professional role. The sample had an age 
range of 18-66 years and a mean age of 33 years. The representation of each 
confessional group is, as close as possible, in proportion to its actual size in 
Lebanon's population: 29 percent Maronites, 10 percent Greek-Catholics, 9 
percent Greek-Orthodox, 27 percent Shi`is, 18 percent Sunnis, and 7 percent 
Druze. In terms of educational level, the sample was found to be over-
represented in the college-educated level with 58 percent having achieved 
college education. Less-educated Lebanese generally have a problem in 
forming political opinions. In terms of occupational groupings the sample 
somewhat over-represented people with professional and managerial 
occupations, and underrepresented people in the trades and labor categoryvi. 
Despite some limitations, including the non-representative composition and 
the relatively small size of the sample, this data constitutes an empirical 
foundation possessing considerable strength. First, the availability of opinion 
data dealing with socio-political issues is itself a very notable strength 
because surveys dealing with political attitudes are extremely rare in the 
Arab world and also in Lebanon. Lebanese people in general are cooperative 
but have deep concern about their security. They suspect that most of such 
surveys are conducted to serve government objectives or a deceitful political 
organization. In responding to questionnaires what they think or write could 
be used against them. Second, the respondents were interviewed in an 
atmosphere of strict confidentiality, and well-trained interviewers of the 
same religious background interviewed the respondents in their native 
language (Arabic). The author maintained close contact with the field 
workers during the entire period of data collection and personally supervised 
the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation 
and presentation. Third, given the precarious nature of survey research in a 
conflictual environment three reliability test measures were imposed on the 
data: pre-testing, internal consistency and response bias. Consequently, 
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proper additions, deletions, and adjustments were made on the final version. 
In general, respondents attested that the questions were easily understood. 
 
Survey Instrument 
 
   In developing the survey instrument, an initial pool of items was 
constructed from two sources. Approximately half of the items were adapted 
from existing instruments (Allport 1954; Khashan 1994; Bettancourt & Dorr 
1998; Labianca et al. 1998; Tuch et al. 1999). The remaining items were 
developed anew by the investigator. Many of the items adapted from 
previous instruments were reworded to simplify their readability. Items were 
selected or developed to assess social distance and attitude toward 
resettlement, which represents the single dependent variable in this study. 
English and Arabic language versions were prepared. A copy of the 
interview schedule is available from the author.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and 
Dependent Variables by Religious Sect 
                  
  
Christian Groups 
                   
 Maronites Catholics Orthodox 
          
 Mean SD Coeff*   Mean SD Coeff*   Mean SD Coeff* 
ATR scaleª   2.51      0.69     0.66       2.43     0.75    0.68       2.27     0.81    0.75       
SD scale°     1.55      0.80     0.79       1.36      0.34    0.81       1.43     0.57    0.87       
Education     1.38      0.61      1.94      0.94     1.65 0.61     
Income 2.30     0.59            2.36 0.54     2.20    0.68  
Occupation   2.20      0.51  2.25 0.55  2.13     0.6  
 
Muslim Groups 
 
 Sunnis Shi’is Druze 
          
 Mean    SD   Coeff*   Mean   SD     Coeff* Mean    SD     Coeff
* 
ATR scaleª      1.68       0.81   0 .78      2.23      0.79   0.67       1.75      0.75   0.53     
SD scale°         2.34      0.87   0.83       1.96      0.91   0.82       2.31     0.86   0.84 
Education 1.58       0.65    1.68        0.70        1.42   0.69     
Income 2.28      0.63    2.44        0.53        2.21   0.53 
Occupation 2.22      0.60    2.45        0.55        2.10  0.45 
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Full Sample 
 
 Mean SD Coeff*     
ATR scaleª            2.21      0.82      0.75              
SD scale°               1.87       0.91      0.86             
Education 1.50      0.65                        
Income 2.32       0.58                     
Occupation 2.26      0.56                    
 
 
N.B: ªAttitudes toward Resettlement  
         o Social Distance 
        *Cornbach’s Alpha coefficient 
 
Independent Variable 
 
   The present analysis seeks to determine the role of social distance 
established between Lebanese and Palestinians in accounting for variance in 
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. A scale to determine 
the level of social distance was constructed from seven items dealing with 
views about preferred social distance between Lebanese and Palestinians. 
Multi-reliability and factor analysis were employed to ascertain the uni-
dimensionality of the scale. The survey items that cluster together are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Survey Items Used to Measure Social Distance towards Palestinians  
 
1. Do you think that Lebanese and Palestinian students should go to same 
schools or to separate schools? 
2. How strong would you object or support if a member of your family had 
close personal relation with Palestinians? 
3. Do you think that there should be laws against marriage between Lebanese 
and Palestinians? 
4. How would you feel if a relative of yours was planning to marry a 
Palestinian? 
5. How would you feel if all your children’s’ schoolmates were Palestinians?                   
6.Would you accept to live in a neighborhood where the Palestinians are a 
majority? 
7.How willingly would you sympathize with Palestinians? 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Factor Analysis Scores for the Social Distance Items Using 
Varimax Rotation (full sample) 
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Item Loading 
Same or separate schools 
 
0.76 
Close personal relation  
 
0.81 
Laws against mixed marriage  
 
0.60 
Palestinian schoolmates 
 
0.79 
Palestinian neighborhood 
 
0.72 
Sympathize with Palestinians 
 
0.71 
Marry Palestinians 
 
0.84 
 
   Social distance or views on integration of Palestinians is the primary 
independent variable in this analysis. Nonetheless, whether it is related to 
attitude toward Palestinian resettlement is to be determined. Although it 
might be assumed that increased social distance implies opposition to 
Palestinian resettlement, permitting differentiation between independent and 
dependent variables, the actual situation is much more complex. Lebanese 
officials have issued contradictory statements about whether the Lebanese 
government will permit Palestinians to be fully integrated in the country, and 
even theoreticians and politicians advance different views about whether 
such integration is probable. 
    Bogardus introduced the Social Distance Scale for use as an index of the 
social distance that respondents perceive between themselves and members 
of different groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, religion, or politics. The 
scale, or some form of it, has been used in studies involving a variety of 
populations, including ethnic minorities (Bogardus 1925, 1967; Fagan & 
O’Neill 1965; Payne et al. 1974; Kunz & Ohenebra-Saki 1989; Lambert & 
Taylor 1990), and has been considered as a measure of prejudice. The survey 
contained a battery of likert scale questions (responded to in terms of strong 
agreement, agreement, etc.) tapping various aspects of the preferred social 
distance between oneself or one’s family and Palestinians living in Lebanon. 
Some items were phrased positively (i.e., indicating tolerance) and others 
were phrased negatively (i.e., indicating prejudice). From seven of the 
questions used in the survey, this scale which assesses respondents’ 
willingness to accept Palestinians in various roles (as a neighbor, friend, etc.) 
was constructed and checked by various empirical analyses (internal 
consistency of items in a scale, factor analysis of items, and scale inter-
correlations). The sum score of the items divided by their number was taken 
as an indication of negativeness or prejudice. The survey items that cluster 
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together are shown in Table 2. Other independent variables are also included 
in the analysis to assess the explanatory power of intense religiosity relative 
to that of other factors. Linear regression is used to examine these 
relationships, with the following independent variables included in the 
model: education, income and SES.  
 
2. The Dependent Variable 
 
Table 3: Survey Items used to measure the Dependent Variable 
 
1.If resettlement were imposed, would you accept it? 
2.If Palestinian resettlement were imposed, would you actually try to resist it 
militarily? 
3.Do you think that Palestinian resettlement will lead to inter-group conflict? 
4.Do you agree with the claim that Palestinian resettlement will result in the 
resumption of the civil war? 
5.Given your understanding of the Palestinian resettlement issue, would you 
say resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese society? 
 
Factor Analysis Scores for the Attitudes towards 
Resettlement Items Using Varimax Rotation 
Item Loading 
Accept resettlement 
 
0.76 
Resist resettlement militarily 0.68 
Resettlement will lead to conflict over allocation of power 0.69 
Resettlement will result in the resumption of the civil war 0.66 
Resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese 
society 
 
0.73 
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Table 4: Attitude Toward Palestinian Resettlement Scale by Religious Sect 
 
                                         
                                           
 
 
 
 
          
 
 Maronites   Catholics    Greek 
Or hodox t
23 
Sunnis        Shi'is Druze      Total          
Favors 
resettlement 
11 15 54 23 44 25 
Somewhat 
for 
resettlement 
27 26 27 24 32 38 29 
Opposes 
resettlement 
62 59 50 22 45 18 46 
 
(*) The items listed in Table 3 have been combined to form a scale.  
 
   The dependent variable in this analysis is attitude toward Palestinian 
resettlement. A scale composed on five inter-correlated items from the 
survey instrument measures attitude. Table 3 lists the items used to construct 
these measures, all of which deal with the respondents’ present position, 
perceived impact, and reaction to Palestinian resettlement, Table 4 presents 
the response distribution on these measures of the dependent variable. 
   Evidence in support of the validity and reliability of these measures comes 
from several sources. Multi-reliability analysis revealed high inter-item 
correlations and the reported Cornbach Alpha was equal to 0.86. Confidence 
was further increased by the use of factor analysis; the five items load highly 
on one factor demonstrating that these items cluster together and thus 
measure the same underlying concept. 
 
Analysis of The Findings 
 
   Table 1 presents the respondents mean ratings for all five independent and 
dependent variables used in the study. In addition to highlighting the socio-
economic status for every sub-group (community), two important results are 
generated. First, with regard to social distance, all three Christian groups, 
joined by the Shiis, display higher levels of discrimination against 
Palestinians compared to Sunnis and Druze. For instance, Christian groups 
scores were 64 percent, 61 percent, and 60 percent respectively in contrast to 
43 percent for the Shiis and 25 percent and 26 percent for the Druze on the 
social distance scale. Second, in terms of the overall level of support for 
Palestinian resettlement, the results indicated only moderate support among 
Sunnis and Druze in sharp contrast to Christian and Shii clear opposition to 
its prospect. These findings indicate that views of Lebanese communities are 
 109
less divided between Christians and Muslims than within each of the sub-
groups. Thus, in order to answer the research question concerning the 
independent relationship between the level of respondents’ social distance, 
their demographic characteristics, and their attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, multiple regression analysis was employed. Table 5 presents 
beta weights and t statistics between social distance, education, income and 
SES and attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement. The results indicate that 
social distance is significantly related to attitudes toward resettlement for all 
sub-groups. Thus, the higher the respondents’ level of social distance, the 
less the overall support given to resettlement. In other words respondents 
from all sects are much less likely to support resettlement in Lebanon if they 
contest future personal contact with Palestinians, whether civic, educational 
or residential. Indeed, these relationships are always stronger than those 
involving any other independent variable, i.e. educational attainment in the 
case of the Sunnis and income level for the Shiis were found significantly 
related to the criterion variable (p>0.05). 
 
Table 5 
Multiple Regression of Factors influencing Attitudes toward Palestinian 
Resettlement in Lebanon 
 
 Maronites   Catholics    Greek 
Orthodox 
Sunnis        Shi'is Druze      Full 
Sample         
    (n=283)    (n=83) (n=83) (n=158) (n=226) (n=68)      (N=901)    
Social 
distance       
-0.33  
 (-5.77)**    
-0.43 
(-4.33)** 
0.49  
(-5.05) **    
--0.47  
(-7.02)**    
- 0.40 
(-6.49)**   
-0.40 
(-3.57)**    
-0.47 
(-16.04)**     
Education        -0.11 
(-1.89)         
0.02    
(0.17)          
-0.08 
(-0.84)         
0.28   
(4.10)**     
0.030  
(0.467)     
0.070 
(0.62)          
0.00  
(0.26) 
Income            -0.09 
(-1.52)        
-0.14 
(-1.38)        
-0.04  
-(0.42)         
0.06 
(0.83)         
0.155 
(2.55)*     
0.12  
(1.09)         
0.04 
(1.46) 
SES -0.02 
(-.42)           
-0.13 
(-1.27)        
- 0.06 
(-0.60)         
0.00  
(0.10)         
- 0.82  
(-1.04)      
0.16  
(1.39)         
0.03  
(1.07) 
Constant 34.81)**   (19.52)**    (17.65)**    (10.34)**   (9.30)**   (10.67)**     (54.61)** 
R²                    0.11             0.19          0.24             0.30            0.17          0.16             0.22 
 
 
NOTE: Table 5 shows standardized coefficients (betas) and gives t statistics 
in parentheses *p<0.05;**p<0.01 
   Although part of these findings is to be expected- in the case of Christian 
groups- those related to Muslim groups- are surprising and interesting. They 
are also at variance with the arguments advanced by some scholars, to the 
effect that Tawtin, or resettlement, is probably the only issue on which the 
views of the Lebanese - across ideological and confessional lines - agree. 
This argument is presented by El-Khazen (1997) who contends that 
Palestinian presence, from being the most divisive issue in post-
independence Lebanese politics is one of the few issues that arouse national 
consensus in post-war Lebanon. A more plausible argument is offered by 
Sayigh (2001) who asserts that Lebanese public can be divided into three 
main segments: 1) a determined anti-Palestinian minority, 2) a large 
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component who are indifferent to the Palestinian issue unless aroused by 
sectarian campaigning, and 3) a minority that positively supports the 
refugees. 
   Findings from the present study lend only partial support to these 
arguments. Social distance defined in terms of degree of endorsement or 
rejection of inter-communal -social, civic, residential, educational- ties with 
Palestinians bears a significant relationship about attitude toward 
resettlement. Intense anti-Palestinianism is discernible in the case of 
Christian groups namely in statements like: "Usually, we don't care about 
them. Sometimes we feel pity for them because they are poor. But we don't 
think that they belong here” (Kolterman 1997, p.7). A reconstructive ethos 
promoting "Lebanon for the Lebanese”, which has been carried by Lebanese 
Christians throughout the civil war, is reiterated usually by Christian leaders 
who tend to exaggerate the size of the Palestinian community and use the 
question of resettlement to flourish their political vision of partitionvii. 
Religious affinity plays a part in this extreme position since the Palestinian 
refugee population is constituted as nearly all Muslim (Peteet 1997). Prior to 
the 1975 civil war, in order to further a sectarian gloss to the refugee issue, 
and in a demographic attempt to bolster the Christian population, the 
Lebanese Government made available Lebanese citizenship to Palestinian 
Christians. One of the major consequences of the Civil War was 
Confessional “cleansing” of Palestinian refugee camps in Christian-
controlled areas to other parts of the country. Massive population shifts, 
accompanied by the reintegration of displaced Palestinians into more 
homogeneous, self-contained and exclusive spaces and the consequent 
physical separations have confined Palestinian interaction to practically two 
Lebanese groups, Sunni and Shii Muslims (Khashan 1992). However, a 
highly significant negative relationship between social distance and attitude 
toward resettlement emerges from the findings. Beyond political factors, 
such as the deterioration of Palestinian-Lebanese relationship, heavy-handed 
Israeli retaliation and PLO excesses, a set of economic asymmetries added to 
Palestinian-Shii antagonism. Both communities lived side by side but the 
Shii belonged to a lower low socio-economic spectrum. Underclass 
resentment aroused because of the material advantage enjoyed by 
Palestinians who were well established in Arab oil-producing states 
projecting Palestinians as aliens, intruders and destroyers of our country 
(Sayigh 1994). Referring to Palestinian misbehavior during their presence in 
Lebanon, a Shii villager told Norton “ We gave Palestinians everything and 
they gave us back insults, corpses, and lessons in corruption” (Norton 1987, 
p. 12). 
   This negative position is extended only to a minority of Sunni respondents. 
Khashan and Palmer (1981), who examined Sunni perceptions during the 
Lebanese civil war, found out that the dominant position enjoyed by 
Palestinians during that period, while not vociferously opposed by the 
Sunnis, was complicated by the fact that Lebanese Sunnis generally accorded 
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the Palestinian refugees an inferior social status. Thus, Palestinian-Lebanese 
Sunnite affinity was partially eroded by military dominance of Palestinians 
and by the reversal of status roles (Khashan & Palmer 1981). While part of 
the Sunnis tends to distance themselves from Palestinians, this tendency is 
stronger among less educated Sunnis than among their college-educated 
counterparts. Indeed this result is striking since the integration of refugees is 
supposed to take place, according to experts, within their sub-community. 
However, this finding is in line with the position adopted by most Sunni 
politicians. In 1990, even the Sunni Muslim leaders-who theoretically had 
most to gain from the assimilation of the Sunni Palestinians into Lebanese 
society- refused to welcome the Palestinians. This ultimately led to the 
unexpected amendment to the constitution refusing non-Lebanese permanent 
residence in the country. Later, Sunni prime Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri 
explicitly uttered, "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will 
not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would 
take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency that has 
supported them since 1948" (Cooley 1999, p.1) 
   Experiences of Palestinian marginality in interacting with Lebanese are 
illustrated by Sayigh ”Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a 
manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that 
immigrants carried tuberculosis, and more recent fears of immigrants as 
carriers of the AIDS virus. Pathology demands quarantine: segregating 
Palestinians would facilitate the "normalization" of Lebanon in the post-war 
era with national health restored through the isolation of an infectious 
presence” (Sayigh 1996, p. 28). 
   Pro-Palestinian voices present a weak minority in favor of resettlement. A 
housing project submitted by the Canadian government to help provide a 
certain measure of relief to the homeless refugees through the construction of 
new barracks outside Beirut was supported in 1994, by Walid Jumblatt, 
Minister for Refugees and leader of the Druze community. However, the 
media leaked the talks and the violent protests that ensued led to the 
abandonment of the entire project. This was a symptom of the fact that any 
initiative that can be interpreted as indirect assent to the Palestinians 
remaining is interpreted as a confessionalistic move. The Druze minority was 
mainly interested in a buffer zone of loyal Palestinians between them and the 
expanding Shi'a population. This is a clear indicator of expressed social 
desirability of Palestinians by a large segment of the Druze community. 
   The findings of the present study indicated that social distance was a 
significant predictor variable for all sub-groups-and the only predictor for 
most of them, i.e. Christians and Druze. According to this concept, not only 
does an observer interpret a group or member of a group erroneously, he or 
she concludes that it he is inferior and therefore unwanted. This tendency for 
outgroups rejection and hostility is clearly reflected in the study’s findings 
that a high rating of social distance is related to the rejection of Palestinian 
permanent settlement in Lebanon. Specifically, the study’s findings indicated 
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that respondents who tend to score highly on the social distance scale 
believed that resettlement will have damaging repercussions on the country, 
and are therefore more likely to resist it.  
   To conclude, some brief observations pertaining to other independent 
variables may be offered. Findings about these variables are not always 
consistent and are, in any event of secondary importance to the present study. 
In his attempt to determine the correlates of multiculturalism in Australia, 
Robert Ho (1990) found that ethnocentrism was the only significant 
predictor, but none of the demographic variables, for respondents’ attitudes 
toward multiculturalism. In fact, respondents’ education, income, and SES 
level were, in most cases, unimportant predictors of attitudes toward 
resettlement. Nevertheless, there are several interesting relationships, some 
of which identify promising areas for future research. To begin, the absence 
of any significant relationship involving SES deserves mention. It delineates 
the failure of the analysis to control for other meaningful factors, most 
notably the respondents’ level of economic security and the perceived effect 
of immigration on employment opportunities. In multicultural Canada, 
economic concerns and worries have been assigned a more important role 
than intolerance in determining the attitude toward immigration. 
Furthermore, because Lebanon suffers from economic stagnation at the 
moment, it may be hypothesized that perceived economic insecurity would 
have pushed towards opposition to resettlementviii. This proposition, which 
deserves future study, is consistent with findings about determinants of 
political attitudes toward immigration in Western countries. In his survey of 
Canadian attitudes toward immigration, Tienhaara (1974) found that 
opposition to immigration was greater during recession and attributed most 
to unemployment concerns. This point receives support from a recent 
investigation that brought similar results using survey data in many studies 
on immigration and attitudes towards immigrants (Palmer 1996). The 
economic dimension is particularly worthy of examination as Lebanon may 
be expected to accept permanent settlement of refugees induced by a 
tremendous aid/development package. If economic conditions improve as a 
result of Palestinian resettlement, would this reduce social distance and hence 
opposition for resettlement? Coupled with the present study’s findings that 
social distance account for variance in Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, this suggests that a multi-factor model, including other 
variables pertaining to the Lebanese situation have a much larger effect on 
attitudes toward resettlement than do the respondents’ self-interest measures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
   A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social 
distance on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using cross-sectional 
survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all Lebanese sub-
groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes toward 
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resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social distance is 
inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes toward the 
prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
   These findings indicate that, although social distance influence political 
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement-a conclusion that is hardly 
surprising for Christian and Shii groups- the majority of Sunnis and Druze 
respondent endorse communal ties with Palestinians and approve their 
permanent economic, social and political integration. They also suggest a 
more focused conclusion about the kind of social factors most likely to have 
explanatory power. Judgments about the perceived consequences and to 
economic needs in particular appear to be important in determining the 
attitude toward resettlement. This proposition, which receives support from 
findings about the importance of nature of perception of immigration on 
economic status, offers a promising area for future research.  
   Keeping in mind that the nature of the sample employed in the present 
study may limit the generalizability of the obtained results, the overall 
findings carry a number of implications for the issues raised on the current 
debate over Palestinian permanent settlement in Lebanon and also for the 
Lebanese system as a whole. How genuine are Lebanese fears about 
resettlement? Palestinian otherness is juxtaposed not to a homogeneous 
singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and 
alliances, each with particular interests and fears. A majority of Christian and 
Shii respondents display intense prejudice towards Palestinians suggesting 
the presence of social barriers that hinders socio-economic integration of 
camp inhabitants and their children. On the other hand, the results suggest 
the presence of a structural weakness in the Lebanese system. Lebanese 
scholar Joseph Maila (2000) concedes that the permanent settlement of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the vast majorities of whom are Sunni 
Muslim, could be fatal to Lebanon’s delicate social mosaic. The Palestinians 
could turn into an autonomous community, a development unprecedented in 
Lebanon. The kind of linkage between these Palestinians and the Palestinian 
Authority is likely to create tremendous problems for the Lebanese in the 
coming yearsix. Hence, for most Lebanese the question is about their own 
political survival not Palestinian resettlement. These negative attitudes, 
coupled with further government restrictions and pressures on Palestinians, 
imply that permanent settlement is a dangerous alternative that threatens the 
regime with collapse. If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will create 
a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of the 
society. In connection with this, the Lebanese government finds itself 
compelled to consent to continued Palestinian military presence in refugee 
camps, which threatens to return to the situation of 20 years ago by 
reenacting the civil war. Refugees in Palestinian camps have grown 
increasingly restive over the course of the uprising. Lebanese authorities are 
discounting fears that the fighting in the Palestinian territories could spark a 
series of organized cross-border attacks into Israel from south Lebanon. 
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Whereas, Muslim clerics have been calling for active support to liberate 
Palestine, Christians responded by condemning “the voices announcing their 
intentions to violate Lebanese laws and attempt to go back to a past the 
Lebanese want to forget (Daily Star 7/10/2000). 
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Endnotes 
 
iIn addition to increased attention to the Palestinian refugee question in 
Lebanon, a conference on Palestinian Resettlement were upheld in 1999,” 
Lebanese Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation,” at the 
University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, on November 11 and academic workshop 
entitled” Opposing Resettlement” at The Saint Joseph University organized 
by Research Center for Arab Law, Beirut on November 26 grouping 
prominent Lebanese figures and even the prime minister. This trend received 
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additional support with the announcement that Lebanese clerics of all sects 
intended to hold conference to take a harsh stance on the matter on July 29.  
 
ii See Palestinians in Lebanon, Report on the Conference Held at Oxford, 
September 27th to 30th, 1996 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1996), 
p. 10. More recently Maronite deputy Naamatullah Abi-Nasr, former 
president of the Maronite League, offered a figure of 12 percent compared to 
other Arab host countries where Palestinian represent 1 percent of the 
population in the United Arab Emirates and only 0.1 percent in Egypt and in 
Saudi-Arabia during a conference entitled” Lebanese Identity: Between 
Naturalization and Implantation," attended by the author on Palestinian 
Resettlement at the University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, Lebanon, on 
November 26, 1999 . 
 
iii Recently Lebanese Parliament approved revisions to Law 11614 (1969) 
concerning ownership of real estate by foreigners, forbidding "anyone who 
does not have citizenship in a recognized state (Palestinians)" from owning 
property, text published by al-Safir, 23 March, 2001). 
 
iv This could mean that 40 to 45 percent of total Lebanese territory cannot be 
exploited and may result in increasing the population density to reach 
632/km². This is a huge figure compared to other countries like Irak 47/km² 
and Australia 2/km². 
 
v Though Lebanon’s constitution allocates public offices on the basis of a 
50:50 ratio of Christians vs. Muslims, it is commonly accepted that the 
Muslims constitute a majority in the country. 
viThe author sought to broaden the representativeness of the sample by 
including 20 professions which were regrouped into five sub-groups for 
reasons of data manageability: 19 percent professionals, 40 percent semi-
professionals, 11 percent unskilled, 25 percent college students (selected 
from three private academic institutions: Notre-Dame University and 
Lebanese University, and the American University of Beirut) and 5 percent 
unemployed.  
 
vii Maronite politicians such as Michel Edde and Naamatulah Abi-Nasr have 
brought the number of Palestinians in Lebanon to 500,000 and 600,000 
respectively stressing that resettling them means partitioning the country.  
 
viii This dimension receives additional support knowing that that 
unemployment in Lebanon is said to have exceeded 27 percent and that the 
demographic composition of the Lebanese society includes a formidable 
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percentage of 31 percent of foreigners (source Debate regarding Palestinian 
Presence in Lebanon MTV Television. Beirut, 11 November 1999). 
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I. TEXT 
 
In-text references are used with the full information of references placed at the back 
of the paper (in a section titled “References”).  When specifically referring to the 
author in the text, please use the following style CONSISTENTLY: 
a (Galtung, 1996, p. 2) 
b. Galtung (1996, p. 2)  
 
When listing multiple sources within text – (Alger, 1996; Axelrod, 1984). 
 
When unquestionably necessary, endnotes should be used. 
 
Single space endnotes, the main text, and block quotes.  
 
Indent for each paragraph; No extra spaces between paragraphs. 
 
Italicize titles of journals, documents, court cases, and books which are referred to in 
the text. 
  
For the first usage, spell out acronyms in full – e.g., Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). 
 
British and American spellings/formats may be used. For example, centre or center, 
programme or program, and 15 May 1995 or May 15, 1995 are accepted.  However, 
please maintain consistency throughout the text. 
 
Define terms clearly and, if possible, avoid jargon.  Do not use ibid, etc, or similar 
terms. 
 
Headings must be centered and in Bold.  Subheadings must be italicized (left 
justification).  Do not use all caps for either. 
 
Tables and figures must not be any larger than 6 1/2 inches by 8 1/2 inches.  Tables 
and figures must be in the same word processing program as the document. 
 
 
 
 
Do :   
 
1. use Word or Word Perfect 6.1 (or newer). 
2. be CONSISTENT within your manuscript. 
3. submit the text, endnotes, tables, figures, and references in ONE file 
document. 
 
Do not use: 
1. page headers or footers in the electronic version. 
2. page numbers or a title page in the electronic version. 
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List references alphabetically in the “References” section at the end of the paper. 
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Roman numerals need to be converted to arabic numerals, as in volume numbers of 
journals and books. 
 
Titles of books and journals must be italicized. 
 
Multiple citations of the same author should be listed with the most recent first. 
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